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

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President's Foreword

One can read many a journal that claims to provide wide-ranging or "international" perspectives on issues of world affairs and security but that only includes the opinions of writers from a relatively narrow circle. But as Wray Johnson details in his article in this issue, organizations risk learning the wrong lessons and even forgetting what they already know if they rely too heavily on the collective wisdom of only a few well-placed thinkers.

This point made, I am pleased to note that two of the four features in this issue are by internationals: Tamir Libel, a fellow at Kinneret College in Israel, and Michael Young, a regional director for the International Rescue Committee. Yet as their pieces show, the issues on which they are working are interconnected with those closer to home. Libel's article on the Israeli Defense Forces documents many parallels of doctrinal myopia that are echoed in Johnson's piece on the U.S. military. In his interview, Young discusses how the U.S. military and State Department played key roles in flood relief in Pakistan in 2010. All four pieces, including those by Johnson (of our faculty) and William Rosenau (of the Center for Naval Analyses and Georgetown University), also touch on the challenges of dealing with nonstate actors, from al-Qaeda and the Taliban to Hezbollah and the FARC.

In launching this journal and Marine Corps University Press, my predecessors in this position, Major General (Ret.) Donald R. Gardner and now-Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller, sought publications that would provide broad perspectives on international affairs and security. These works are instructive to our students at the university and also have relevance far beyond the gates of Quantico. The articles, interview, and book reviews in this issue provide an array of scholarship that benefit the military, academic, and policy communities. It is our hope that the issue will be widely read and discussed.

I thank all the people who wrote, edited, and designed this issue, as well as those who oversaw the work of the editors and designers, for their contributions to this impressive publication.

Thomas M. Murray
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps
President, Marine Corps University

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez.

Understanding Insurgent Intelligence Operations

by William Rosenau

Writing in 1996, Lincoln B. Krause observed that despite near-universal agreement among practitioners and theorists that insurgent success requires effective intelligence, "almost no specific writings on guerrilla intelligence exist."[1] Nearly 15 years later, consensus about the importance of such intelligence remains, and so does the gap in the literature. Authors such as David A. Charters have explored the acquisition and use of intelligence by individual armed groups, but with the exception of the work of J. Bowyer Bell and, more recently, Graham H. Turbiville Jr., there have been no systematic attempts to consider insurgent or "underground" intelligence from a comparative perspective.[2]

Addressing this analytical shortfall is of more than passing theoretical interest, given the increasing U.S. emphasis on irregular warfare, the strategic importance of which is equal to that of conventional war, according to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.[3] Understanding how intelligence contributes to the sustainment and success of insurgencies should be seen as an essential step

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[1] Lincoln B. Krause, "Insurgent Intelligence: The Guerrilla Grapevine," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 9 (1996): 291.

[2] See, for example, David A. Charters, "Eyes of the Underground: Jewish Insurgent Intelligence in Palestine, 1945-47," *Intelligence and National Security* 14 (Winter 1998): 163–77; J. Bowyer Bell, "The Armed Struggle and Underground Intelligence: An Overview," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 17 (1994); and Graham H. Turbiville Jr., *Guerrilla Counterinsurgency: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing Adversary Intelligence Operations*, JSOU Report 09-1 (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2009).

[3] U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3000.07, 1 December 2008, 2.

in devising strategies and policies for countering the violent substate groups that play so prominent a role in ongoing conflicts in South Asia, the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa.

A brief consideration of intelligence at its most general level and a review of the "disciplines" of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action, as employed by sophisticated state services, will be addressed first. This discussion will be familiar to intelligence specialists, but it provides a necessary context for the subsequent analysis, which explores how, and for what purposes, insurgent groups employ these disciplines. The article will conclude with a set of thoughts about what policies the U.S. government should consider as part of any thoroughgoing effort to counter contemporary insurgencies.

Before beginning, two caveats are in order. First, each of the armed groups that play a particularly large part in the discussion on insurgent intelligence—namely, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and al-Qaeda—have at one time or another been labeled as "terrorist," and so some readers may object to their categorization here as "insurgent" groups. While acknowledging that this terminology is problematic (as discussed at the beginning of the insurgent intelligence section below), it is hoped that readers will accept their inclusion, if only for the sake of argument.[4]

Quite simply, there is much that we do not know about insurgent intelligence activities.

Second, and more importantly, this article does not purport to offer comprehensive treatment of the subject. Quite simply, there is much that we do not know about insurgent intelligence activities. Relatively "glamorous" features of insurgency, such as the use of violence, technology, and propaganda, have commanded considerable attention from academic and policy-oriented researchers. Like other clandestine organizations, insurgents make considerable efforts to conceal or obscure their activities, and this is no doubt a challenge. But, as the substantial sociological and anthropological literature on organized crime, cults, and "new religious movements" suggests, researchers are able to gain access to interview subjects within "closed" organizations.[5]

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[4] For a discussion of the use of language by incumbents during one counterinsurgency campaign, see Phillip Deery, "The Terminology of Terrorism: Malaya, 1948–52," *Journal of Southeast Asia Studies* 34 (June 2003): 231–47. For stylistic reasons, the terms "armed groups" and "insurgent groups" are used interchangeably.

Among other aims, this essay is a plea for an analytical rebalancing that places less emphasis on the sanguinary drama of insurgency and more on the quotidian aspects of armed groups, to include their administrative, logistical, and of course, intelligence structures and operations. In the absence of more substantial data, some critical questions must remain unanswered, including a central one: what is the ultimate contribution of intelligence to the "armed struggle"? For the purposes of this article, we will continue to share the belief among practitioners and scholars that Krause averred in 1996, namely, that intelligence is critical to insurgent success.

Intelligence is critical to insurgent success.

"Shamans and Soothsayers"

Intelligence has been the subject of academic inquiry for 50 years, but as David Kahn concludes, the call among scholars for a theory of intelligence has been unmet, due in large part, in his judgment, to the fact that no one has proposed concepts that can be tested.[6] By behavioralist standards, a theory of intelligence certainly seems unlikely, given that the secrecy surrounding intelligence activities is likely to thwart the "observability" requirements erected by behavioralism. Assessing the epistemological merits of Kahn's judgment is beyond the scope of this article; however, it does seem fair to say that some general propositions about intelligence are possible, even if those propositions do not meet the formal requirements of theory. Moreover, as a practical matter, a framework is essential if researchers are to avoid "death by drowning or, at least, mental collapse in a sea of information," as Peter Gill and Mark Phytian have noted.[7]

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[5] See, for example, David G. Bromley and J. Gordon Melton, eds., *Cults, Religion and Violence* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Donatella della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

[6] David Kahn, "An Historical Theory of Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 16 (Autumn 2001): 79.

What general propositions about intelligence might usefully be put forward? The first concerns the purpose of intelligence. Sherman Kent, a pioneering figure in the development of "analytical tradecraft" within the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), positioned intelligence within the behavioralist paradigm that dominated mid-20th-century American social science and went so far as to describe it as a branch of social-scientific inquiry. For Kent, intelligence was a knowledge-generating enterprise intended to predict future behavior in the international sphere, particularly at the strategic level.[8]

Today, few intelligence specialists share Kent's confidence in the predictive power of intelligence analysis or, more generally, social science. However, the promise of a glimpse into the future—no matter how incomplete, imprecise, or imperfect that glimpse may be—retains a powerful allure for decision makers. Sir Percy Cradock, a former chairman of Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee, put the matter nicely: "We were members of an older and shadier fraternity, all those who over the centuries have claimed to read the future for their masters: the shamans and soothsayers, sybils and readers of entrails, Macaulay's 'pale augurs muttering low.'"[9]

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[7] Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Cambridge, UK, and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006), 21–22.

[8] For more on Kent, see Harold P. Ford, "A Tribute to Sherman Kent," *Studies in Intelligence* (Fall 1980), accessed 9 September 2009, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/1tribute.html. For a critique of Kent's approach, see Gary J. Schmitt and Abram N. Shulsky, "Leo Straus and the World of Intelligence (By Which We Do Not Mean *Nous*)," in *Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American Regime*, eds. Kenneth L. Deutsch and John A. Murley (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 407–12.

Intelligence, then, has (or should have) a fundamentally practical purpose, namely, the ability to help policy makers anticipate future behavior and events. Ideally, such foreknowledge bestows a relative security advantage over a nation's adversary or adversaries.[10] Intelligence should be seen as a weapon to be wielded along with diplomatic, political, economic, and military instruments in a nation's struggle with its adversaries, which were states in Kent's era, but today increasingly are transnational and nonstate actors.

Intelligence should be seen as a weapon to be wielded along with diplomatic, political, economic, and military instruments.

Unlike pure scholarship, intelligence is not an end unto itself, but rather a means to an end. As mentioned above, the "customers" for this knowledge are individuals in positions of power (in Kent's time, the U.S. president above all others, but today, a much broader set of civilian and military figures). Moreover, intelligence is predictive knowledge of a specialized kind. In its ideal form, intelligence is "targeted," "actionable," and designed explicitly to service the demands of its intended audiences.[11]

Finally, a few words are required on the role of secrecy in intelligence. Open-source information plays a role in the analytical process of state services. But those services are expected to provide something unique to their political masters. Many individuals, including journalists and academic specialists, can provide penetrating analytical insights, but only intelligence services can generate analysis that is derived in large measure from information that target countries, as well as nonstate groups, commit vast resources to protect, namely secrets. As will be discussed in more detail below, open-source information plays a role in the analytical process, but the collection and analysis of information that one's opponents wish to keep secret is an intelligence service's unique added value. Acquiring (or less politely, stealing) and processing information that national opponents are attempting to keep hidden is the extent that the CIA, Britain's MI6 (officially, the Secret Intelligence Service), or any other state service contributes to policy making and national security.

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[9] Percy Cradock, *In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major* (London: Murray, 1997), 37.

[10] Gill and Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 1.

[11] Andrew Rathmell, "Towards Postmodern Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 17 (Autumn 2002): 88–89.

Intelligence Disciplines

To provide a more detailed framework for analyzing underground intelligence activities, the following section offers an overview of two of the primary disciplines of intelligence: foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.[12] This section also explores covert action, an associated or "allied" activity that is to some degree separate and distinct from the "core" missions of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. These three elements are discussed in the context of state intelligence services, and this section is intended to serve as a baseline to be used during the subsequent analysis of insurgent intelligence operations.

Foreign Intelligence

In the broadest sense, foreign intelligence aims at understanding externally generated threats to national security. It is worth noting, however, that all types of regimes—democratic, "less than democratic," authoritarian, and totalitarian—also apply the tactics, techniques, and procedures of foreign intelligence against domestic "targets." The nature of contemporary transnational threats has served to erode whatever "bright line" existed between foreign and domestic intelligence.

Foreign intelligence is often described as a cycle composed of stages: requirements (i.e., planning), collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination to civilian policy makers and military commanders.

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[12] Gill and Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 5.

According to a CIA description of the process, "the policy makers—the recipients of finished intelligence—then make decisions based on the information, and these decisions may lead to the levying of more requirements, thus triggering the Intelligence Cycle."[13] Put another way, foreign intelligence is the product of a system that gathers and transforms (in a structured way) raw information into a form that is useful to national security decision makers.

In the broadest terms, modes of collection fall into two categories: technical and human intelligence. Technical collection includes the interception of electronic communications, telemetry from missile tests, and the electromagnetic emanations from military equipment such as radar transmitters (known collectively as signals intelligence, or SIGINT), and the gathering of photographic imagery.[14] Human intelligence collection (HUMINT) is in essence the use of agents to collect information about a target. For most people, this is the connotation of the term "spying"—the suborning of individuals, typically those holding a position of trust and responsibility within a given nation's civil service, diplomatic corps, or security forces. Falling outside these two broad conceptual containers is open-source information (OSINT), such as print and electronic media. Within the U.S. intelligence community, and within the intelligence services of countries such as the United Kingdom, the consensus is that open-source information should (and indeed does) inform analysis, but that its contribution is necessarily secondary when compared with technical or human intelligence.[15]

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[13] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "The Intelligence Cycle," n.d., accessed 9 September 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/facttell/intcycle.htm.

[14] For more on signals intelligence, see James Bamford, *The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America* (New York: Anchor Books, 2009); and "Special Issue on 'Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond,'" *Intelligence and National Security* 16 (Spring 2001).

[15] For more on open-source intelligence and the U.S. intelligence community, see Richard A. Best Jr. and Alfred Cumming, *Open Source Intelligence* (OSINT): *Issues for Congress*, CRS (Congressional Research Service) Report for Congress, RL342705 (Washington, DC, 2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ intel/RL34270.pdf.

Counterintelligence

The vast bulk of academic studies on intelligence have focused on foreign intelligence. Counterintelligence, in contrast, remains underinvestigated and neglected in the academic world, as well as in broader policy communities.[16] Robert Jervis is surely correct in attributing this lack of attention to the discipline's unglamorous and even seedy reputation; in his view, counterintelligence "smacks of police work."[17] The contested legacy of James J. Angleton, the CIA's Cold War counterintelligence chief, continues to resonate within the U.S. intelligence community and beyond.[18] In addition, the very nature of the craft, with its necessary emphasis on practicing as well as uncovering deception, has no doubt contributed to its reputation as a devious, if not altogether tainted, activity.

Undoubtedly, however, effective foreign intelligence is impossible without effective counterintelligence. Broadly speaking, the principal target of counterintelligence is the intelligence activities of an adversary. As with foreign intelligence, it includes an ongoing cycle of planning/ requirements, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Counterintelligence not only contains passive elements aimed at protecting personnel and information from rival intelligence services and rooting out suspected traitors, but it also includes "active" or "offensive" measures "to degrade the competitor's intelligence capability or manipulate the competitor's decisions to achieve a policy

> *Counterintelligence… remains underinvestigated and neglected in the academic world.*

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[16] See, for example, *Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), chap. 11.

[17] Robert Jervis, "Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Perception and Deception," in *Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence*, eds. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 69.

[18] For a recent scholarly treatment of Angleton, see Michael Holzman, *James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, and the Craft of Counterintelligence* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008).

outcome."[19] In the realm of offensive counterintelligence, deception assumes a position of particular prominence. Deception, according to Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt,

> is the attempt to mislead an adversary's intelligence analysis concerning the political, military, or economic situation he faces and to induce him, on the basis of those errors, to act in a way that advances one's own interests rather than his. It is considered a form of counterintelligence because it attempts to thwart a major purpose of the adversary's intelligence operations; in addition, it often involves counterintelligence methods, such as double-agent operations.[20]

Successful deception, particularly at a strategic level, is an expensive, time-consuming, and potentially dangerous activity.

Covert Action

Finally, there is the "discipline" of covert action. The word is placed in quotation marks to indicate that some controversy exists about its usage in the present context. In the view of some scholars, covert action is outside the realm of what should be considered intelligence. According to Michael Herman, for example, "intelligence is information and information gathering, not *doing* things to people; no one gets hurt by it, at least not directly."[21] Within the U.S. national security establishment, covert action certainly is considered an intelligence activity, but the term is rarely part of the lexicon of non-U.S. services. Today in the United States, covert action is as much a legal concept as it is an operational one. Since 1974, Congress has asserted statutory control over covert action, requiring, among other things, that the president formally authorize (through a "finding") such activities and notify the relevant congressional committees in a timely fashion.[22] Technically, only the CIA can conduct covert operations; organizations like the Department of Defense can only carry out "clandestine" activities, although such distinctions can sometimes dissolve in practice.

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[19] Vincent H. Bridgeman, "Defense Counterintelligence Reconceptualized," in Sims and Gerber, *Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks*, 128.

[20] Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993), 132.

[21] Michael Herman, "Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001," *Intelligence and National Security*, 19 (2002): 342. Emphasis in the original.

What do we mean, precisely, by covert action? As Herman suggests, the key word here is "action." Unlike core intelligence functions, covert action is not intended to generate predictive, actionable information for policy makers, although that can sometimes be a secondary effect. Rather, covert action is meant to advance national objectives more directly. As defined by Shulsky and Schmitt, covert action is "some secret activity to influence the behavior of a foreign government or political, military, economic, or societal events and circumstances in a foreign country."[23] In popular usage, "covert action" connotes plots to topple foreign governments (in Iran and Guatemala during the 1950s, for example) or programs to support indigenous resistance movements (such as the Hmong "secret army" in Laos during the 1960s and 1970s and the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s). In reality, most covert operations have been far more mundane and have included activities such as intelligence support to foreign governments, the creation and maintenance of front groups, and assistance to political parties.[24]

Insurgent Intelligence

The following section explores intelligence as organized and practiced by insurgent groups. This analysis draws heavily, but by no means exclusively, on the activities and organizations of Lebanese Hezbollah and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). An obvious selection bias is at work here, due largely to the fact that the intelligence-related activities of these groups have received much attention from journalists and analysts. Simply stated, open-source information on Hezbollah and PIRA is more plentiful than it is on other contemporary armed groups. Despite this selection bias, there is a compelling reason for drawing heavily on these two organizations: both Hezbollah and PIRA have been "high-performance" armed groups that have made considerable investments in intelligence activities and can be seen as the "gold standard" of insurgent capabilities and performance and thus probably represent the most formidable adversaries the United States is likely to face.

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[22] For a summary of the legislative history and requirements surrounding covert action, see Alfred Cumming, *Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL333715 (Washington, DC, 2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33715.pdf.

[23] Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 85.

[24] For more on what he terms the "principles" of covert action, see Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 120–79.

A substantial body of literature argues that components of al-Qaeda are waging what must be characterized as an insurgency.

The following analysis also considers the intelligence-related writings of violent jihadists associated with al-Qaeda. Including it in an analysis of insurgent intelligence is problematic, since al-Qaeda is not universally regarded as an insurgency. But there are two persuasive reasons for bringing it into the discussion. First, although no general agreement on the subject exists, a substantial body of literature argues that components of al-Qaeda are waging what must be characterized as an insurgency, albeit in a "nontraditional" (i.e., non-Maoist) form.[25] Second, theorists and practitioners across the al-Qaeda firmament have produced substantial writings on the subject of intelligence.[26] Given the scale and scope of the violent jihadist challenge to U.S. national security interests—regardless of whether those threats are strictly "insurgent"—one would be mistaken to ignore this rich vein of discourse.

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[25] See, for example, Karen J. Greenberg, ed., *Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists* (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3–26; and David Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux," *Survival* 48 (Winter 2006–2007): 111–30.

[26] See, for example, Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery; The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass*, trans. William McCants (Cambridge: John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 2006), accessed 18 September 2009, http://ctc.usma.edu/ publications/naji.asp.

This section considers in turn the three intelligence disciplines discussed in the preceding section. Before examining these elements, however, a few general comments on the purpose, nature, and requirements of underground intelligence are in order. As with state intelligence, insurgent intelligence is an auxiliary activity and a means to an end. Intelligence preparation helps reduce risk and instills intangible benefits like operational confidence. Within armed groups, it involves careful, even obsessive, attention to intelligence planning and collection, and analysis appears aimed at satisfying a psychological requirement for assurance.[27] Investments in intelligence necessarily entail opportunity costs; funds, personnel, training, and other resources that are employed for intelligence purposes are resources that cannot be applied to other important insurgent activities. Intelligence must demonstrate its utility, and for armed groups, this comes down to two things: identifying and providing information on appropriate targets, and protecting the organization, particularly from traitors.

Intelligence organs of successful armed groups are distinguished by their professionalism, their ruthlessness, and their commitment to nonideological expediency.

Armed groups require structure if they hope to become more than tactical irritants to their adversaries. The most sophisticated insurgent intelligence structures and operations, such as those of Hezbollah, have been characterized as state-like in their reach and effectiveness.[28] "The emergence of more sophisticated, specialized structures, including dedicated intelligence organs, is an indicator that an insurgency has advanced along an evolutionary path. At their most robust and formidable, these intelligence structures are part of the insurgent "para-state," a parallel underground governance structure that challenges the state's Weberian monopoly on the use of force.[29] Groups as diverse as the PIRA, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) established "guerrilla states" with robust security intelligence structures at their centers.[30]

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[27] Gaetano Joe Ilardi, "Al Qaeda's Operational Intelligence: A Key Prerequisite to Action," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31 (2008): 1090.

[28] Alex Fishman, "The IDF's Long Ear," *Yedi'ot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), 19 September 2008.

Intelligence organs of successful armed groups are distinguished by their professionalism, their ruthlessness, and their commitment to nonideological expediency. "An armed struggle introduces a very harsh reality to rebel assumptions," according to J. Bowyer Bell.[31] At the strategic level, the rebel's "ideological filter" is generally switched off. But at the tactical level, the failure to switch it back on and to accept reality in a form that is as undistorted as possible has potentially lethal consequences.[32] Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, is one recent example of an insurgent commander whose ideological rigidity blinded him to the shifting "correlation of forces" on the ground.

Insurgent Foreign Intelligence

Every armed group—indeed, every organization—devotes resources to the challenge of understanding the environment in which it operates and, toward that end, collects and processes information from a variety of sources.[33] Variations in that operating environment generate differing intelligence requirements, structures, and methods of operation. Writing primarily about insurgencies in

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[29] Gill and Pythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 55.

[30] Brynjar Lia, *A Police Force Without a State: A History of the Palestinian Security Forces in the West Bank and Gaza* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2006), 40.

[31] J. Bowyer Bell, *The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998), 126.

[32] Ibid., 127.

[33] Benjamin I. Higginbotham, "On Deceiving Terrorists" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), 74.

Cold War–era Southeast Asia and Latin America, Lincoln Krause delineates these elements for various phases of Maoist "people's war"—guerrilla and mobile warfare, stalemate, and strategic counteroffensive.[34] However, while still useful in terms of analyzing the intelligence requirements, structures, and activities of some contemporary insurgent groups (for example, the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army), the people's war framework, with its imbedded concepts of popular mobilization, base areas, and subversion of government institutions, is less applicable to what has been termed the "post-Maoist" insurgents of Iraq, Afghanistan, and West Africa.[35]

Every armed group…devotes resources to the challenge of understanding the environment in which it operates.

Instead, one might consider a simple typology for insurgent foreign intelligence, what might be termed the "minimalist" and "maximalist" approaches. Generally speaking, successful armed groups are "learning" organizations that continuously adapt and evolve in the face of the challenges posed by their adversaries and by their operating environment.[36] Such groups, like any human institutions, naturally make mistakes, but in general they conserve resources carefully, doing no more or no less than what is required of them. If strategic intelligence on an adversary is needed, it will be produced; if not, resources will be directed elsewhere. In other instances, resources permit—and circumstances demand—that an armed group commit itself to acquiring a full-spectrum intelligence capability, including signals intelligence. At their most state-like, insurgent groups have formal structures to support both current operations and strategic planning. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a guerrilla separatist group in Sri Lanka, used specialists for each phase of the intelligence cycle, including "a formally trained cadre of intelligence operatives whose only responsibility [was] long-term intelligence collection and analysis of potential and real targets," according to Kevin A. O'Brien.[37] The minimalist approach is represented by the PIRA, a relatively small but highly capable armed group that faced a police- and intelligence-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaign for the final two decades of its active life. Hezbollah, a movement with a near-conventional-level military capability, represents the maximalist approach.

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[34] Krause, "Guerrilla Grapevine," 292–307.

[35] For more on post-Maoist insurgency, see Frank G. Hoffman, "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?" *Parameters* 37 (Summer 2007):71–87; and John Mackinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

[36] Brian A. Jackson and John C. Baker, *Aptitude for Destruction*, vol. 1, *Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), particularly 17–72.

The Minimalist Model

For the PIRA, intelligence requirements were modest, namely, identifying targets for attack, conducting surveillance, and maintaining security. For the PIRA leadership, strategic intelligence intended to inform policy at the highest level was unnecessary, since strategy was essentially a given—employ force, or the threat of force, to drive the British out—and long-range planning was also considered unnecessary. Intelligence served immediate, tactical imperatives. Active service units (ASUs), the PIRA's operationally autonomous (but not politically independent) armed cells, typically designated individuals as intelligence officers, but in reality, every volunteer was expected to gather, if not analyze, intelligence.[38] This approach, in which everyone is expected to "do" intelligence, is replicated in many other insurgent groups. Within each of the fronts of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), for

For the PIRA…intelligence served immediate, tactical imperatives.

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[37] Kevin A. O'Brien, "Assessing Hostile Reconnaissance and Terrorist Intelligence Activities: The Case for a Counter Strategy," *RUSI Journal* 153 (October 2008): 36.

[38] Tim Pat Coogan, *The I.R.A.* (London: HarperCollins, 2000), 238.

example, exist a formally designated intelligence unit; however, according to one former front commander, every front member is expected to serve as an intelligence collector.[39]

Intelligence for the PIRA was a process of accretion, the ant-like piling up of countless bits of information on potential targets. Open-source data often proved to be extremely valuable, particularly with respect to the PIRA campaign on the British mainland, and rich pickings were gleaned from publications such as *Who's Who,* the *Army List,* and the *Civil Service Year Book.*[40] In the words of Eamon Collins, a PIRA volunteer who later turned against the organization, "I began to learn the importance of building up character profiles, of gathering all kinds of intelligence—no matter how trivial or seemingly irrelevant—and how to be selective, to question people without them realizing you were looking for information."[41] Deeply embedded in the Catholic community, and exercising varying degrees of control over that population,[42] the PIRA was able to draw on a large human resource pool—a republican Argus, as it were—for intelligence collection and target surveillance purposes. Collins describes his recruitment "pitch" to a television repairman, whose job placed him in an ideal position to serve as a source for the PIRA:

> Don't worry. I don't want much. Just pass on wee bits here and there. I don't want you to endanger yourself. Just open your eyes a wee bit more when you're out and about. You'll see soldiers about the place. You mightn't think it's important, but it could be important to me. You might hear something in conversation; you talk to a lot of Prods [Protestants]. They might just drop something. All I want you to do is to open your eyes when you're out in your van.[43]

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[39] Author's interviews with former FARC commanders, Bogotá, Colombia, 2 April 2009.

[40] C.J.M. Drake, "The Provisional IRA: A Case Study," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3 (1991): 53.

[41] Eamon Collins with Mick McGovern, *Killing Rage* (London: Granta Books, 1997), 16.

[42] For more on this point, see Lindsay Clutterbuck and William Rosenau, "Subversion as a Facet of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Case for A Twenty-First Century Approach," *Strategic Insights* 8 (August 2009).

[43] Collins, *Killing Rage*, 91.

This base also allowed the PIRA to extend its reach into the administrative apparatus of the British state. For example, informants within public housing authorities had access to comprehensive information on residents. Sympathetic engineers could give the PIRA entrée to government telephone systems.[44] And an informant inside a tax or social security agency could help the PIRA identify individuals who were spending beyond their means and were therefore potentially vulnerable to blackmail or intimidation.

As mentioned above, the PIRA had no specialized structures for foreign intelligence collection or analysis. This lack of institutional structure freed the PIRA from administrative and logistical burdens and kept the PIRA's organizational footprint to a minimum. But this absence had a cost. Personal experience and individual knowledge and expertise lay at the heart of PIRA intelligence, and as Bell observes, "Such experience is regularly depleted by time, arrests, and negligence."[45] This personalism—with expertise resident in individuals as opposed to the "corporate" PIRA—almost certainly hindered the organization's ability to adapt to new and evolving challenges.

Intelligence for the PIRA was a process of accretion, the ant-like piling up of countless bits of information on potential targets.

The Maximalist Model

With its nonexistent formal intelligence structure, its emphasis on planning the next attack, and its reliance on the eyes and ears of the communities in which it was embedded, the PIRA represents insurgent intelligence minimalism. Lebanese Hezbollah is an outstanding example of insurgent intelligence maximalism, displaying the full spectrum of capabilities. In the judgment of some analysts, Hezbollah's intelligence operations are the most effective of any actor—state or nonstate—in Lebanon. Indeed, Hezbollah consciously attempts to operate in the manner of a state intelligence service. As one senior field commander in southern Beirut told a reporter, "we are trying to fight Israel with the same intelligence weapons that it fights us with. We are trying to develop the reconnaissance methods and understand how they think and what they may do."[46]

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[44] Peter Taylor, *Brits: The War Against the IRA* (London: Bloomsbury, 2001), 158.

[45] Bell, *Secret Army*, 253.

Relatively little is known about the organization of Hezbollah's intelligence apparatus, but given the apparent scope and depth of its signals and human intelligence collection efforts, it seems safe to assume that a relatively robust structure is in place. Moreover, assistance to Hezbollah from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards has reportedly included training on organizational matters such as the creation of specialized intelligence units.[47]

Hezbollah consciously attempts to operate in the manner of a state intelligence service.

Hezbollah's signals intelligence capabilities arguably surpass those of any other contemporary insurgent group. During the 2006 Lebanon war, Hezbollah intelligence personnel reportedly eavesdropped electronically on Israeli Defense Force (IDF) units both inside and outside of Israel and relayed information of operational use to local Hezbollah commanders. In so doing, they caused considerable damage to IDF operations, according to some observers.[48] "We were able to monitor Israeli communications and we used this information to adjust our planning," according to another Hezbollah commander.[49] Even before the war, dozens of fluent Hebrew speakers within Hezbollah translated mobile telephone conversations intercepted inside Israel and gathered open-source intelligence through the Israeli press to gauge public opinion and morale.[50]

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[46] "Hizbullah's Intelligence Apparatus," *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor* (online edition), 13 September 2006.

[47] Steven Erlanger and Richard A Oppel, "A Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel With Its Training, Tactics, and Weapons," *New York Times*, 7 August 2006, accessed 4 September 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/world/middleeast/07hezbollah.html.

[48] Ze'ev Schiff, "Hezbollah listened in on IDF beepers, cell phones," *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv), 10 April 2006, accessed 3 September 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/770043.html; and Caroline B. Glick, "As the Storm of War Approaches," *Jerusalem Post*, 6 October 2006, accessed 3 September 2009, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=1&cid=1159193378736&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.

Hezbollah's capabilities, however, extend well beyond signals and open-source intelligence. The organization relies heavily on human networks inside Lebanon, across the border in Israel, and, according to some reports, into the United States.[51] According to the Shin Bet, Israel's domestic security service, Hezbollah has made a major effort to recruit Arab citizens of Israel, particularly those who served in the IDF.[52] Assessing the impact of this reported recruitment effort is difficult, although one Middle East intelligence official has claimed that agents helped Hezbollah procure "very detailed and modern military maps about Israel's sensitive military and infrastructure sites . . . showing military bases and other strategic places."[53] During the 2006 war, Hezbollah intelligence operatives gathered much useful tactical intelligence among the civilian population; the organization also reportedly recruited agents within the South Lebanon Army (SLA), finding relatively easy pickings among its poorly motivated ranks. These reported recruitments did more than generate high-quality military information. The inclusion of civilian informants and

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[49] Paul McLeary, "Motive and Means: High-Tech Weapons Are Now a Staple of Insurgencies," *Defense Technology International* 2 (2008): 42.

[50] Ibid. Hezbollah has also reportedly gathered information on IDF personnel through social networking services like Facebook. Turbiville, *Guerrilla Counterinsurgency*, 61.

[51] Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, "Hezbollah: Signs of a Sophisticated Intelligence Apparatus," *STRATFOR*, 12 December 2007, accessed 29 July 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/hezbollah_signs_sophisticated_intelligence_apparatus. In 2007, a Lebanese-born CIA officer, Nada Nadim Prouty, pleaded guilty to charges that she unlawfully attempted to gain access to classified information on Hezbollah. While there is no evidence that Prouty and her co-conspirators passed information to the group, the plot suggests to some analysts that Hezbollah has established a "sophisticated intelligence apparatus" that has reached into the U.S. intelligence community.

[52] Yosi Melman, "The Prying Game" *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv), 23 July 2006, accessed 30 July 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=741443.

[53] "Hizbullah's Intelligence Apparatus."

SLA personnel in Hezbollah's intelligence networks contributed substantially to its information operations by reinforcing the perceptions of the group's prowess and indeed invincibility, with "nothing . . . apparently, hidden from its eyes."[54]

Insurgent Counterintelligence

Recounting his experiences as a leader of Irgun Zvai Leumi in Mandate Palestine, Menachim Begin concluded that, for the underground, "the informer is the most terrible of its enemies."[55] What was true for the Irgun remains true for every armed group today. State intelligence structures, and the regimes they support, can survive treason. Insurgent groups are more fragile, and the "enemy within" is likely to cause far more damage than he or she would inside an incumbent regime. For groups operating in particularly hostile environments, security lapses of any kind can have devastating consequences. For the jihadists, the need for security is paramount; all planning and operations, and indeed, everything the organizations undertake, is subordinate to this imperative.[56]

State intelligence structures, and the regimes they support, can survive treason. Insurgent groups are more fragile.

To understand the particular threat that turncoats pose to armed underground groups, it is well worth returning to Bell, who argues persuasively that such movements are fundamentally faith-based organizations in which the maintenance of a revolutionary or liberationist ideal is paramount. As Bell explains,

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[54] Ron Schleifer, "Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah Versus Israel," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 1–19. This is reminiscent of "Democratic Kampuchea," where the Khmer Rouge fostered an impression of omnipotence through surveillance: "Nothing escaped the vigilant eyes of the authorities who, according to one slogan, had 'as many eyes as a pineapple.'" Stéphane Courtois and Mark Kramer, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 606.

[55] Menachim Begin, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1951), 102.

[56] Gaetano Joe Ilardi, "Al-Qaeda's Counterintelligence Doctrine: The Pursuit of Operational Certainty and Control," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 22 (2009): 250.

> Every movement fears the informer, the once faithful now corrupt. This is the great revolutionary crime: plagiarism for the scholar, cowardice for the soldier, heresy for the saint, and informing for the gunman and the guerrilla. To betray one's faith, one's own fellows, implies a weakness not only in the villain but also in the faith. . . . Ideologically, it is disastrous and operationally, deadly.[57]

It is understandable, therefore, why every insurgent organization makes a considerable investment in internal security and passive counterintelligence. In the insurgents' operating environment, dangers can lurk everywhere, but perhaps no more so than within their own ranks. The passive counterintelligence principles employed by groups like the PIRA and Hezbollah are universal and applicable to state as well as nonstate organizations. These principles included the strict adherence to the "need to know" policy, compartmentalization, and the requirement to debrief personnel who have been detained by the security forces, both to detect signs that an individual has been "turned" and to gain insights on the adversary's tactics, techniques, procedures, and priorities. Capture and interrogation present particular dangers. Not only is there the possibility that secrets will be revealed, but detention can also serve as a venue for recruitment into the enemy's ranks. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that jihadi literature is replete with guidance on resisting interrogation techniques,[58] and the PIRA carefully trained volunteers to resist interrogation through silence and other methods.[59]

More generally, insurgent organizational culture can foster a climate of internal suspicion intended to promote vigilance against

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[57] Bell, *Dynamics of the Armed Struggle*, 52–53.

[58] See, for example, Abdul Aziz al-Abeani, "The School of Prophet Joseph" *Sada al-Malahim* 2 (2008): 26.

[59] Tony Geraghty, *The Irish War: The Military History of a Domestic Conflict* (London: HarperCollins, 1998), 87.

(and deterrence of) treachery. A former FARC commander explained it this way: "Everyone watches everyone. This is ingrained in every guerrilla. It is accepted that it's your obligation to report suspicious activity. There is no regard for rank. You are expected to report on your superiors."[60] In a period of organizational, operational, and political decline for the FARC during recent years, a climate of suspicion apparently helped thwart mass defections since individuals were typically unwilling to ask others to join them as they left the movement. For example, a FARC commander's wife, who served in the same front, defected a month before he did, and without telling him in advance.[61]

Insurgent organizational culture can foster a climate of internal suspicion intended to promote vigilance against (and deterrence of) treachery.

In the case of the high-performing armed groups discussed in this article, the internal security imperative led to the creation of specialized counterintelligence units. Hezbollah's "preventive intelligence" unit is responsible for communications security and the prevention of "the penetration of foreign agents into its ranks," according to one press account.[62] Within the PIRA, the Internal Security Unit (ISU)—the notorious "Nutting Squad"—was responsible for vetting recruits and for identifying, rooting out (typically through protracted torture of suspects), and eliminating informants or "touts."[63] The squad was the one centralized structure with respect to PIRA intelligence. Its remit extended across the active service units (ASUs), reporting directly to the PIRA's general headquarters. Such specialized units are obviously intended to strengthen defensive counterintelligence, but these structures can generate new and unintended vulnerabilities for their organizations, as demonstrated in the case of the ISU. A centralized security unit was an irresistible target for the British security forces. The ISU "had an intimate and unrivalled knowledge of the organization's affairs. . . . It was the Achilles' heel," concludes Ed Moloney.[64] British military intelligence was able to recruit an informant within the squad, Alfredo "Scap" Scappaticci (codenamed "Stakeknife"), who, for an astonishing 25 years, provided vast amounts of sensitive and "actionable" information on the PIRA leadership and operations. "With Stakeknife in place," according to Martin Ingram and Greg Harkin, "the IRA effectively had no internal security."[65]

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[60] Author's interview, Bogotá, Columbia, 2 April 2009.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Melman, "Prying Game."

[63] PIRA counterintelligence also reportedly uncovered and disrupted the Four Square Laundry operation, an effort by the British Army's Military Reaction Force to gather intelligence on terrorist suspects. Ed Maloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 118–22.

Most of the counterintelligence practiced by insurgent groups could be classified as passive. But for the high-performing organizations considered in this article, counterintelligence is not limited to protective or defensive measures. As is the case with state intelligence services, insurgent counterintelligence can also take an aggressive or offensive form. At the most basic level, offensive insurgence counterintelligence includes efforts to delineate the goals, structures, and policies of the adversary's intelligence services. During the late 1980s, al-Qaeda's precursor organization, the Afghan Service Bureau (Mekhtah al-Khidemat, or MAK), produced an eleven-volume *Al-Jihad Encylopedia* on guerrilla tactics and operations, bomb making, and intelligence and security.[66] The encyclopedia contains a detailed, if sometimes fanciful, discussion of Israeli intelligence structures, tradecraft, and liaison relationships with foreign services. Other writings serve an exhortative and even psychological function for militants by exposing and "demystifying" what many jihadists believe to be an omnipotent and omnipresent U.S. intelligence community. For example, Muhammad Khalil Al-Hakaymah's *The Myth of Delusion* uses open sources to identify structural and other weaknesses in American intelligence and to demonstrate to the faithful that the might of the U.S. colossus is in fact limited and can be challenged successfully.[67]

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[64] Ed Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA* (London: Penguin, 2002), 335.

[65] Martin Ingram and Greg Harkin, *Stakeknife: Britain's Secret Agents in Ireland* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 97. For more on the subsequent controversy over Stakeknife, see Rosie Cowan, "He Did the IRA's Dirty Work for 25 Years—and Was Paid £80,000 a Year by the Government," *Guardian* (London), 12 May 2003, accessed 20 July 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/may/12/northernireland.northernireland1.

[66] Ilardi, "Al Qaeda's Operational Intelligence," 1094, n. 11. The author thanks G. J. Ilardi for generously sharing intelligence-related material from these volumes.

More ambitiously, armed groups will attempt to, and sometimes succeed in, disrupting the intelligence-gathering activities of their adversaries. "Blinding" the enemy through the targeting of personnel and informants is one approach. During the Anglo-Irish War, the PIRA's "Squad," working under Michael Collins, director of PIRA intelligence, carried out what might be termed "lethal" counterintelligence operations. Directed against the Royal Irish Constabulary's "G" Division, which gathered intelligence on the republican leadership, the Squad targeted and assassinated detectives in an explicit attempt to blind British intelligence in Ireland.[68]

The Irgun studied PIRA intelligence operations closely and gleaned important lessons, most notably, the need to paralyze British intelligence operations.[69] These studies apparently paid off handsomely, for according to Begin, "the Hebrew underground smote the intelligence hip and thigh."[70] On a contemporary note, jihad theorist Abu Bakr Najr has written that destroying "stool pigeons and informants" has a devastating effect on the "secret police of the enemy," which is unable to operate without the information supplied by these traitors.[71] In Afghanistan, the Taliban has reportedly waged campaigns in contested districts to identify and root out local residents suspected of supplying information to U.S. and Afghan government forces.[72]

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[67] Brian Fishman, *Al-Qaeda's Spymaster Analyzes the U.S. Intelligence Community* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, 2006), accessed 5 July 2009, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/research_fishman.asp.

[68] John F. Murphy Jr, "Michael Collins and the Craft of Intelligence," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 17 (2004): 342–45. For more on these operations and the so-called "Secret War," see T. Ryle Dwyer, *The Squad and the Intelligence Operations of Michael Collins* (Cork, Ireland: Mercier Press, 2005).

[69] Charters, "Eyes of the Underground," 170.

[70] Begin, *The Revolt*, 97.

[71] Abu Bakr Naji, *Management of Savagery*, sec. 4.

Examples of sophisticated counterintelligence-related deceptions of state intelligence services by armed groups are more difficult to find. One example—perhaps not a surprising one, given its overall intelligence prowess—involves Hezbollah. Echoing the British "Double Cross System" employed with devastating effect against Nazi intelligence, Hezbollah reportedly was able to "turn" members of an Israeli spy ring during the 2006 war in Lebanon and feed back to Israel false information about militia emplacements.[73]

Armed groups will attempt to, and sometimes succeed in, disrupting the intelligence-gathering activities of their adversaries.

Infiltration of military and police services is a well-established component of many insurgent campaigns, as demonstrated in South Vietnam, Iraq, and now Afghanistan. However, it appears that developing sources within the intelligence services of even the most feckless and incompetent incumbent regimes is a much more daunting challenge. Non-democratic regimes (that is, the regimes that are most likely to face internal violent opposition) may underpay, underprovision, and otherwise neglect their armed forces, and they certainly tend to neglect their police services. But such regimes' treatment of their intelligence agencies, particularly those that focus inward, is likely to be a different matter. Leaders of such regimes typically lavish them with resources and populate them with their most trusted, if not most capable, henchmen.[74] This is not to suggest, of course, that such intelligence organs are incapable of error or are particularly capable or astute with respect to understanding regime opponents. But operating within the miasma of conspiracy and paranoia that suffuses dictatorial regimes, intelligence agencies must be considered an extremely "hard target" for armed groups.

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[72] Christoph Reuter and Borhan Younus, "The Return of the Taliban in Andar District: Ghazni," in *Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field*, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 108.

[73] Turbiville, *Guerrilla Counterinsurgency*, 61.

[74] See, for example, Patrick Devenny, "The List: The Middle East's Most Powerful Spooks," *Foreign Policy*, July 2009, accessed 3 August 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/20/the_list_the_middle_easts_most_powerful_spies.

That said, there are several significant examples of the penetration of state services by nonstate groups. As the apartheid regime waned during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the African National Congress (ANC) mounted "Operation Vula," an attempt to build an underground political and military structure within South Africa in preparation for an all-out "people's war." As part of the operation, the ANC stepped up its ongoing efforts to develop sources within South Africa's security structures. Speaking contemporaneously, one member of the ANC's military wing, Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we Sizwe, or MK), claimed that "we haven't done badly" in terms of recruiting "moles" inside the security services. According to other Vula participants, sources were also recruited within the police, military, and other security forces and gained access to National Intelligence Service files and other intelligence reports.[75]

Under what circumstances are insurgent efforts to infiltrate intelligence services and other state security forces likely to succeed? In some instances, insurgents will exploit greed and other ordinary human weaknesses. Outright bribery might therefore be seen as a form of financial counterintelligence if it leads to information that thwarts a regime's intelligence efforts. In a conflict in which the counterinsurgency effort is going badly for the incumbent, insiders may be more tempted to provide intelligence information they believe will help the cause. Human motivations are complex and layered, and so monocausal explanations for such behavior are unsatisfactory. Outright sympathy may play a part, as may the desire to "get on the right side of the ledger" when the insurgents appear to be on the path to victory.

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[75] Robert D'A. Henderson, "Operation Vula Against Apartheid," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 10 (December 1997): 419.

Insurgent Covert Action

As discussed in the preceding sections, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence are significant features of the insurgent repertoire. While differing in some obvious respects, these disciplines are clearly recognizable as analogous to the disciplines employed by state services. Covert action, the third intelligence discipline, is more problematic.

Clandestinity is an obvious feature of any insurgency. In the early stages of an insurgency, activities such as recruitment must be done quietly, and even in late stages of classical Maoist insurgency, when guerrillas are engaged in open warfare, underground political, logistical, and administrative structures remain important. But to what extent can insurgents be said to engage in covert operations? Returning to Shulsky and Schmitt's definition, covert action is "some secret activity to influence the behavior of a foreign government or political, military, economic, or societal events and circumstances in a foreign country."[76] Under this definition, it might be tempting to characterize as "covert" virtually everything an insurgent group does, and indeed, many insurgent groups have been described as "secret armies." But such a characterization would be inappropriate. While many aspects of the armed struggle are secret (or are intended to be so), insurgents rarely attempt to conceal the fact that they are trying to influence behavior or events and are hardly shy about acknowledging their efforts to drive out a foreign occupier or topple a hated regime. Moreover, insurgents rarely, if ever, have the resources to engage in the kinds of sophisticated and costly machinations associated with state-run covert operations.

Foreign intelligence and counterintelligence are significant features of the insurgent repertoire.

That said, at least two types of insurgent activities might be categorized as covert operations. The first is propaganda, specifically

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[76] Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 77.

"black" propaganda, defined by the Department of Defense as "propaganda that purports to emanate from a source other than the true one."[77] Such propaganda is intended to deceive the target audience not just by misrepresenting its origins, but also by presenting distortions and outright lies as facts. The use of black propaganda by insurgents is surely as old as the phenomenon of insurgency itself. A contemporary example can be found in Iraq, where insurgents reportedly acquired the flash-memory drive of a U.S. Army specialist, Lee Kendell, and used its contents to concoct a letter. According to Manuel R. Torres Soriano, the fraudulent letter

> described the desperate situation of the foreign soldier in Iraq and the existence of abuses and unpunished war crimes. A person could obtain the material via a downloadable video which contained the reading of the false letter by an anonymous narrator using American-accented English.[78]

The second insurgent activity that might reasonably be characterized as covert action is the employment of front groups—again, a tool in the repertoire of many, if not most, insurgencies. In essence, a front group is an organization that is controlled secretly by another entity. Nominally independent, fronts provide a façade of legitimacy and attract support and resources from individuals who might otherwise avoid involvement in the insurgency. Among other things, fronts "can draw the sting of disapproval away from the cause and redirect it against the state or institutions" opposed by the insurgency, as John Thompson has observed.[79] Armed groups as diverse as the LTTE, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT, the South Asian extremist organization fighting for the "liberation" of Indian-occupied Kashmir), and the FARC have established elaborate networks of front groups in their theater of operations and, in some instances, "out of area" among diasporic communities. Hezbollah fronts appear to be aimed largely at fund-raising, as illustrated by the case of Orphans Project Lebanon, a German group suspected of serving as a front for the Lebanese Martyr Institute, which is in turn believed to have raised funds for Hezbollah.[80]

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[77] U.S. Department of Defense, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 19 August 2009, accessed 5 September 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.

[78] Manuel R. Torres Soriano, "Jihadist Propaganda and Its Audiences: A Change of Course?" *Perspectives on Terrorism* 1 (2007), accessed 20 May 2010, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=8&Itemid=5.

[79] John Thompson and Joe Turlej, *Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism in Canada*, Mackenzie Institute Occasional Paper (Toronto: Mackenzie Institute, 2003), 63, accessed 12 March 2010, www.mackenzieinstitute.com/Overseas_Terrorism_In_Canada.pdf.

Although armed groups clearly engage in some forms of covert action, it would be a mistake to overstate their significance. While hardly luxuries from the point of view of the insurgents, such intelligence operations are decidedly secondary to the first-order tasks of identifying targets, preparing for attacks, and protecting the organization from its adversaries.

Policy Implications and Conclusions

Any well-crafted and effective response to the phenomena discussed in this article obviously must begin with a thorough appreciation of the problem. As mentioned at the beginning, scholars have devoted little analytical attention to insurgent intelligence operations. Reflecting the influence of the dominant, state-centric paradigms of international relations, academic specialists on intelligence have focused almost exclusively on state intelligence institutions. To its credit, the 2008 *National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America* highlighted the threat to U.S. interests posed by the intelligence activities of violent nonstate groups, noting for example that such entities "acquire resources, train and deploy personnel, and execute both clandestine and covert intelligence operations against us."[81] But as is frequently the case with such white papers, the *National Counterintelligence Strategy* languishes in unread obscurity. If the broader public record is any indication, policy makers have neglected the subject, and as intelligence priorities ordinarily flow from the interests identified by decision makers, it seems safe to conclude that the U.S. intelligence community has devoted relatively little analytical attention to the topic. Violent nonstate groups have hardly been ignored, to be sure, but in the cases of those operating in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the focus has been on identifying so-called "high-value" individuals. With the exception of the subject of leadership, these armed groups have been treated largely as analytical black boxes, with their organizational inner workings—including such functional areas as finance and administration, training, and, as argued in this article, intelligence—seldom exposed to analytical scrutiny.

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[80] Benjamin Weinthal, "German Charity Front for Hizbullah," *Jerusalem Post*, 1 August 2009, accessed 10 September 2009, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1248277943449&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.

[81] Director of National Intelligence, *National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America: 2008* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), 9.

Any well-crafted and effective response to the phenomena discussed in this article obviously must begin with a thorough appreciation of the problem.

As a first step, policy makers should reconsider their traditional neglect of the topic. As mentioned in the introduction, assessing the net contribution of intelligence to insurgent performance is an impossible task at the moment and will remain so until scholars, analysts, and practitioners begin gathering more data, including (ideally) firsthand accounts from participants as well as documentary evidence. One of the reasons we know as much about PIRA intelligence activities as we do is because Bell and other specialists thought to ask PIRA volunteers about intelligence matters during the course of their interviews. For students of insurgency, and for government intelligence personnel, interviews with current and former members of armed groups should include (when possible) questions regarding intelligence matters. A thorough assessment of the intelligence contribution to insurgency will have to wait, but in the meantime, one can reasonably conclude that we need to do more to develop our understanding. As indicated in this article, insurgents certainly appear to take intelligence—both their own and that of their foes—quite seriously. For that reason alone, the subject merits much greater scrutiny.

Based on what we do know today, it is also possible to consider some preliminary approaches for dealing with underground intelligence operations. Although insurgent attempts to penetrate U.S. intelligence services have been reported in recent years, that aspect of threat seems less salient than others. Compared with state intelligence services, nonstate groups are ill equipped to marshal and deploy the resources needed to penetrate American intelligence agencies. Russia and China, which have "whole ministries with burgeoning bureaucracies and a dedicated cadre of intelligence officials willing to commit millions of dollars to collect intelligence on American targets," pose a much more realistic and pressing counterintelligence threat, as Justin R. Harber argues convincingly.[82] The threat posed to the less-robust services of American partners abroad is no doubt greater, but as discussed in this article, even feeble regimes are likely to possess intelligence organs that pose formidable challenges to insurgent groups. However, the services of partner countries (or the "host nations" who are receiving U.S. counterinsurgency support) should receive additional American attention. The United States is relying increasingly on the so-called "liaison services" of friendly countries to provide intelligence information, particularly on nonstate threats.[83] Given our apparent dependence on these countries for information on threats to our interests, it makes sense to encourage foreign services to commit collection and analytical resources toward understanding insurgent intelligence phenomena in a more systematic and rigorous way.

Assessing the net contribution of intelligence to insurgent performance is an impossible task at the moment.

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[82] Justin R. Harber, "Unconventional Spies: The Counterintelligence Threat from Non-State Actors," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 22 (June 2009): 222.

[83] See, for example, Garrett Jones, "Torture and the CIA," *E-Notes*, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2005, accessed 7 September 2009, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/ 20051202.americawar.jones.torturecia.html.

Finally, particular emphasis should be given to developing offensive counterintelligence against insurgent groups. It goes without saying that passive counterintelligence should not be neglected. But this aspect of the discipline can be relegated to the category of "lesser-included" counterintelligence since a robust internal security regime designed to protect against the incursions of a state service should, with minor adaptation, work against nonstate intelligence as well. Offensive counterintelligence, on the other hand, requires special consideration. The United States should work with its international partners to develop more effective means for penetrating insurgent groups and, in particular, to cultivate informants among (or near) underground intelligence structures. This is and will likely remain a formidable challenge for any intelligence service.

It makes sense to encourage foreign services to commit collection and analytical resources toward understanding insurgent intelligence phenomena.

An insurgent group's capability depends on its structure. That said, some insurgent groups are more loosely structured than others, potentially making identification of targets inside more difficult. A notable feature of many insurgencies—strong social, religious, kinship, or ethnic ties among members and supporters—creates additional hurdles to penetration by outsiders and suggests the need for suborning individuals already inside the relevant armed group.[84] However, the experience of the British security forces against the PIRA suggests that with time and persistence, extensive networks of informants can be developed inside even relatively small and cohesive violent underground organizations. Such groups fear internal treachery above all else, and fomenting suspicion and distrust within their ranks is likely to have a powerfully corrosive impact. To return for a final time to Bell, "conspiratorial organizations fear conspiracy," and violent nonstate groups are conspiratorial enterprises par excellence.[85]

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[84] Harber, "Unconventional Spies," 229.

[85] Bell, "Armed Struggle and Underground Intelligence," 143.



Kit Carson Scout Pham-Douc (left) points out location of suspected enemy installations near Hill 65, 20 miles south of Danang, Vietnam, to LCpl R.D. Kilmer (center) and Cpl P.F. Collins (right) on 26 August 1967. Photo by Sgt Ryan.



Doctrine for Irregular Warfare

Déjà Vu All Over Again?

by Wray R. Johnson

> *Without some sense of historical continuity, Americans are likely to relearn the lessons of history each time they are faced with low-intensity conflict. But what is more dangerous is the fact that during the relearning process, Americans may suffer casualties and develop policy directions that can only lead to defeat.*
>
> *—Sam C. Sarkesian*[1]

In a 2007 *New York Times* column entitled "A U.S. General's Disquiet," Roger Cohen described how U.S. Army Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli experienced an epiphany with regard to "modern warfare." General Chiarelli had spent the first two decades of his career "training to defeat the Soviet Ninth Army in Europe," described as "symmetrical war," not the "elusive asymmetry of borderless modern warfare, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism."[2] But after two tours

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[1] Sam C. Sarkesian, *America's Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future* (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press, 1984).

[2] Roger Cohen, "A General's Disquiet," *New York Times*, 10 September 2007. In a similar vein, retired Gen Wesley K. Clark wrote in the *Washington Post*, "After the demoralizing loss in Vietnam, the United States went high tech, developing whole classes of new tanks, ships, and fighter planes and new operational techniques to defeat then-enemy no. 1—the Soviets." In doing so, the U.S. military "junked the doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare, which we're trying to relearn in Iraq." Wesley K. Clark, "The Next War," *Washington Post*, 16 September 2007.

in Iraq, General Chiarelli had adapted to the exigencies of modern war and by that time averred that the United States "entered the War on Terrorism . . . with armed forces well suited to defeat opposing armies" but unsuited to "the imperatives of . . . counterinsurgency warfare."[3] Unfortunately, General Chiarelli's lament is anything but new.

In 1994, capitalizing on Samuel P. Huntington's postulation of worldwide cultural crisis, then-Major Ralph Peters wrote "The New Warrior Class."[4] In this controversial essay, Peters boldly asserted that "the soldiers of the United States Army are brilliantly prepared to defeat other soldiers. Unfortunately, the enemies we are likely to face through the rest of this decade and beyond will not be 'soldiers,' with the disciplined modernity that term conveys in Euro-America, but 'warriors'—erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in the civil order."[5] Thirty-three years earlier, Roger Trinquier had published an equally provocative work, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. Like Peters and Chiarelli, Trinquier claimed that in *modern warfare* (a term he italicized throughout the book for emphasis), "We still persist in studying a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again," meaning the sort of "conventional" warfare witnessed in World War II. "The result," he wrote, "is that the army is not prepared to confront an adversary employing arms and methods the army itself ignores."[6] One finds similar sentiments expressed by U.S. military officers as far back as the colonial period when Colonel George Washington posited, "Indians are the only match for Indians; and without these we shall ever fight upon unequal terms."[7] More than a century later, Brigadier General George Crook likewise observed, "An Indian in his own mode of warfare is more than the equal of the white man. . . . In operating against them the only hope of success lies in using their own methods, and their own people with a mixed command."[8]

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[3] Peter Chiarelli and Stephen Smith, "Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future," *Military Review*, September–October 2007, 3.

[4] In a groundbreaking and highly controversial article written in the summer of 1993, "The Clash of Civilizations?," Huntington argued that the fundamental source of conflict in the post–Cold War era would no longer be ideological or economic. Instead, he wrote, "The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural." Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 22–49 (quote p. 22). Huntington greatly expanded this thesis in a subsequent book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

[5] Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters* 24 (Summer 1994): 16.

[6] Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (1964; repr., Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), 3. Originally published as *La Guerre Moderne* (Paris: Éditions de la Table Ronde, 1961).

Thus, to borrow from Cohen, there is a disquieting continuity in American military history with respect to irregular warfare and, as military historian John Keegan has written, "continuities, particularly hidden continuities, form the principal subject of historical enquiry." It is the "identification of links" between the past and present that "enables us to comprehend our actions in context."[9] With that in mind, there is very little about irregular warfare today that is genuinely novel. Moreover, much of what is being written today pales in comparison to what has been written about irregular warfare in the past.[10] The problem of irregular warfare is therefore not one of theory or analysis, or even best practices—there is already a considerable body of literature on these subjects—but rather the rise and fall of professional interest in the subject within the U.S. military in the manner of a sine wave throughout American military history.[11] The purpose of this essay, then, is to illustrate this sine wave by examining the evolution of U.S. military doctrine for irregular warfare.

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[7] Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 11.

[8] LS2584DA1882, Crook to AAG, Military Division to the Pacific, 6 September 1882, and George Crook, *Annual Report*, 1883, 11–12, as quoted in Dan Thrapp, *General George Crook and the Sierra Madre Adventure* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), 104, 130–31.

[9] John Keegan, introduction to Alan Wykes, *SS Leibstandarte* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), 6.

[10] Although perhaps too harsh an assessment, the point is that the student of irregular warfare will find very little written today that is not old wine in a new wineskin. Regrettably, however, many policy makers and senior military officers at present have never drunk the wine in question, so it seems new. But it would be better in most cases to drink in the original works of David Galula, John J. McCuen, Harry Eckstein, and others whose studies were published in the 1960s. Some adaptation is necessary, but the principles are enduring. See, for example, David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), currently issued by the U.S. Army for training human terrain teams at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The above said, one must admit that there are some fresh voices of note in the current literature on irregular warfare. Of course, Australian author David Kilcullen comes to mind, but also Thomas A. Marks of National Defense University, whose book *Maoist People's War in Post-Vietnam Asia* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2007) is the best explication of Maoist operational art currently in print. In that regard, the notion that understanding Maoist strategy is unnecessary in an era of Islamic terrorism is wholly refuted by the fact that most insurgencies around the globe today, including Islamists, have adopted a Maoist approach. See, for example, Norman Cigar, *Al-Qa'da's Doctrine for Insurgency: 'Abd Al-'Aziz Al-Muqrin's A Practical Course for Guerrilla War* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009).

There is very little about irregular warfare today that is genuinely novel.

U.S. military interest in irregular warfare has followed a fairly predictable pattern. For one reason or another, irregular warfare is first declared to be a significant threat to U.S. interests. Shortly afterward, analysts demand a qualitatively different approach to combating the threat outside the mainstream of conventional warfare.[12] A contest is then engaged between "small wars" enthusiasts and "big war" traditionalists. The former achieve some measure of success in altering doctrine, force structure, etc., but invariably, this progress is fleeting as traditionalists reassert the dominance of conventional principles of warfighting. In the end, the conventional mind-set of the U.S. military is reaffirmed, and the theory and operational art associated with irregular warfare recedes into a doctrinal backwater—until the next foreign internal conflict erupts, demanding center-stage attention and starting the cycle over again. This sine wave is most pointedly reflected in U.S. military doctrine.

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[11] The idea of a sine wave refers to the phenomenon of interest and neglect regarding irregular warfare concepts as represented by an undulating waveform over time. The peaks of the wave represent periods of national and military interest in irregular warfare, e.g., the small wars era between 1915 and 1933, during the Vietnam War, and in the 1980s when revolutionary insurgency in Latin America provoked a response from the Reagan administration and the U.S. Congress, resulting in the production of military doctrine for low-intensity conflict. The low points or valleys represent periods of neglect, both in terms of policy and doctrine production, e.g., during World War II and in the 1970s following the Vietnam War when the U.S. military focused on the Soviet conventional threat in central Europe.

[12] One can easily become bogged down in definitional debates regarding the nature of "irregular" versus "conventional" warfare. In its simplest terms, an "irregular" can be defined as "a soldier who is not a member of a regular military force." (*Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 11th ed. [Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 2006]). Friedrich von der Heydte writes that irregular warfare is usually "conceived to be an armed conflict, in which the parties are not large units, but small and very small action groups, and in which the outcome is not decided in a few large battles, but the decision is sought, and ultimately achieved, in a very large number of small, individual operations." In contrast, "conventional warfare" involves large battle formations that prosecute positional campaigns on the basis of decisive battle to achieve victory, what von der Heydte describes as "large war." Friedrich von der Heydte, *Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy as a Military Phenomenon*, trans. George Gregory (New York: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986), 3, 25.

As the quote from Sam Sarkesian at the beginning of this essay points out, it seems we must relearn the principles of irregular warfare with each new "low-intensity conflict."[13] In short, as the sine wave dips, interest in irregular warfare wanes, and the U.S. military jettisons what has been learned about the subject, which it then must relearn when a new irregular challenge presents itself. The danger, of course, is that the military can bungle the effort before the lessons are relearned. This very nearly occurred in Iraq. Owing to the poor performance of U.S. forces in quelling the insurgency following the so-called "decisive" phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were repeated calls for the withdrawal of American troops even though doing so would have resulted in the collapse of the new Iraqi state. Only the steadfast determination of the George W. Bush administration to stay the course in Iraq permitted this relearning process to unfold to the point where "victory" is now within our grasp.[14] Unfortunately, if our newfound understanding of irregular warfare is permitted to atrophy or is willfully jettisoned in the coming years, as has occurred so often in the past, we may find ourselves losing the fight in the next low-intensity conflict before relearning can occur.

> *U.S. military interest in irregular warfare has followed a fairly predictable pattern.*

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[13] Sarkesian is a retired U.S. Army officer and professor emeritus of political science at Loyola University, Chicago. During the 1980s and early 1990s, he was a widely respected authority on irregular warfare, authoring numerous books and articles on the subject.

[14] Whether or not "victory" has been achieved in Iraq is open to debate. And it depends on how victory is defined. As the author stated to a senior CIA official in 2005, "If we define victory in Iraq as creating a Switzerland in the Middle East, we will fail. On the other hand, if we can create something along the lines of Columbia, a state with an ongoing insurgency but the insurgents cannot win and the government will not lose, then we will succeed."

This is why doctrine is so important: it is the intellectual conceptualization of the nature and character of war and provides a measure of continuity in terms of the theory for military victory. In that regard, doctrine represents the basic precepts that drive decisions regarding how the armed forces are organized, trained, and equipped. As General Curtis E. LeMay stressed, "At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is fundamental to sound judgment."[15]

U.S. military doctrine is the product of historical experience, interpreted and adapted to present requirements, but with an eye on the future. If doctrine is to remain relevant, it must be frequently reexamined in the context of its continuing validity. What this means in terms of the present study is that any analysis regarding the evolution of U.S. military doctrine must be made in context, as doctrine for irregular warfare does not exist in a vacuum. Doctrine is not merely theoretical; it requires an appraisal of the conditions that give rise to specific doctrinal thinking. Hindsight being clearer than foresight, French doctrine in the 1920s and 1930s was ill conceived in its attempt to apply the lessons of World War I and was based upon erroneous assumptions concerning the nature of enemy strategic and operational thinking, yet it was an honest attempt rooted in the prevailing assumptions of the time. Development of U.S. military doctrine for irregular warfare over the years emerged from similarly peculiar American assumptions regarding the nature and character of war.

With the above point in mind, it is proper to specify a point of departure for the evolution of U.S. military doctrine for irregular warfare to illustrate the aforementioned sine wave. Although one could argue that General Orders No. 100 was the genesis of U.S.

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[15] Curtis E. LeMay, quoted in A. G. B. Valance, ed., *Air Power Doctrine: Essays Compiled by Group Captain A. G. B. Valance* (Ministry of Defence: Royal Air Force, 1990), ix.

military doctrine for irregular warfare,[16] the first definitively "doctrinal" expression of U.S. military thought on the subject was the U.S. Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual*. As a consequence of their experience in several small wars in the early 20th century, the Marines published the manual in 1935 and revised it in 1940.[17] What made the manual unique at the time was its in-depth exploration of revolutionary guerrilla warfare.[18] Although informed by British small wars theorist C. E. Callwell's work and others,[19] the Marines paid considerably greater attention to the roots of the conflict as well the character of the enemy and realized that emergent small wars in the 20th century were different from those of the previous centuries. Consequently, the authors gave special consideration to socioeconomic and political grievances that gave rise to insurgency and thus defined the theory of victory in such situations as relying upon an accurate assessment of the root causes of internal rebellion.

> *If doctrine is to remain relevant, it must be frequently reexamined in the context of its continuing validity.*

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[16] General Orders No. 100 was issued by the Lincoln administration during the American Civil War and formed the basis of initial American actions during the Philippine War at the turn of the century.

[17] U.S. Marine Corps and Ronald Schaffer, *Small Wars Manual: United States Marine Corps, 1940* (1940; repr., Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1987). The 1935 edition was written by Maj Harold Utley and other Marines who were experienced in small wars. It also reflected the research of U.S. Army officers and foreign experts in colonial warfare. Utley included direct quotations from British Col C. E. Callwell's book regarding small wars during the Victorian era (C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* [London: Harrison and Sons, 1889]) and other works in the 1935 edition, but these were excised in the 1940 manual. Nevertheless, the 1940 edition contained more than 400 pages of text, with detailed treatments regarding organization, tactics, intelligence, propaganda, and a host of other topics, including the care and feeding of pack animals and the role of aviation in counterguerrilla and counterinsurgency warfare.

[18] Ancient guerrilla campaigns did not lack a political dimension, but only in the 20th century did political will become the principal motivator for insurgency and guerrilla warfare. In short, guerrilla warfare became more than simply an adjunct to larger conventional political-military strategy; it became the prime instrument of revolutionary war.

[19] See Ronald Schafer, "The 1940 Small Wars Manual and 'The Lessons of History,'" *Military Affairs* 36 (1972): 46–51.

The Marines recognized that the "application of purely military measures may not . . . restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social." Consequently, "the solution of such problems being basically a political adjustment, the military measures to be applied must be of secondary importance."[20] This is a remarkable statement for that era, with its emphasis on nonmilitary solutions to what had hitherto been viewed as exclusively a military problem. Indeed, an entire section of the manual addressed the issue of "revolutionary tendencies" under the general heading of "psychology." Of particular interest was the characterization of revolution as having a potentially legitimate causation.[21] Whether this contention was an outgrowth of the Marines' experience is unclear, but the manual nevertheless explicitly described the relationship between revolution and guerrilla warfare: "Abuses by the officials in power and their oppression of followers of the party not in power are often the seeds of revolution." Once rebellion occurs, "It can be expected that hostile forces . . . will employ guerrilla warfare as a means of gaining their end."[22]

Not surprisingly, the advent of World War II caused the U.S. government to lose interest in small wars, and the *Small Wars Manual* was soon all but forgotten. Only in the 1950s, when communist-inspired revolutionary insurgency threatened the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States around the globe, did the government again take note of irregular warfare. But with their focus on the conventional and nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union, the armed services overlooked the manual and their own history in an effort to craft a military doctrine for countering the burgeoning insurgency in South Vietnam. Thus, as Bernard B. Fall aptly wrote in 1964, "American readers—particularly those who are concerned with today's operations in South Vietnam—will find to their surprise that their various seemingly 'new' counterinsurgency gambits . . . are mere rehashes of old tactics to which helicopters, weed killers, and rapid-firing rifles merely add a new dimension of speed and bloodiness without basically changing the character of the struggle."[23]

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[20] *Small Wars Manual* (1940), 1-9-15, 1-9-16.

[21] Ibid., 1-11-19, 1-13-20.

[22] Ibid., 1-13-21, 1-9-14.

The Vietnam War remains the touchstone for U.S. intervention in foreign internal conflict, and any debate regarding extant or emergent doctrine for irregular warfare and its applicability to the post–Cold War security environment inevitably returns to the fundamental counterinsurgency theories that emerged during that war. When the U.S. military deployed to South Vietnam, specific doctrine for counterinsurgency did not exist. Doctrine for counterinsurgency emerged as an intellectual construct during the John F. Kennedy administration and was conceived as a response to perceived indirect aggression against the United States, perpetrated by the Soviet Union and carried out by insurgent proxies in the developing world. Kennedy regarded the threat to be unprecedented and deserving of an equally unprecedented countervailing strategy. Notably, theories of revolution and counterrevolution informed Kennedy's views, and various academics helped formulate counterinsurgency policy. As the policy became wedded to the theory, historical examples of successful counterinsurgency efforts were mustered to validate doctrinal propositions, and an inevitable interplay occurred between the doctrinal heritage of the armed forces and emergent doctrine for irregular warfare. In effect, counterinsurgency doctrine was a crash program thrust upon the military by the president.[24]

The advent of World War II caused the U.S. government to lose interest in small wars.

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[23] Bernard Fall, introduction to Trinquier, *Modern Warfare* (1964 ed.), xviii.

[24] For a more in-depth discussion, see Wray R. Johnson, *Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2001). See also Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1977); and *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking in Vietnam: The Senator Gravel Edition* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

None of the armed services possessed doctrine or forces specially trained to combat insurgents. Although the Army had three special forces groups at the time, these were raised to wage guerrilla warfare operations behind Soviet lines in the event of war in Europe. Neither the Navy nor the Marines had specially tailored forces, and although the Air Force had fielded three wings largely dedicated to unconventional warfare in the early 1950s, they were deactivated by 1957. In fact, despite clear guidance from President Kennedy, the U.S. military was determined to dismiss the contrast between conventional and irregular warfare as an exaggerated premise, prompting General George H. Decker, the Army chief of staff, to assure the president that "any good soldier can handle guerrillas."[25] In the end, the disconnect between what the president envisioned and how the uniformed services responded created a tension between policy and implementation that contributed to the American failure in Vietnam.

When the U.S. military deployed to South Vietnam, specific doctrine for counterinsurgency did not exist. Doctrine for counterinsurgency emerged as an intellectual construct during the Kennedy administration.

Ironically, the U.S. Army had long experience with guerrillas but mostly ignored the challenge they presented. The Army produced six manuals from 1898 through 1915, but these paid scant attention to irregular warfare. If at all, the Army focused on "partisan warfare," meaning guerrillas operating in support of enemy conventional forces and therefore a problem of rear area security.[26] By 1961, the problem was addressed as "military operations against irregular forces," meaning not only partisans, but also insurgents.[27]

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[25] Trinquier, *Modern Warfare* (1964 ed.), 80.

[26] U.S. Army, *Field Service Regulations: Operations, FM 100-5* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1944), 284–86.

[27] U.S. Army, *Operations Against Irregular Forces, FM 31-15* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1961). During the Vietnam War, the Army defined insurgency as a "condition of subversive political activity, civil rebellion, revolt, or insurrection against a duly constituted government or occupying power wherein irregular forces are formed and engage in actions which may include guerrilla warfare, that are designed to weaken or overthrow that government or occupying power." See "Cold War Terminology," *Army Information Digest* 17 (June 1962): 54.

By 1962, "counterinsurgency" emerged as the definitive label, but it was not until 1958 that *Field Manual (FM) 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Operations Forces*, even addressed the problem of insurgency. Still, on the eve of large-scale U.S. intervention in South Vietnam, basic "warfighting" doctrine (as reflected in *FM 100-5*) ignored counterinsurgency, and counterguerrilla doctrine remained a low priority.

Kennedy's emphasis on counterrevolutionary warfare moved counterinsurgency to the forefront of military discourse. The initial result was a burst of military scholarship on the subject, with an entire issue of the journal *Military Affairs* dedicated to the subject in 1960.[28] The Army response began to accelerate in the second half of 1961, with special positions created at the Pentagon, a series of conferences, and changes made to Army school curricula reflecting the sense of urgency. The Army clearly led in crafting counterinsurgency doctrine, and between 1961 and 1963, it published a number of field manuals.[29] The crowning doctrinal manual regarding counterinsurgency was *FM 100-20, Field Service Regulations: Counterinsurgency*, published in 1964.[30]

The Marines and the Air Force made some strides in the same period to address counterinsurgency. In the Marine Corps, the

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[28] Ironically, 46 years later, the journal *Military Review* published a similar "special" issue dedicated to counterinsurgency. See *Military Review, Special Edition: Counterinsurgency Reader*, October 2006.

[29] *Operations Against Irregular Forces, FM 31-15*, was published in May 1961. *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Operations, FM 31-21* (1961), as well as its classified supplement *31-21A*, was revised by the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg to include a chapter on counterinsurgency special forces operations. *Doctrinal Guidance, FM 100-1* (1961), was revised by the Advanced Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and included three chapters on counterinsurgency. *FM 100-5* was also revised in 1962, with three chapters on counterinsurgency. *Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 31-16* (1963), was a detailed treatment developed at the Infantry Combat Developments Agency. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, FM 31-22* (1963), and its classified supplement *31-22A*, described phases of counterinsurgency but with an emphasis on special forces.

[30] U.S. Army, *Field Service Regulations: Counterinsurgency, FM 100-20* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1964). *FM 100-20* was originally published in 1943 as air power doctrine. However, with U.S. Air Force independence in 1947, *FM 100-20* was shelved as a doctrine in the U.S. Army until 1964 when it was reissued as doctrine for counterinsurgency. Oddly, the 1964 and the 1967 editions remain classified. For a thorough examination of the development of U.S. Army doctrine for counterinsurgency on the eve of direct American intervention in Vietnam, see Stephen L. Bowman, "The Evolution of United States Army Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Warfare: From World War II to the Commitment of Combat Units in Vietnam" (PhD diss., Duke University, 1985).

Hogaboom Board concluded that the most likely employment of the Corps would be in small wars and made several recommendations regarding education and training, doctrine, and force structure.[31] However, Marine Corps leaders held that their men were already competent in counterguerrilla operations and saw no need to alter the basic composition or outlook of the Corps. The Marines did issue a new manual, however, in the form of *FMFM (Fleet Marine Force Manual) 8-2, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces*. But *FMFM 8-2* was a far cry from the *Small Wars Manual*, focusing on tactics almost to the exclusion of broader concerns.[32] For its part, the Air Force stood up the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Florida, to deal with the problem of insurgency. This action was considered "adequate to meet the needs" of the Air Force, and no doctrine was promulgated.[33] The net result of this flurry of activity was to develop nominal counterinsurgency doctrine to fulfill the president's order. In reality, however, the services paid only lip service to the theory of counterinsurgency and continued to regard counterguerrilla operations as merely auxiliary to their conventional and nuclear missions. Thus, as the Vietnam War unfolded, the theory and doctrine of counterinsurgency and operations in the field were not in consonance.

The disconnect between what the president envisioned and how the uniformed services responded created a tension between policy and implementation.

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[31] In late 1955, the Marine Corps issued Landing Force Bulletin 17. It was a complete rewrite of the manual governing amphibious operations and focused on rotary-wing air assault, placing the helicopter at the center of the Marine Corps' future. The publication of this bulletin was followed by a meeting of the Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board, known as the Hogaboom Board after MajGen Robert E. Hogaboom, who was appointed as the chairman. The board was charged with studying organizational requirements created by the new doctrine.

[32] U.S. Marine Corps, *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, FMFM 8-2* (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1962).

[33] Charles Hildreth, *USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Capabilities, 1961–1962* (USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1964 [Secret], declassified 7 November 1983), 8–10, 123.

The development of the war itself has been scrutinized in great detail, and it would serve little purpose here to attempt to enlarge upon this body of work. That said, two dominant opposing analyses have emerged regarding the American defeat in Vietnam. Some assert that the United States conducted a conventional war against an unconventional opponent; others counter that the conflict was in fact a conventional war and that the insurgency was a sideshow.[34] Regardless, the main point is that American defeat appeared to discredit the theory of counterinsurgency, and the term virtually disappeared from the military lexicon. Consequently, for the remainder of the 1970s, the U.S. military virtually ignored the theory and doctrine of counterinsurgency, concentrating on conventional warfare and focusing on the Soviet threat in Europe.

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[34] The former view is best represented by historian Larry E. Cable and former Central Intelligence Agency analyst Douglas S. Blaufarb. Despite scandalous revelations about his past, Cable was one of the more illuminating commentators on the American defeat in Vietnam during the 1990s. (See Ben Steelman, "Whatever Happened to Larry Cable?," http://www.myreporter.com/?p=2716, accessed 31 March 2011; see also B. G. Burkett, *Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation Was Robbed of Its Heroes and History* [Dallas, TX: Verity Press, 1998]; and Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong* [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997].) Likewise, following the publication of his *The Counterinsurgency Era* (New York: Free Press, 1977), Blaufarb was influential in governmental circles concerned with unconventional conflict, coauthoring a major study with George K. Tanham—a long-time specialist on revolutionary war and the author of the classic work *Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Viet Minh to the Viet Cong* (New York: Praeger, 1967)—on counterinsurgency for the BDM Corporation in 1984. Blaufarb's research substantially influenced military doctrine in the 1980s with respect to low-intensity conflict. The best examples of opposition to Cable and Blaufarb's contention that the nature of the Vietnamese conflict was rooted in insurgency are Norman B. Hannah and Harry G. Summers. Hannah was the deputy director of Southeast Asian Affairs at the State Department in 1962 and later served as the political advisor to the commander in chief of U.S. Pacific Command during the war. In this capacity, Hannah strongly criticized the Johnson administration's conduct of the war in official and unofficial correspondence. Specifically, he asserted that the war was being prosecuted as a counterinsurgency when in fact the South was being invaded by North Vietnam. After the war, he wrote a book along the same lines, *The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War* (New York: Madison Books, 1987). Summers served in the Korean War and in Vietnam and was a negotiator with the communists at the close of the war. He later served on the faculty of the U.S. Army War College, where he formulated his central thesis that the United States erroneously defined the Vietnamese conflict as an insurgency. In his widely acclaimed book, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), Summers argued that the U.S. Army exhausted itself fighting an insurgency that, at best, was secondary to the strategic invasion of the South by the North and which materially contributed to American failure to contain communist expansion in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, a small cadre of academics and military thinkers persisted in addressing the threat of internal war and irregular warfare and with the catalyst of revolutionary insurgencies in Latin America in the 1980s found purchase for their doctrinal proposals. In a seminal report for the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, Robert H. Kupperman declared, "The Army's dilemma is that the conflict least likely to occur—extended conventional superpower hostilities in Europe—nevertheless dominates Army thinking, training, and resource allocation." In short, Kupperman argued, the Army was least prepared for the most likely threat—"those small but critical low-intensity conflicts proliferating at the periphery of the great powers."[35] This contention—that the Army was unprepared for irregular warfare in the Third World—became a prevailing theme in professional literature in the 1980s, leading even the casual observer to draw obvious parallels to the 1960s.

As noted earlier, counterinsurgency had been discredited by defeat in Vietnam, and in its stead, the Army conceived a replacement doctrine embodied in a revision to *FM 100-20*. Although the 1972 edition replaced the term counterinsurgency with "internal defense and development," the manual was nevertheless a determined attempt by a small minority of Army thinkers to institutionalize counterinsurgency theory. Unfortunately, when *FM 100-20* was revised again in 1974, the conventional predisposition of the Army regained a foothold in what was otherwise appropriate counterinsurgency doctrine. In the 1974 edition, conventional precepts "characterized by mobility, to find, fix, destroy, or capture the guerrillas" predominated.[36] In that respect, the 1974 revision reflected the propensity for doctrine writers to fall back on their institutional repertoires, that is, to rely on conventional tactics, including "strike campaigns" consisting of "major combat operations targeted against insurgent tactical forces."[37]

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[35] Robert Kupperman Associates, *Low-Intensity Conflict*. vol.1: Main Report (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1983), 1.

[36] U.S. Army, *Internal Defense and Development: U.S. Army Doctrine, FMFM 8-2* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974), 5–9.

[37] Ibid., 5–13.

The reason that conventional tenets made their way back into internal defense and development doctrine must be examined in the context of what was occurring elsewhere in the U.S. military in the 1970s, particularly in the Army, which more often than not is the driver of modern U.S. military doctrine. As one U.S. Army Command and General Staff College research paper pointed out, "Doctrine reflects the times in which it is written."[38] Conventional concepts worked their way into the doctrine for a variety of reasons, but the most important was the renewed emphasis on conventional warfare in mainstream Army thought. During the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union had enlarged and improved its conventional forces and adopted a preemptive, nonnuclear strategy. Such a posture required a corresponding response on the part of the United States, and consequently, Army officers dedicated themselves to addressing conventional war in the context of Central Europe. Reflecting on the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (also known as the Yom Kippur War), in which the Israelis emerged victorious through the employment of combined arms (tanks supported by mechanized infantry), the Army concluded that tanks were the decisive element in ground combat.[39] By its nature, counterguerrilla warfare is infantry-intensive. But the 1976 edition of *FM 100-5*, *Operations*—the centerpiece of Army warfighting doctrine—emphasized armored warfare. By the 1980s, the doctrine would become known as "AirLand Battle." Advanced as a general approach to theater conventional warfare, the doctrine made no mention of irregular warfare except to claim that "an army prepared to fight Warsaw Pact forces in Europe could probably fight successfully in other areas of the world against other enemies with little modification to its doctrine."[40]

American defeat [in Vietnam] appeared to discredit the theory of counterinsurgency, and the term virtually disappeared from the military lexicon.

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[38] Paul Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 1989), 5.

[39] Ibid., 34.

[40] Ibid., 9.

As the 1980s unfolded, *FM 100-20* was revised again and titled *Low-Intensity Conflict* (LIC). Not surprisingly, the revised manual concerned itself mostly with tactical operations, including brigade-sized operations against guerrillas. Whereas "balanced development" was described as the key to victory against insurgency in the early 1970s, the 1981 manual asserted that "defeat of an insurgent threat requires destruction of guerrilla forces."[41] In effect, irregular warfare doctrine in 1981 had devolved almost entirely back to pre-1970s precepts, in which military concerns were placed ahead of other, arguably more critical, concerns.[42] The revision devoted an entire chapter to the employment of such units as airmobile forces, air cavalry, armor, armored cavalry, and mechanized infantry. The central theme of this chapter was the defeat of an insurgency through "strike campaigns," intended to "find, fix, and destroy small guerrilla groups."[43]

Irregular warfare doctrine in 1981 had devolved almost entirely back to pre-1970s precepts.

Thus, despite the purported lessons of the Vietnam War, *FM 100-20* in 1981 reflected the virtual wholesale return of the Army's irregular warfare doctrine to conventional warfare tenets. In a similar vein, the Air Force all but disbanded its special warfare assets, and air power doctrine written in the 1970s and 1980s eschewed any discussion of irregular warfare, concentrating on conventional and nuclear air warfare. Likewise, the Navy continued its willful pre-Vietnam ignorance regarding irregular warfare and made no effort to capitalize on the lessons of Vietnam. However, once again a determined minority labored to keep alive the original theoretical underpinnings of counterinsurgency and once more found a receptive audience for counterinsurgency concepts in the Ronald W. Reagan administration. In time, as insurgencies proliferated around the globe, the Defense Department was instructed to pay greater attention to LIC, and in April 1985, the Army directed its Training and Doctrine Command to "identify, analyze, and codify the factors which contribute to the success or failure in worldwide low-intensity conflict." To this end, the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project was formed at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Echoing similar studies from the 1960s, the final report of the project asserted that the Army was "poorly postured institutionally, materially, and psychologically for low-intensity conflict."[44] In July, Congress stated its own sense that, although "the incidence of terrorist, guerrilla, and other violent threats to citizens and property of the United States has increased rapidly,"[45] the Defense Department and the armed services had not given sufficient attention to the challenge.[46] Consequently, in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress directed the establishment of an assistant secretary of defense for special operations and LIC.[47] Even then, many members of Congress doubted that the military would overcome its conventional mind-set and argued that special operations forces were a more appropriate force of choice in LIC. As a result, Congress established the United States Special Operations Command in 1987.[48]

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[41] U.S. Army, *Low-Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1981), 147.

[42] All of the elements of conventional warfare contained in earlier counterguerrilla doctrine were revived in the 1981 doctrine. Particularly revealing was the role of the antitank platoon. Although there have been only rare instances in which insurgents have ever employed armored fighting vehicles (e.g., Colombia and Sri Lanka), the doctrine retained the antitank platoon in the table of organization for U.S. Army units but acknowledged that use of antitank platoons in counterinsurgency might "require substitution of other weapons for the antitank guided missile" (Ibid., 156).

[43] Ibid., 81, 174, 177, 199. The extent to which former concepts of conventional counterguerrilla operations made their way back into low-intensity conflict doctrine is also illustrated by the fact that the chapters on armor, armored cavalry, and mechanized infantry were derived almost verbatim from the 1967 edition of *FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations*.

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[44] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report*, vol. 1 (1986), 1–9.

[45] Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, Conference Report 99–118, (1985), 135.

[46] Loren Thompson, ed., *Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 12–13.

[47] The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict was created by the addition of a subsection to Section 136(b) of Title 10, United States Code, which also provided for the establishment of a Board for Low-Intensity Conflict in the White House. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Conference Report 99-1001*, (1986), 177.

[48] U.S. Special Operations Command was created by the addition of Section 167 to Chapter 6, Title 10, United States Code, as part of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987*.

As matters came to a head in Washington, the Army's Command and General Staff College began work to revise doctrine for LIC to reflect the "new" priorities. In 1986, *Field Circular (FC) 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict*, was published as a stopgap measure until *FM 100-20* could be revised. The circular asserted that the larger political context was the dominant feature in planning for LIC, with the ultimate objective being to "win the trust and support" of the people.[49] With respect to tactical operations, *FC 100-20* encouraged restraint and simply referred to *FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations*, for specific details. *Counterguerrilla Operations* appropriately distinguished between counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations within an overarching strategy of internal defense and development, the former seeking to alleviate the conditions that precipitate insurgency, and the latter targeting the "active military element" of the insurgency. The fundamental principle was to "provide enough internal security" to enable the host country to pursue developmental initiatives. Restraint was the key. According to the manual, "The unrestricted use of firepower in the vicinity of civilians . . . will result in turning their anger toward the government and may turn them to the insurgent cause."[50]

FC 100-20 formed the basis for subsequent doctrine, not only in the Army, but in the Air Force and at the Joint Staff as well. Capitalizing on the groundwork laid in *FC 100-20*, the Army and Air Force produced *FM 100-20/AFP (Air Force Pamphlet) 3-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*. Regarded at the time as a milestone in the history of doctrine for irregular warfare, the manual emulated the *Small Wars Manual* when it declared that political objectives drive military decisions at every level from the strategic to the tactical.[51] An outgrowth of *FM 100-20/AFP 3-20* was *AFM (Air Force Manual) 2-11, Air Force Operational Doctrine: Foreign Internal Defense*, the first Air Force doctrine specifically written to address the challenge of irregular warfare. Up until that time, Air Force doctrine was written as if irregular warfare did not exist. *FM 100-20/AFM 3-20* was therefore a watershed in Air Force history. Truly "joint" doctrine for LIC across the services was never realized; however, after a number of "test publications" were produced, the context of foreign internal conflict changed yet again, necessitating a complete rewrite of the doctrine. That said, in its various drafts, joint LIC doctrine was largely in consonance with the doctrine embodied in *FM 100-20/AFP 3-20*.

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[49] U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *Low-Intensity Conflict, FC 100-20* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986), 3-2.

[50] U.S. Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 90-8* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1986), 4-13. See also 1-5, 1-8, 3-5, and 3-9.

[51] Ibid., 1-5. See also the *Small Wars Manual*, 1-8-13.

In 1986, the Joint Staff published doctrine entitled *Unified Action Armed Forces*. In a section detailing "common functions," the armed forces were instructed to "prepare forces . . . for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war."[52] Two years later, in an editorial introduction to the January issue of *Military Review*, Major General Gordon R. Sullivan (USA) noted that the military had thus been "charged" not only with the preparation of forces for war (the hitherto undisputed mission of the armed forces) but also for operations that did not constitute war. In that light, Sullivan contended that the military would have to redefine its role in an environment where the use of force was "dominated by nonmilitary considerations."[53] A year later, with the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, American national security strategy underwent a major overhaul, with a substantial reduction in the numbers of strategic and theater nuclear weapons, a massive reduction in U.S. military force structure, and a new emphasis on flexible and deployable forces to meet "regional" threats. Consequently, *Joint Publication 3-07*—originally conceived as joint doctrine for LIC in 1986—was published in 1995 as doctrine for military operations other than war (MOOTW).

Whereas the paradigm of the 1960s had been counter-insurgency—put to the test in South Vietnam—and the paradigm of the 1980s was LIC and tested in El Salvador, in the early 1990s, the emergent paradigm, MOOTW, found its first test in Somalia. The debacle in Somalia, not unlike the American defeat in Vietnam, profoundly affected the discussion regarding irregular warfare and energized the debate in the U.S. military regarding the nature of interventionary operations and the need to develop doctrine that provided operational guidance. When U.S. forces deployed to Somalia in 1992, LIC remained the descriptor of the environment of conflict short of war. But in 1993—when events came to a head in Somalia—*FM 100-5, Operations*, had added a chapter on "operations other than war."[54] The new chapter noted that the concept was not new, but that the "pace, frequency, and variety" had "quickened." Borrowing from counterinsurgency theory, *FM 100-5* asserted, "If committed forces solve an immediate problem . . . but detract from the legitimacy of the government in so doing, they may have acted detrimentally against the long-term strategic aims." Restraint was therefore a principle specific to MOOTW, appended to the principles of war.[55]

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[52] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), 2-1.

[53] Gordon Sullivan, "From the Deputy Commandant," *Military Review*, January 1988, 1, 3.

The debacle in Somalia… profoundly affected the discussion regarding irregular warfare.

The fact that basic warfighting doctrine in the Army now included a chapter on operations other than war was significant, as this had occurred only 31 years earlier when chapters on unconventional warfare, operations against irregular forces, and "situations short of war" were included in the 1962 edition of *FM 100-5*. Although the 1993 edition maintained the fundamental precept that the "Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nation's wars," it at least recognized that the Army would often find itself in an environment short of war, wholly unlike the AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s. However, as had occurred so often before, and despite the emergence of appropriate doctrine, the U.S. military once again resisted any fundamental reforms.

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[54] Other Army field manuals followed the lead of *FM 100-5*, including *U.S. Army, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, FM 100-7* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1995). *FM 100-7* was concerned with U.S. Army forces at the operational level of war and described how the Army service component commander, previously known as the theater Army commander, would apply the fundamental precepts of *FM 100-5* to Army forces under his command. With respect to operations other than war, *FM 100-7* stated that commanders must "tailor" their forces to the mission. Thus "suitability" was the measure of a force's capability to perform adequately in MOOTW and "acceptability" was the force's appropriateness "given diplomatic considerations." Ibid., iii, 8-1.

[55] U.S. Army, *Operations, FM 100-5* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 13-0–13-3.

In 1994, when the Joint Staff was finalizing *Joint Pub 3-07*, Congress chartered the Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to examine whether the armed services were prepared to meet the post–Cold War challenge. The commission concluded that U.S. forces must be prepared to engage in operations other than war, particularly peace operations, but at the same time be able to defeat more conventional military threats.[56] The impact of the commission's findings was acute, for not unlike the 1950s and 1970s, the armed forces of the 1990s were undergoing a major drawdown. Over a period of five years beginning in 1990, the services were reduced by one-third to a level comparable to that of 1939. In response, the armed forces adhered to their conventional disposition, claiming that they were capable across the "operational continuum" without force structure changes or the creation of special units specifically dedicated to MOOTW. The event that convinced the U.S. military that structural and other changes were unnecessary was the Gulf War of 1990–91. Victory in Operation Desert Storm vindicated AirLand Battle doctrine and prompted at least one observer to remark, "This is what we've trained for, and this is how wars should be fought."[57] In short, a conventionally arrayed force, implementing an AirLand Battle doctrine, could defeat any enemy.[58]

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[56] *Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), ES-4.

[57] John Waghelstein, "Some Thoughts on Operation Desert Storm and Future Wars," *Military Review*, February 1992, 80. It should be pointed out that Waghelstein opposed the idea that Desert Storm had validated AirLand Battle as a construct useful in LIC and lamented that the aftermath of Desert Storm, like World War II, proved yet another example of the U.S. military's "penchant for learning the wrong lessons from the last war." Ibid.

[58] Harry G. Summers, "Full Circle: World War II to the Persian Gulf," *Military Review*, February 1992, 42.

Critics responded that this conclusion was misguided, and a RAND Corporation study warned:

> The net effect [of Desert Storm] was to convince a generation of soldiers that armies existed solely to fight wars and, consequently, that their energies, training, equipment, and ultimate success lay in the mainstream "concept" of warfighting at the conventional level. LIC and related concepts were removed from the consciousness of the Army and were relegated to a corps of personnel who stepped outside of the mainstream, with the knowledge that they did so at some peril to their careers.[59]

Thus, as had occurred repeatedly before, when the prevailing estimation of the geostrategic setting demanded forces capable of missions other than conventional war, the U.S. military clung to its long-held conventional traditions. Continuing to bask in its victory in the Gulf War, the armed forces concluded that the most important lesson to be learned from the failed intervention in Somalia was simply the need to adapt conventional forces to "methods of operations that can cope with multidimensional challenges that go far beyond conventional warfare."[60] The typology used to categorize these multidimensional conflicts was MOOTW. The new doctrine included much of the original language of earlier LIC doctrine but was couched in terms that clearly indicated it was subordinate to warfighting doctrine. And yet, once more, a handful of academics and military thinkers declared MOOTW doctrine to be inadequate in the face of emerging threats around the globe. But this time, the new calculus was "failed states" and the need for U.S. military forces to engage in "stability operations."

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[59] Jennifer Taw and Robert Leicht, T*he New World Order and Army Doctrine: The Doctrinal Renaissance of Operations Short of War?* R-4201-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), 22.

[60] Antonia Chayes and George Raach, eds., *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 3.

As stated earlier, Samuel Huntington's thesis of culturally driven warfare set the stage for predictions regarding the strategic environment in the post–Cold War era. For example, Robert D. Kaplan concluded, "While a minority of the human population will be, as Francis Fukuyama would put it, sufficiently sheltered so as to enter a 'posthistorical' realm . . . an increasingly large number of people will be stuck in history . . . where attempts to rise out of poverty, cultural dysfunction, and ethnic strife will be doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to till, and space to survive in."[61] Within this setting, "the state . . . is dying."[62] Somalia had set the precedent for intervention in dying or failed states, breaking from the traditional practice of defining uninvited intervention as a violation of state sovereignty. U.S. defense policy was therefore reexamined in the context of the new challenge, and MOOTW as a construct was found wanting.

Rising to the challenge, Ralph Peters asserted that "the incompetence of the state" would precipitate a "constellation of crises" in which "conventional wars [would] be supplemented with new and hybrid forms of conflict."[63] Peters also argued that "warriors" would respond "asymmetrically" to the intervention of regular troops and this would leave conventional armies "in the role of redcoats marching into an Indian-dominated wilderness."[64] Other analysts raised similar concerns and argued that MOOTW doctrine had failed to take this fact into account. Much of the criticism regarding the doctrine stemmed from the purported evolution of the strategic environment from modernity to postmodernity. Adherents to this continuum, popularized by Martin van Creveld in his book *Transformation of War*, divided the lineage of warfare into distinct states, or "dialectic qualitatives," resulting in different "generations" of warfare.[65] The first generation "reflected the tactics of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of the line and column." The rise of the nation-state marked the beginning of this phase of warfare. Second-generation warfare, based on firepower and movement, emerged in the mid-19th century. Third-generation warfare was invented by the Germans: the blitzkrieg, or "lightning war," which emphasized maneuver over firepower. Fourth-generation warfare is an elliptical return to premodern warfare—the warriors envisioned by Peters. According to fourth-generation warfare acolytes, U.S. military doctrine and strategy remain fixed in the third generation, which will prove ineffective in the fourth.[66] In that regard, U.S. intervention in the failed state of Yugoslavia—in particular, in Bosnia-Herzegovina—seemed to illustrate this point.

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[61] Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, 46.

[62] Martin van Creveld, "The Fate of the State," *Parameters* 26 (Spring 1996): 4.

[63] Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," *Parameters* 25 (Winter 1995–1996): 18–24.

[64] Peters, "New Warrior Class," 20.

[65] Martin van Creveld, *Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991).

From the standpoint of U.S. military anxiety regarding any ground combat role in Bosnia, the mixed lessons of Vietnam, the Gulf War, and Somalia were not comforting. Asked to analyze the Bosnian Serb irregulars who might oppose American intervention, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin remarked, "We don't know if they're Iraqis or Viet Cong."[67] Aspin was voicing the concern of many military officers that a protracted guerrilla war in the Balkans would result in politically unacceptable casualties and force an eventual ignominious withdrawal not unlike Somalia. Indeed, the Balkan experience revealed yet again the continuing disconnect between U.S. military doctrine for conflict short of general war and the conventional predisposition of the U.S. armed forces. One Army officer described the Bosnian peace operation as "a condition that's not war, but it isn't peace."[68] Other interviews with military officers consistently revealed that they were wholly unprepared for their role in Bosnia. Although the advance into Bosnia was a classic military operation, once U.S. forces settled in, they became engaged in civil-military operations focusing more on negotiations and persuasion than traditional security operations, prompting one officer to complain, "This is a strange mission. . . . They didn't train me for this."[69] Major General William L. Nash, commander of the 1st Armored Division, similarly averred, "They don't teach this stuff at Fort Leavenworth."[70]

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[66] William Lind et al., "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Military Review*, October 1989, 3–4. Fourth-generation warfare as a concept has been around since the 1980s. There is nothing new in the idea, but it has been heralded nonetheless as a novel and groundbreaking concept. For a hard-hitting critique, one that the author of this essay happens to agree with, see Antulio Echevarria, *Fourth Generation War and Other Myths* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005).

[67] Georgie Anne Geyer, "When Policy is Driven by Desire," *Washington Times*, 25 February 1996.

[68] Attributed to Col Gregory Fontenot, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division. Col Fontenot also remarked, "You find that your classical military activities are in support of and supplemental to civil functions. . . . I spend a lot more time negotiating and assessing people's willingness to be cooperative than I do on traditional military tasks." John Pomfret, "Bosnia Beat Cops, U.S. MPs Fight Boredom to Keep Peace, In Role More Like Police Than Military," *Washington Post*, 13 May 1996.

In retrospect, the commentary of one U.S. Army lieutenant colonel summed up the paradox of using conventional forces in an unconventional warfare environment: "There's no comfort level for any of this. You don't have an array of manuals that take you from corps down to company level, providing you [with] doctrine that contains specific guidance."[71] According to British military historian John Keegan, this lack of detailed doctrinal guidance is precisely the point:

> The U.S. Army is . . . very doctrine-minded. They go to West Point and they're taught the rules there. And then they go to Command and Staff College [sic] and they're taught the rules there. And they go to the Army War College and they're taught the rules there. So, not surprisingly, they approach situations very much in terms of the rules they've been taught.[72]

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[69] One journalist thus concluded, "Long schooled in the traditional art of fighting war, American commanders now find themselves grappling with political, diplomatic, and military demands that go far beyond the martial skills they were taught." Rick Atkinson, "Warriors Without a War, U.S. Peacekeepers in Bosnia Adjusting to New Tasks: Arbitration, Bluff, Restraint," *Washington Post*, 14 April 1996.

[70] John Keegan was therefore moved to observe, "This kind of thing is not really America's cup of tea, is it? For the British and French it seems to come easier. . . . It's embedded in the ethos of their armies, because they were imperial armies dealing with bandits and warlords and that sort of thing, and the Americans weren't doing that." Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

The "rules" are embodied in doctrine, and the relevant doctrine extant when U.S. forces were introduced into the Bosnian imbroglio was *FM 100-20/AFP 3-20*. Although *Joint Pub 3-07* was similarly extant, it did not offer the detailed operational guidance found in the Army–Air Force manual. But *FM 100-20/AFP 3-20* was by that time obsolete and effectively worthless in the context of failed states and unilateral interventionary operations. It became clear that the manual required revision. With Somalia and Bosnia fresh on the minds of Army thinkers, *FM 100-20* was rewritten as *Stability and Support Operations*.[73] Drawing on the notion of an operational continuum, the doctrine asserted that "the military instrument of national power alone cannot 'win' in stability and support operations, but it can lose."[74]

Encompassing the entire spectrum of theory and doctrine for counterinsurgency, LIC, and MOOTW, as well as the legacy of academic criticism, the revision to *FM 100-20* noted "a fundamental difference" between stability operations and conventional warfare: "The goal in war is to destroy an enemy's will and capability to fight. . . . By contrast, military stability and support operations act as a damper on political violence, reducing the intensity of conflict and establishing an environment of security conducive to settlement through political, economic, and informational means."[75] The revision acknowledged the "changing international political order" and, in particular, the advent of failed states as well as the fact that

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[73] At first blush, the title might lead the casual observer to conclude that the doctrine had come full circle, in that "stability operations" was the preferred leitmotif in the early 1970s when counterinsurgency was replaced by internal defense and development. In some respects, this is an accurate assessment. The 1967 edition of *FM 31-21, Stability Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine* and the 1972 edition of *FM 31-25, Stability Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine*, both contended that the overarching objective of U.S. military stability operations was to create a stable international environment and promote world peace. However, these manuals focused on the threat of communist-inspired revolutionary warfare. Emergent doctrine in *FM 100-20* (1996) found the causes to be more complex, including the deterioration of the nation-state system, ethnic and religious conflict, as well as "traditional" ideologically motivated revolutionary insurgencies.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid., 1–3.

"nonstate actors" and other irregular forces would play a major role. More importantly, the doctrine asserted that such conflicts were "neither conventional war nor peace," but "guided by its own logic." The dilemma, however, is that the Army is "not designed for conflict," being instead "geared toward a particular type of war in which the decisive action is the destruction of the enemy's ability to fight." Thus, the revision confessed that, although experience clearly indicated that "political" requirements had to dominate "military" requirements in counterinsurgency and other stability operations, the U.S. Army remained disinclined to reorient itself in this respect.[76] In that light, the draft doctrine attempted to reconcile the paradox, maintaining that "Army leaders must adapt their thinking to unfamiliar purposes and methods."[77] Regrettably, the revision became mired in bureaucratic squabbles and was never published.

Which brings us to the present: the Army and the Marines' newest manual, *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency*, repeats the record of the past. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, national attention paid to the challenge of irregular warfare has come to the fore yet again, and with ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the armed forces found MOOTW doctrine lacking (and in the specific case of the Army, the 16-year-old LIC doctrine embodied in *FM 100-20/AFP 3-20*). This "new" doctrine, which, like counterinsurgency doctrine in previous years, emphasizes the same concepts and themes. Yet again, the U.S. military has issued

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[76] In a remarkably insightful letter to *Military Review* in 1988, one U.S. Army officer pointed out this patently obvious but apparently overlooked fact during the debate on low-intensity conflict doctrine: "Current Army doctrine, as outlined in *Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict*, and its accompanying *Field Circular (FC) 100-20*, suggests that conventional combat units have an important role in LIC, especially in counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense operations. This may be so, but how many of us who have served in line armor, infantry, cavalry, aviation, field artillery, or air defense artillery units can ever recall training our soldiers for anything other than mid- to high-intensity AirLand Battle warfare? Most of the Army has spent years perfecting the techniques required to prevail on the Central European battlefield. Further, 'everyone' has read and generally understands *FM 100-5, Operations*, but how many will confess to even a rudimentary knowledge of *FM 100-20*? In reading both these manuals, one gets the impression that LIC is merely AirLand Battle fought in a Third World country!" Guy Swan III, "Swan on Swain," *Military Review*, May 1988, 86.

[77] U.S. Army, *Stability and Support Operations, FM 100-20* (Final Draft), (1996), 1–12.

"revised" doctrine in response to the problem of irregular threats, foreign internal conflict, etc., and it would appear that the cycle described in this study persists. The question is if the newfound emphasis on irregular warfare as embodied in *FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5* (as well the Air Force doctrine on irregular warfare [*AFDD 2-3*] and the Defense Department directive on the same [*DoDD 300.07*]), will suffer the same fate as previous efforts to institutionalize an irregular warfare consciousness in the armed forces of the United States.

* * *

Sun Tzu wisely counseled, "If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight."[78] And yet, as the *Small Wars Manual* pointed out, the United States has historically intervened where and when necessary, and not always with calculated objectives in mind. Consequently, the record of U.S. performance in interventionary operations has been mixed, in stark contrast to America's relatively unblemished record in conventional conflicts, prompting then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili to quip in 1996 that some of his colleagues "might feel more at ease if a sign were posted outside the Pentagon that read, 'We only do the big ones.'"[79]

The record of U.S. performance in interventionary operations has been mixed, in stark contrast to America's relatively unblemished record in conventional conflicts.

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[78] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 142.

[79] Jonathan Landay, "Pentagon's Identity Crisis over Its Role as Global Cop," *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 February 1996.

The reasons for U.S. military reticence about small wars are many, but the fact remains that, despite the prevalence and particular viciousness of irregular warfare in the developing world, U.S. policy makers, small wars theorists, and military practitioners have failed to devise an enduring formula to institutionalize conflict short of general war in the U.S. military consciousness. Evidence of this paradox is found in the fact that there have been almost as many terms of description as there have been internal conflicts. And given the recent pronouncements by several senior military officers that echo General Decker's claim that any good soldier can handle guerrillas, we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of the current emphasis on irregular warfare and the beginning of the next dip in the sine wave. Indeed, the current emphasis is already under attack from different quarters, ranging from Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr. of the Air Force to Colonel Gian P. Gentile at the U.S. Military Academy.[80] In the final analysis, *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5* may be the best attempt yet to devise an enduring formula, but it remains to be seen whether or not the concepts embodied in that doctrine are wholly embraced by the services and, likewise, whether recent additions to professional

U.S. policy makers, small wars theorists, and military practitioners have failed to devise an enduring formula to institutionalize conflict short of general war in the U.S. military consciousness.

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[80] See, for example, Charles J. Dunlap Jr., *Shortchanging the Fight? An Airman's Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2007); Gian P. Gentile, "Listen to the Airman," *Military Review*, March–April 2008, 114–15; and Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army," *Parameters* 39 (Autumn 2009): 5–17.

military education regarding irregular warfare will also endure.[81] That said, only when the U.S. military embraces the basic theory of irregular warfare will the services respond to future changes in the calculus of foreign internal conflict, regardless of etiology or manifestation.

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[81] Although beyond the scope of this essay, the sine wave phenomenon of interest and neglect associated with doctrine for irregular warfare applies in a similar fashion to professional military education (PME). For example, at the Army's Command and General Staff College following the Vietnam War, insurgency and counterinsurgency virtually disappeared as topics of study. Even as American involvement in El Salvador began to deepen in 1982, only eight hours of instruction were dedicated to LIC at a time when the British staff college devoted 128 hours to the subject. For academic year 1985–86, as insurgencies proliferated around the globe, LIC instruction rose to a mere 30 hours. Thus, in a devastating critique of U.S. military performance in El Salvador in 1988—the so-called "Colonels' Report"—the authors noted that foreign officers "attending American service schools . . . too often received 'conventional war-in-Europe type training' that was clearly inappropriate" (A. J. Bacevich, James Hallums, Richard White, and Thomas Young, "American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador" [unpublished paper, March 1988, typescript], 27.) Matters were little better at the U.S. Army War College, where only two days were devoted to the study of LIC, focusing exclusively on the Vietnam War (Michael Massing, "The Military: Conventional Warfare," *Atlantic Monthly*, January 1990, 28, 32). Thus, despite several years of emphasis and debate on LIC, relevant concepts retained their status as a secondary intellectual concern within the PME establishment. This was true even in the Marine Corps, regardless of its small-wars heritage. For example, during academic year 1947–48, only 6 of 1,211 academic instructional hours were dedicated to small-wars topics. Following the Korean War, the senior course devoted a mere 40 of 4,821 cumulative hours of instruction to irregular warfare. The Vietnam War restored the Marine Corps' interest in the subject, and the Command and Staff College increasingly emphasized counterinsurgency instruction, only to virtually eliminate the topic by war's end. Even at its peak, however, counterinsurgency instruction accounted for only 74 of 1,339 hours. By 1972, this figure had dropped to 32 hours and by 1978 had fallen further to 22 hours. Despite the war in El Salvador and the emphasis placed on LIC by the Congress and the Reagan administration during the 1980s, the Marine Corps' schools paid very little attention to LIC. And by 2001, the college dedicated only a handful of contact hours to MOOTW. (See Willard Buhl, "From the Small Wars Manual to Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq . . . Can the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College Institutionalize Irregular War in its Curriculum?" [masters paper, U.S. Marine Corps War College, 2006]). Needless to say, given their own outlook regarding irregular warfare, instruction in the U.S. Navy and Air Force following World War II to the present was even less than that of the Army and Marines.



Shay Amir (left), a counterterror warfare instructor for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), works with LCpl Steven W. Lewis during a training exercise led by IDF personnel at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, in November 2009. IDF training and doctrine evolved during the 1990s in response to deficiencies the force identified while deployed in southern Lebanon. Photo by LCpl John M. Raufmann (USMC).



Crossing the Lebanese Swamp

Structural and Doctrinal Implications on the Israeli Defense Forces of Engagement in the Southern Lebanon Security Zone, 1985–2000

by Tamir Libel

The occupation of what the Israelis called the security zone in Lebanon by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from 1985 to 2000 deeply affected the military in terms of changes in force structure and perceptions and choices of force structure development. The security zone was a buffer region in the southern part of Lebanon formed when Israeli forces withdrew in 1985 from the territory they had occupied since the First Lebanon War in 1982. Fighting a proficient and effective nonstate actor, Hezbollah, compelled the IDF to transform itself from an effective conventional force into an efficient full-spectrum one.

In contrast to many contemporary accounts that focused on the operational record, this article surveys the structural and doctrinal developments initiated by the growing challenges the IDF faced in the security zone. As described, Israel's performance in the security zone is a missing link in explaining the transformation of the IDF from a conventional army at the time of the First Lebanon War into the counterinsurgency force of the Second Intifada (which started in 2000). It is also a vital and often-overlooked element in Israeli military thought that sheds more light on the flawed plans of the IDF in the Second Lebanon War in 2006.

The first section of this article describes and analyzes how the IDF, which relied on a force structure suitable for high-intensity conflicts during the initial phase of the security zone occupation,

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transformed its force structure and doctrine, making them more suitable to counterinsurgency operations. The second section shows how these changes affected the IDF's doctrine during the latter portion of the 1990s.

Israeli national security doctrine, and even the discussion surrounding it, had, until the 1990s, focused on military and political preparedness for war against regular Arab armed forces—that is, high-intensity conflict. An example of this focus was the fundamental division (and priority of importance) of potential threats against the state of Israel into those pertaining to "basic security" and those relating to "current security." Basic security described the threats posed by Arab standing armies (high-intensity conflict) with the extreme threat scenario of a two-front surprise attack, for example, the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Both IDF manpower allocations and its military specialties requirements were geared toward countering these threats. Current security threats (low-intensity conflict) included terrorist attacks, retaliatory attacks, and border incidents.[1] These conflicts were considered routine occurrences and therefore did not require any special capabilities. The IDF believed that the basic skill set necessary for high-intensity conflicts was adequate for dealing with current security threats.

In their book *Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution*, security experts Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J.

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[1] Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, *Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution* [Hebrew version], (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), 20. For further analysis of Israel's traditional security doctrine and its evolution since the end of the Cold War, see, among others, Stuart A. Cohen, *Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Yoram Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006); Kobi Michael, "The Israeli Defense Forces as an Epistemic Authority: An Intellectual Challenge in the Reality of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30 (2007): 421–46; and especially Sergio Catignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifada: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009). Very few scholarly works were written about the Israeli campaign in the security zone in south Lebanon. Among them, see Andrew Exum, "Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment," *Policy Focus* 63 (2006): 2–4; and especially Sergio Cantigani and Clive Jones, *Israel and Lebanon, 1976- 2006: An Interstate and Asymmetric Conflict in Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2009). The author of this article is working on a manuscript that may be the first comprehensive account of the Israeli side of the conflict.


Beirut
Mediterranean Sea
Awali River
LEBANON
Sidon
ISRAELI SECURITY ZONE
Tyre
SYRIA
Golan Heights
ISRAEL
N
Sea of Galilee
JORDAN
Israeli Security Zone
1985—2000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10km
0 1 2 3 4 5 6mi

Map illustration by Vincent J. Martinez.

Bacevich argued as well that while a focus on current security activities may have advanced certain units' training, especially infantry units, it negatively affected the level of preparedness of the rest of the ground forces.[2] However, according to a state comptroller's report concerning an IDF infantry brigade, these routine current security assignments required the acquisition of a skill set not necessarily compatible with that needed in times of all-out war. While the brigade armament and organizational structure—companies, platoons, and squads—reflected the requirements for high-intensity conflicts, the current security operations necessitated different weapons and force structures, which in turn required specialized training.[3]

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[2] Cohen, Eisenstadt, and Bacevich, *Knives, Tanks, and Missiles*, 55.

One of the IDF's difficulties adapting to the special needs that low-intensity conflict created was its deployment of mainly conscripts to the security zone. The IDF had only three years to train these recruits for not only high-intensity conflicts, but also for security operations in the security zone, as well as to prepare them for deployment on real assignments. According to IDF's General Staff Planning Division's February 1996 regulations, infantry company training cycles included 16 weeks of basic training, 10 weeks of advanced training, and 33 weeks of active duty in the battalion. At the end of the cycle, the company was dissolved, with some of its men going on to command courses and the rest bolstering the numbers of other companies in the battalion. The eight months stretching from completion of advanced training until the individual company members went their separate ways was the only period during which the soldiers could acquire the necessary level of proficiency as members of fighting teams, and this time period was further fragmented due to the requirements of routine operations.[4]

The state comptroller's report also pointed out that some of the training themes were not taught on a regular basis, that the brigade's training center was monitoring this issue, and that the overly rigid training schedule hindered attempts to introduce these lost themes at later dates. Additionally, since companies did not keep records of class attendance, the extent to which lost themes may have been re-covered could not be measured.

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[3] Israel State Comptroller, "Golani Brigade," *Annual Report 47* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Governmental Printing, 1997), 992–93.

[4] Ibid., 993.

The report noted as well that, although regulations stipulated qualification standards for completing basic training—including physical fitness and sniper exams and the execution of individual and squad field exercises—soldiers who had failed to participate in or pass these tests were still being graduated. Furthermore, the report found that no standards had been set for certain themes, such as the use of heavy machine guns or field craft, which were deemed essential by regulations.

The purpose of advanced training was to instruct a company in the various forms of battle and in the use of individual and team weapons. Regulations that governed advanced training required companies to practice various elementary themes, such as securing exposed objectives; self-defense; urban warfare; use of armored personnel carriers; topography, navigation, and their derivatives; firearms; physical fitness; and knowledge of the enemy. Themes that may have been included if time permitted in a training cycle involved securing fortified objectives and platoon- and company-sized raids in preparation for operational assignments.[5]

One of the IDF's difficulties adapting to the special needs that low-intensity conflict created was its deployment of mainly conscripts to the security zone.

IDF Deficiencies and the Security Zone

Infantrymen had difficulty coping with the tough southern Lebanese terrain and the type of warfare employed by Hezbollah, revealing training deficiencies in sniper skills and field craft. Field craft had been an IDF strength during the War of Independence (1948–49) and again during the mid-1950s following the establishment of Unit 101 and the Elite Paratroopers Regiment. Aside from these two periods (and apart from certain elite units), the IDF had neglected field craft training until its practices in southern Lebanon highlighted the importance of field craft in the conflict with Hezbollah. Through various projects, field craft became common infantry practice once again.[6] The turning point was the establishment—the end result of a long process that began in the summer of 1991 and ended in the spring of 1998—of the guerrilla section in IDF Northern Command's Elyakim training base. The express mission of the school, which was founded by Shmuel Zakai and Mordechai Peretz, was to counter Hezbollah guerrilla tactics. The instructors were experienced officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who trained all infantry brigades for two weeks before they took up their posts in Lebanon. The school also enjoyed close cooperation with the command's Egoz elite unit that specialized in guerrilla warfare.[7] Egoz used the school's training and instruction facilities while its commanders assisted in forming counterguerrilla doctrine. An additional step in the IDF's adaptation to the Lebanese reality occurred in June 1999 when the school instituted joint armor-infantry training that included ambushes, post defense, and evacuation procedures.[8]

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[5] Ibid., 998–99.

Field craft had been an IDF strength during the War of Independence… and again during the mid-1950s.

The IDF's inability to cope with Hezbollah tactics resulted in the need to form Egoz. In a sense, Egoz served a dual purpose. First, it acted as a specialized force that enabled Northern Command to adopt a more offensive posture toward Hezbollah. It is not surprising that the unit was formed under the leadership of Lieutenant General Amiram Levin, a former special operations officer, as the new approach he instituted—of which Egoz was a major component—in Northern Command from 1994 to 1998 had significantly improved the IDF's military capabilities against Hezbollah. One of Levin's new ideas entailed increasing the Israeli military presence on the border and in the security zone. Preferring small elite units over large units using massive amounts of indiscriminate firepower, Levin reinstituted patrols deep within enemy territory and ambushes on known infiltration routes. These patrols and ambushes had been stopped two years earlier following a friendly fire incident in which four soldiers had been killed. The new approach was to seal the attackers within "fire blocks" and then send in attack helicopters to finish the fight. According to some media reports, this approach paid off, and the use of attack helicopters was especially effective.[9]

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[6] Amos Golan and Nir Gue, "Fieldcraft: The Warrior Art of Using Terrain," [in Hebrew] *Maccatz* 1 (2000): 9.

[7] Yossi Harpaz, "Identity Card: School of CG (counter guerrilla)," [in Hebrew] *Bamahane* [IDF official magazine], March 2000, 24.

[8] Aya Tanzer, "New at the North: Combined Arms Guerrilla Training for Armor and Infantry Combatants," [in Hebrew] *Bamahane*, June 1999, 10.

Egoz also served as a laboratory of sorts. The methods, equipment, and attitudes developed by Egoz, and through its cooperation with the guerrilla school, enabled the IDF to assimilate this burgeoning knowledge into the other infantry brigades.

Nonetheless, the IDF only realized in 2000 that infantry training had to be reformed, leading to the establishment of the field craft department in the IDF Infantry School. The main idea behind this addition to military training was to explore themes such as terrain evaluation and analysis; evasive maneuvers; camouflage; combat navigation; choosing approach routes; avoiding detection; and creating fire and observation points. One officer and six NCO-level instructors graduated the first course. Following three and a half months of training, some of the instructors were sent to brigade training bases, where their objective was to train the bases' instructors in the knowledge and skills they had acquired.[10]

The department was founded for other reasons as well, including creating uniformity in field craft training for all units, inserting it as an integral element of warfare, and further developing the training of elite units.[11] Sharpshooting received similar attention as a means to improve the infantry's skill set. A new infantry position, "sharpshooter" or "marksman,"[12] had been introduced in 1996 and had become one of the most important positions in squads, platoons, and companies during the fighting, both in southern Lebanon and in the Second Intifada, because it much improved the accuracy and range of the small infantry groups, thus minimizing the need to call for reinforcements or fire support.[13] Other weapons and aids were introduced concurrently, thereby enhancing infantry sniper capabilities, including camouflage means, organizational changes regarding the sniper's position within the infantry battalion, and the institutionalization of the sniper squad that had, until 1998, been at the discretion of the commanding officers.[14]

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[9] Dafna Vardi, "The Methods of Lt. General Levin Will Require an Increase in IDF Forces at Lebanon," [in Hebrew] *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv), 3 March 1995.

[10] Yoash Limon, "Fieldcraft on the Field," [in Hebrew] *Maccatz* 12 (2003): 42.

[11] Ibid., 43; and Arieh O' Sulivan, "Hide and Seek," [in Hebrew] *Jerusalem Post*, 8 December 2000, 18.

The IDF's recognition of the distinction between company training for high-intensity conflicts and squad-sized operations in the security zone was instrumental in the institution of the abovementioned changes. Until the 1990s, the IDF's tactical-level ethos of command had stressed initiative, independence, and offensive-mindedness. These attitudes were prevalent both in training and in current security activities to prepare for an eventual war against a conventional army. However, the nature of warfare in southern Lebanon had changed these attitudes. Consecutive commanding officers of Northern Command, fearing Hezbollah's reaction to noncombatant deaths by the hand of the IDF (for example, fear of Katyusha rockets being fired on the Israeli civilian population), led senior commanders to micromanage operational planning in the hope of minimizing its negative consequences.

The micromanaging attitude resulted from three other factors as well. One was the IDF's sluggishness in recognizing the nature of the conflict in southern Lebanon as guerrilla warfare due to its fixation on high-intensity conflict. The second factor was that while the IDF traditionally focused on achieving battlefield decisions in high-intensity conflict, the nature of prolonged guerrilla warfare in southern Lebanon—when collateral damage brought retaliation (short-range rockets) on Israel's northern settlements, thereby minimizing legitimate decision-making mistakes to nil—tended to suffocate tactical creative thinking. This occured so much that, according to a leading Israeli journalist, planning had become

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[12] According to *The IDF Dictionary for Military Terms* (1998 version) [in Hebrew], a "sharpshooter" or "marksman" is "a soldier who is good at hitting a target, mainly with light weapons, such as a gun, machine gun, or pistol."

[13] Major Mike, "How to Choose a Storm Sniper," [in Hebrew] *Maccatz* 15 (2004): 33. As a rule, the IDF identified active-service officers in sensitive positions by their rank and first name only.

[14] Tahal Bloomenfeld, "Sharpshooting: A Significant Improvement in the Quality of Infantry Snipers," [in Hebrew] *Bamahane*, April 1998, 11.

> a collection of safety instructions, cautionary instructions, security measures, and protective measures. It is a sequence of lessons and more lessons, many of which are attached to names of soldiers who paid the ultimate price for some sort of negligence. The trick is how to be prepared, ready for danger, how to be sure and kill when you must but also to be careful of mistakenly killing a UN soldier, an innocent bystander, a woman, a child, or your friend. How to follow the nonexistent rules of the game. How to play with fire without touching it.[15]

The IDF [was sluggish] in recognizing the nature of the conflict in southern Lebanon as guerrilla warfare due to its fixation on high-intensity conflict.

The third contributing factor was the influx of inexperienced and under-trained junior commanders in whose authority senior commanders were reluctant to trust. In order to solve this problem, the junior commanders' level of training was increased significantly through a continuum of new training and command courses intended to raise their professionalism. For example, the IDF introduced the position of a team leader as a preparatory stage before the traditional squad leaders' course in 2000. Their weeklong training was held during basic training.[16] In addition, in May 2000, the IDF also opened a senior sergeants' course.[17] Amnon Barzilai, a military commentator who worked for the *Ha'aretz* daily newspaper, argued that this course was part of a more comprehensive change in military education and in the training of junior commanders who chose to pursue a military career. These changes included a senior platoon sergeants' course, a ground forces officer school, and the Tactical Command College for company commanders.[18]

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[15] Imanuel Rozen, "Kids of the Zone," [in Hebrew] *Maariv Weekend Supplement*, 29 November 1991, 16.

[16] Major Mike, "How to Choose a Storm Sniper," 35.

At the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifida (September 2000), small forces conducted a growing number of missions; however, it soon became apparent that they could not all be led by officers. According to an officer identified as Lieutenant Colonel Udi, commander of the Shimshon infantry battalion in the Kfir Infantry Brigade,[19] which was in charge of the Gaza Strip's Nezarim sector in 2003,

> We were trained wrong in Lebanon… as second in command of Egoz, I would command ten-men operations. The whole business of command and control didn't work right then. We'd sit on our ass and wait for a company commander to lead an ambush because no one even relied on platoon commanders. Platoon sergeants were considered endangered species, getting up only at ten in the morning… when we started fighting the Palestinians, and every patrol, every road block, and every post needed a commander, we had no choice but to employ the whole chain of command, and that re-elevated the position of junior commanders to its proper place. My squad leaders lay ambushes. They were trained as squad leaders, so let them lead squads. An army can't work without trusting junior commanders, and in Lebanon we didn't trust them… war today is different than any we've

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[17] Israel State Comptroller, "Golani Brigade," *Annual Report 52A* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Governmental Printing, 2001), 130–31.

[18] Amnon Brazilai, "Nemera Program: Merkava Mark 1 Would Be Converted into APC," [in Hebrew] *Ha'aretz*, 10 June 2004.

[19] The Kfir (young lion) Infantry Brigade is the largest infantry brigade in the IDF, with six battalions. In contrast to the rest of the infantry, the brigade is attached to a specific theater of operations: the Occupied Territories.

> known before, and those who have to deal with it are NCOs. It's not like the Yom Kippur War when battalion commanders led charges. Most incidents today involve sergeants and squad leaders. That strengthened junior command and my sergeants' command operations. They shoot all day and I trust them just like I trust my platoon commanders, no question. My platoon commanders today have sergeants—just like in the American movies.[20]

Indeed, in this Intifada, sergeants often had more authority and discretion than did platoon leaders who commanded similar operations in the security zone. This resulted not only from operational demands, but also from a change in public opinion. During the first few years of the Intifada, the IDF had more leeway concerning public acceptance of collateral damage and decreasing public criticism of commanders' mistakes that resulted in causalities and injuries. When public opinion acknowledged the need for sacrifice, public and judicial criticism of the IDF lessened, and senior commanders took a step back from the micromanagement command style of the southern Lebanon conflict and were able to delegate responsibility to junior NCOs.

The Influence of Lebanon on Doctrine Development

An additional problem that arose during the fighting in southern Lebanon was a lack of doctrine and of organizations for its development and dissemination. One contributing factor to this doctrinal vacuum was the absence of forums dedicated to discussing doctrinal issues, aside from the IDF-only professional journal, *Maarachot*. According to Colonel Yizhar Seter, then head of the Doctrine and Headquarters Development Department within the Doctrine and Instruction Branch of the General Staff, in 1999, no debate about the importance of developing knowledge in the IDF existed. He also pointed out the absence of forums in which interested parties could present their opinions and reflections or debate relevant issues.

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[20] Itai Asher, "Sergeant Shmuel," [in Hebrew] *NRG*, August 2004. The articles provided only the rank and first name of Lieutenant Colonel Udi, who was an active-service officer in a sensitive position.

In 1999, a new journal, *Zarkor* (Spotlight), was launched to address these concerns, specifically, the absence of professional knowledge concerning southern Lebanon, the IDF's only active area of operations at that time. Shmuel Nir, who had been the Lebanon Liaison Unit's intelligence officer, wrote the first issue of the journal.[21] He devoted it to an analysis of the IDF's deficiencies in countering Hezbollah tactics and offered various solutions to the problems he described. He had hoped that this discussion would develop into a shared conceptual framework and doctrine.[22] To a great extent, the first issue reflected the desire of many officers who had served long periods in the security zone to translate their experiences, not just on a personal level, but on a professional one as well. However, Nir's essay, which focused on the importance of combat intelligence in operations against nonstate organizations, neglected the noncombat dimensions of countering insurgency, such as the fact that the IDF's failure in the security zone was due in part to having alienated the civilian population because soldiers were not taught how to act in occupied territories. The essay, which was later developed and published as the IDF's doctrine for low-intensity conflicts (termed "limited conflict"), reflected a lack of knowledge concerning countering insurgency, as Nir's discussion failed to address issues such as the ideal force structure for fighting nonstate organizations and the type of intelligence ties that should

In this Intifada, sergeants often had more authority and discretion than did platoon leaders who commanded similar operations in the security zone.

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[21] Though defined as a journal, each issue was written by one author as a monograph.

[22] Shmuel Nir, "The Fighting in the Lebanese Arena as a Conflict Between Unequal Forces: Simple Truths," [in Hebrew] *Zarkor* 1 (1999), introduction.

exist between military and nonmilitary organizations. An additional weakness in his discussion was an emphasis on offensive operations, as these operations often incur casualties, which in turn tend to weaken public support. (He did, however, acknowledge the importance of public support in asymmetrical warfare).

The Lebanon experience, either directly or indirectly, influenced the change in attitude toward doctrine in two other ways. The first was through the publication of several doctrinal documents by units that were involved in security zone operations. These publications were translations of both doctrine for low-intensity operations of other armies and original doctrine that drew upon the experience in Lebanon. The second influence was the emergence of a new cohort of field commanders who began their service close to the end of the First Lebanon War and became battalion and brigade commanders by the time of the withdrawal from the security zone. Many of them attended the Barak Course at the Command and General Staff College, the first professional military education experience in the IDF.[23] They were more willing to look for solutions to the problems they faced—that is, fighting a guerrilla war of the kind they had not faced before—in the doctrine and operational experience of foreign militaries.

From a sociological point of view, these groups can be called the "Lebanese Generation": when these officers arrived in the Territories in late 2001, they possessed the operational experience and knowledge of how to use their brigades to deal with counterinsurgency operations that they had gained during the last years in the security zone. By 2002, these were the troops who succeeded in Operation Defensive Shield, a major operation in the West Bank region during the Second Intifada.

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[23] Regarding the Barak Course, see Tamir Libel, "Late Bloomers: Professionalising Israel Defence Forces," in Hubert Annen and Wolfgang Royl, eds., *Educational Challenges Regarding Military Action* (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Peter Lang, 2010).

High Energy Biscuits

Residents of Pano Aqil, Sindh Province, Pakistan, rush toward food supplies delivered by U.S. Marines with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit on 11 September 2010. Photo by Sgt Jason Bushong (USA).



The International Response to the 2010 Pakistan Flood

An Interview with Michael Young of the International Rescue Committee

Edited by Kenneth H. Williams

More people worldwide died in 2010 as a result of natural disasters than had in any other year in at least two decades, due in large part to the extensive loss of life (perhaps more than 300,000 people) in the 12 January earthquake in Haiti. But of the nearly 208 million people who were affected by natural disasters in 2010, a staggering 86 percent of those suffered from the impact of floods.[1] Asia was the hardest-hit region, with devastating flooding all summer in parts of China (its most substantial flooding in decades) and the worst flooding ever in Pakistan.

The Pakistan flood displaced 20 million people and at its peak covered one-fifth of the country, a land mass the size of Florida or Wisconsin. This disaster was of both humanitarian and strategic interest to the United States, given Pakistan's interconnectivity with

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Young is regional director for Asia, Caucasus, and the Middle East for the International Rescue Committee. His work with that organization is discussed in the introduction. In addition to his fieldwork, he completed a master's degree in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in 2010, focusing in his thesis on relief aid as an element of counterinsurgency. Williams is senior editor for *Marine Corps University Journal* and Marine Corps University Press.

[1] Nearly twice as many people worldwide were affected by floods in 2010 as had been on average in the years 2000 through 2009. This and other data in this paragraph from Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), "2010 Disasters in Numbers," http://cred.be/sites/default/files/PressConference2010.pdf, with information drawn from CRED's International Disaster Database (http://www.emdat.be). CRED officially recognizes 222,570 deaths from the Haitian earthquake and resulting traumas, but in January 2011, the Haitian prime minister updated the mortality figures by 93,430 additional deaths, information that CRED was still verifying at the time of publication.

the war in neighboring Afghanistan.[2] U.S. service members participated in missions in Pakistan that evacuated more than 40,000 people and delivered more than 26 million pounds of supplies.[3]

Numerous aid agencies, both government-based and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), also participated in the relief efforts, many of which are still ongoing at the time of this publication.[4] The largest collective of these groups is the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF), a network of 40 nonprofit relief agencies from around the world. During the time of the flooding, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) chaired the PHF.[5]

Michael Young, IRC's regional director for Asia, Caucasus, and the Middle East, was the point person for coordinating this massive international relief effort. Prior to assuming that position, he had been the IRC's country representative in Pakistan. He had also worked in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, and Sudan as a field manager and technical advisor on issues of displacement relief and postcrisis development.

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[2] For collective coverage by major new agencies, see *New York Times*, "Times Topics: 2010 Pakistan Floods," http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/floods/2010_pakistan_floods/index.html; and BBC News, "Special Reports: Pakistan Floods," http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special_reports/pakistan_floods/.

[3] U.S. military assistance began on 31 July, continued until 2 December, and involved elements of the Marines, Navy, Army, and Air Force. The U.S. Department of Defense collected stories on these operations on a single site: "U.S. Provides Support during Pakistan Flooding," http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0810_pakistan/. See also U.S. Central Command, "Pakistan Flood Relief," http://www.centcom.mil/en/pakistan-flood/. Marines from the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units participated in the relief efforts.

[4] For an overview of the status of relief efforts at the time of the publication of this interview, see United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Pakistan Office, *Pakistan Humanitarian Bulletin*, 3–16 March 2011, http://pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yB3qkjDn7K4%3d&tabid=87&mid=760.

[5] For the International Rescue Committee's work in Pakistan in response to the flooding, see IRC, "Pakistan Flood Crisis," http://www.rescue.org/special-reports/special-report-pakistan; and IRC, "After the Flood: Pakistan's Humanitarian Crisis Far from Over," http://www.rescue.org/news/after-flood-pakistan%E2%80%99s-humanitarian-crisis-far-over-10365.

This interview with Young was conducted via e-mail on 28–29 March 2011.

Kenneth H. Williams: What was your view of the state of conditions in Pakistan before the floods of late summer/early autumn 2010, and of the effectiveness of aid efforts at that time?

Michael Young: Pakistan was already in an increasingly fragile state before the floods. The ramifications of the massive counterinsurgency campaigns carried out by the Pakistani military—which at one point had displaced more than 3 million of its own citizens—were still rippling out.[6] The Taliban and other extremist groups were still pervasive and active. Security was continuing on a downward trend.[7] And then there were the continuing political, social, and economic challenges.[8] For example, Pakistan already had a major public health crisis even before the floods, with indicators, like maternal mortality or child survival, that spoke of a situation you normally see only in times of acute crisis and which lagged behind all their regional peers.[9]

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[6] One study as of July 2009 calculated the internally displaced persons in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province alone, which includes the Swat Valley, at between 2.7 and 3.5 million Pakistanis. See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Pakistan: Millions of IDPs and Returnees Face Continuing Crisis," 2 December 2009, http://www.internal-displacement.org. For the resulting damage, see Asian Development Bank and World Bank, *Pakistan North West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment: Immediate Restoration and Medium Term Reconstruction in Crisis Affected Areas* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, November 2009), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/PAK-FATA-Damage-Needs-Assesment-Nov-2009.pdf. For the military operations up through early 2010, see Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf. For the longer view of the civil-military challenges in the country, see Husian Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005); and Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[7] For the strategic situation at the time the flooding hit, as well as the flood's initial impact, see the transcript of the 14 September 2010 program at the Center for American Progress, "Turmoil in Pakistan and an Assessment of U.S. Policy," http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2010/09/inf/coin.pdf.

[8] In Pakistan, 60.3 percent of the population lives on less than two dollars a day (U.S. currency). The literacy rate is estimated at 54 percent, but the primary school completion rate is only 19 percent. Inflation was 11.7 percent before the floods but rose quickly to 13.5 percent. USAID, "Pakistan Fact Sheet," November 2010, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT583.pdf. For a detailed examination of one of the many significant problems, see Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway, eds., *Hunger Pains: Pakistan's Food Security* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ASIA_100412_PakistFood_rptL0713FINALVERSION.pdf.

Williams: Then came the floods. Briefly describe the timeline, scope, and devastation of the flooding.

Young: The rains started a little early last year, in mid-July, and they followed an unusual pattern. Rapid flash floods hit the northwest that month, almost instantaneously with monsoon onset, and these were very destructive.[10] They also cut off a lot of mountain areas, such as Upper Swat, within the first week. But it took about a month of constant heavy rainfall for the flood surge to reach Punjab and then Sindh. By late August, northern Sindh was essentially an inland sea, moving rapidly, scouring all in its wake.

Pakistan was already in an increasingly fragile state before the floods.

Perversely, this slow onset was a little lucky in that direct deaths from the floodwater were few and mostly concentrated in the flash-flood areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[11] The long time lag of the flood surge and the more gradual rise in water levels in Punjab and Sindh gave people more time to move out and enabled the government, military, and NGOs to do more advance response work.

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[9] Pakistan's infant mortality rate is 65.14 deaths per 1,000; for comparison, the rate is 6.26 for the U.S. (2009 data). Pakistan's maternal mortality rate is 320 deaths per 100,000 live births; in the U.S., it is 11 deaths (2005 data). Of the Pakistani children who survive birth, 89 out of 1,000 die before age 5. U.S. Global Health Policy, "Infant Mortality Rates," http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/topic.jsp?i=93; U.S. Global Health Policy, "Maternal Mortality Ratio," http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/topic.jsp?i=97; USAID, "Pakistan Fact Sheet."

[10] See Goddard Earth Sciences Data and Information Services Center, "Flooding in Pakistan Caused by Higher-Than-Normal Monsoon Rainfall," 14 December 2010, http://disc.sci.gsfc.nasa.gov/gesNews/pakistan_flooding_monsoon_rainfall; and Brian Vastag, "Devastating 2010 Pakistan Floods Highlight Difficulties in Sounding Alarm," *Washington Post*, 13 February 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/devastating-2010-pakistan-floods-highlight-difficulties-in-sounding-alarm/2011/02/13/ABI16pQ_story.html.

[11] As of the time of publication, the internationally accepted death toll for the Pakistan flood is 1,985. Of these, 1,156 (58 percent) occurred in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. CRED, "2010 Disasters in Numbers"; United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Response—Pakistan, "Pakistan Floods—2010," http://www.pakresponse.info/FactsandFigures.aspx.

The level of physical destruction is huge; that is matched by the devastation in people's livelihoods. A lot of people lost everything: house, livestock, crops, cash reserves, other assets.

Williams: Was the international reaction to the Pakistan flooding hurt by the nature of the event, since it was relatively slow in developing, as opposed to a sudden catastrophe, such as an earthquake?[12]

Young: That was certainly one factor in what was a laggardly response. But it wasn't the only one. There was definitely donor fatigue with Pakistan, the floods coming on top of what were several years of crisis culminating in the 2008–2009 conflict displacement. There was obviously an international image problem for Pakistan given the attention given groups like the Taliban and the tangled relationship with the Afghan conflict. Then there was the Haiti earthquake, which justifiably ate up attention and also obviously soaked up a lot of aid funding at the front end.[13] For several months, therefore, there was too little money around to kick-start a proper response, given the scale.

That massive scale—20 million people affected at the height—challenged everyone in terms of logistics. Everyone was operating at the very edge of their capacity and beyond. Hundreds of thousands of people were very hard to reach, either because they were cut off by roads and bridges being washed away, or because they were constantly on the move, ahead of the floodwaters.

I also need here to commend the U.S., particularly its USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] Office for Foreign

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[12] See Lynda Polgreen, "The Special Pain of a Slow Disaster," *New York Times*, 11 November 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/giving/11AID.html.

[13] For a juxtaposition of the crises in Haiti and Pakistan, see Elizabeth Ferris, "Earthquakes and Floods: Comparing Haiti and Pakistan," Brookings Institution, 26 August 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/ 2010/0826_earthquakes_floods_ferris/0826_earthquakes_floods_ferris.pdf.

Disaster Assistance [OFDA]. The U.S. administration and OFDA did a great job. They earmarked aid money early and at scale, thanks to Secretary [of State Hillary Rodham] Clinton and Ambassador [Richard C. A.] Holbrooke's quick decision making, and they got that money out and working on the ground fast. I'd award them the best performance marks among the major international donors during the flood response.[14]

Williams: What was the shape of Pakistan's infrastructure before the flooding? What was the impact of the flooding on it? How have infrastructure challenges affected the aid efforts?

Young: Basic infrastructure was pretty good in general—roads, bridges, canals, that kind of thing. Utilities were less so: chronic electricity shortages; gas price hikes and supply blips; poor potable water supply; inadequate sanitation. Maintenance and upkeep were chronic problems. Public service delivery—health, education, for example—was broadly poor in terms of coverage and quality.

The floods impacted and worsened all these structures and services, most obviously in destroying a lot of fixed infrastructure, but also in directly placing even more stress on already low-capacity services like health, or

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron P. Munter offloads flour from a Marine CH-53E helicopter, bringing flood relief supplies to a small village in Sindh Province, Pakistan. Photo by SSgt. Kali Gradishar (USAF).

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[14] For coverage of the USAID response, see USAID, Pakistan Office, "USAID/Pakistan Disaster Assistance News Releases," http://www.usaid.gov/pk/newsroom/news/disaster/; and USAID, "Pakistan Floods: 60 Days Later," http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ471.pdf. For an interview with Holbrooke at the time of the flooding, see the transcript of his appearance on the *PBS News Hour* on 19 August 2010: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/july-dec10/pak2holbrooke_08-19.html.

indirectly such as schools being occupied by people fleeing the floodwaters. Whole districts were rendered inaccessible or swamped by an influx of thousands fleeing areas now under water.[15]

For example, within days of the start of the floods in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, we were working with locals to cut new tracks through the mountains, past washed-out roads and collapsed bridges, into isolated villages in Upper Swat to get aid in. This had two benefits: people who had been totally cut off could get aid and also get out and back (critical for getting people to local health care facilities), and the work put cash directly into the hands of villagers who had lost everything, as well as giving them renewed dignity in taking charge of their own aid.

Whole districts were rendered inaccessible or swamped by an influx of thousands fleeing areas now under water.

Williams: What international aid organizations have been major players in helping the flood victims?

Young: Pretty much everyone pitched in. The military, both national and international, played a strong role, particularly in meeting the logistical challenges. The 40 nonprofit relief agencies that are members of the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum—a network body that was chaired by the IRC during the floods—all had major response programs. Pakistan also has a strong national civil society with many very experienced development organizations, though obviously an emergency response is radically different from a development program. Then there was the character of Pakistani society and communities. Ordinary citizens responded on a huge scale, offering assistance and shelter to those fleeing the floods.

Williams: What are some of the keys to coordinating relief efforts of nongovernmental organizations?

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[15] See Carlotta Gall, "Pakistan Flood Sets Back Infrastructure by Years," *New York Times*, 26 August 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/world/asia/27flood.html.

Young: There's a whole coordination architecture that rolls out in emergency response. In Pakistan, it had been in place for several years, following the 2005 earthquake and other natural and man-made disasters.[16] Typically, the UN [United Nations] will organize what's called a cluster system,[17] where government, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental aid actors get together in groups organized around the obvious areas, such as education, nutrition, shelter, water, sanitation, etc. Often, these groups are cochaired: someone from the relevant UN body, someone from the relevant government ministry, and sometimes a lead NGO, too. The clusters map out who is doing what where, share information about issues, and act as a focus for identifying needs and how to best go about meeting them. There's also the Humanitarian Country Team,[18] chaired by the UN humanitarian coordinator, and including representation from NGOs. Then the Pakistani government has gradually developed its own coordination bodies, learning from lessons during the 2005 earthquake response. In the floods, the National Disaster Management Authority played a key role.

If anything, there were maybe too many coordination fora, leading to some duplication and meeting mania. Our country director was probably in some kind of coordination or policy meeting for several hours every day for three months solid. You do begin to question the balance between coordination—which is important—and just getting the job done, which is critical to saving lives, especially in such a huge emergency.

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[16] The 7.6 magnitude earthquake of 8 October 2005 in northern Pakistan, with the epicenter near the border of the Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan region of Kashmir, killed 73,338 people. CRED, "CRED Crunch," June 2006, http://www.cred.be/ sites/default/files/CredCrunch05.pdf.

[17] For the cluster system, see Inter-Agency Standing Committee, "Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response," 24 November 2006, http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/Resources%20&%20tools/IASCGUIDANCENOTECLUSTERAPPROACH.pdf.

[18] For the role of a Humanitarian Country Team, see Inter-Agency Standing Committee, "Guidance for Humanitarian Country Teams," 18 November 2009, http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx?docID=5158&type=pdf.

The reality of aid coordination during an emergency is always going to be messy and a matter of feeling the way forward, listening always to your context. I think coordination is best at ground level, and the higher up the tree it goes, the less useful it actually is in terms of helping you to get the aid out to the people who need it.

Williams: What roles did international militaries, and specifically the U.S. military, play in flood relief?

Young: A big, big role. Without military capacity, hundreds of thousands of people would have been cut off from aid, or stranded in rapidly shrinking islands of dry land, for weeks. So, in sheer logistical terms, the U.S. military made a critical contribution. They saved lives.

The question of how militaries interact with humanitarian non-governmental agencies is a more complex proposition, especially in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they are active parties in a conflict.

Williams: What was the reaction of the Pakistani people to the U.S. military personnel who participated in the aid efforts, particularly considering the contentious question of whether U.S. troops should be used in Pakistan to fight the Taliban?

Young: Among the people affected by the floods on the ground, it was generally a neutral reaction. There were isolated incidents of resistance to U.S. involvement and refusal of aid, but mostly, people were willing to accept assistance no matter where it came from. There was a lot of justifiable anxiety about U.S. military involvement, which heightened when the Taliban made their statement about targeting international aid agencies, but the worst-case scenario—extensive targeting of aid staff and assets or targeting of communities for accepting aid that could be branded as coming from the U.S.—did not come to pass.[19]

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[19] Salman Masood, "In Pakistan, Taliban Hint at Attacks on Relief Workers," *New York Times*, 27 August 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/world/asia/27pstan.html; "UN Reviews Security after Pakistani Taliban 'Threat,'" *BBC News*, 26 August 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11095267; Rob Crilly, "Taliban Vows to Kidnap Foreign Aid Workers," *London Daily Telegraph*, 26 August 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7965241/Pakistan-floods-Taliban-vows-to-kidnap-foreign-aid-workers.html.

We were careful, for example, about branding aid in some of the more insecure areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where there was high militant activity. In Sindh, it was a different matter, and U.S. aid could be branded as such. Again, knowing your local context and responding accordingly is absolutely key. We did comprehensive risk assessments in each and every district we worked in—talked to villagers, the government, the police, the army, and colleague agencies about attitudes to aid, including U.S. branding of aid. Basically, where they told us this was possible, we did it; where they advised against it, and there was supporting evidence in terms of incident trends, we did not brand.

The U.S. military made a critical contribution. They saved lives.

You can usually trust the advice of local people once you establish dialogue and mutual accountability. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, our ability to access insecure areas rests on the acceptance of the people living there. We've worked consistently in some of the most violent areas in both countries for over three decades, and we have extremely strong links with communities. We don't use armed guards or armored vehicles; instead, we go very low-profile: unmarked vehicles, an emphasis on national and local staff who know the landscape and important local power holders, constant dialogue with communities and local government. For example, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, we are 99 percent staffed by Afghans and Pakistanis, from director level on down. That's a pretty usual model for IRC programs worldwide, except in the most acute periods of emergency response when you tend to need expatriate surge capacity.

You often hear an argument that the only military can program aid in highly insecure areas because NGOs can't get in. My experience is that this is mistaken. Pretty much everywhere, even in the most actively violent districts, NGO access can be enabled or is already there. IRC, for example, has worked consistently in Khost, a very conservative and violent province in Afghanistan, or in the tribal areas of Pakistan up against the Afghan border, using this low profile/acceptance strategy.

Williams: While on this topic, how do you see the role of militaries in humanitarian operations? Obviously on certain levels, militaries have capacities that far outpace those of civilian aid enterprises, but they also introduce an element into the equation that civilian agencies do not, particularly in already-unstable areas.

Young: There are clearly circumstances where military capacity is critical. No other institution has the reach, mobilization ability, or stronger logistics and human resource platforms. In places like Haiti, or more recently Japan, you absolutely need the military as a big part of the humanitarian response.

But in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, where there is this very complex interaction between *salafist jihadi* insurgencies and military-led counterinsurgencies, with a transnational character, heavy military involvement in aid delivery becomes much more problematic. Organizations like IRC work within a set of humanitarian principles, including impartiality and independence. These derive from the laws of war and are critical to delivering an effective response that genuinely meets needs and is not driven by political or military rationales. Where structures like PRTs [provincial reconstruction teams]—with their blended military-civil character—or the military, like the Pakistani army, are heavily involved in delivering all kinds of aid based on political and military aims, rather than purely on need, you get a dangerous blurring between military actors and civilian actors that heightens risk and renders aid less effective.

There are clearly circumstances where military capacity is critical.

There are many reasons behind this. PRTs have massive pressure to spend but difficulty in mobilizing the correct human resources for project identification or management. There tends to be more superficial community consultation about aid projects, or diversion of aid to benefit a particular clique important to the COIN [counterinsurgency] effort, and the results can be of poor quality and/or not owned or wanted by the wider community. The COIN strategy is an attractive one, and many elements are surely correct in terms of defining the effort, emphasizing local ownership, and bringing resources to bear, but it is the "build" part of the core trinity[20] that becomes problematic when aid is dominated by national security imperatives in that tight of a grip.

For me, the bottom line is that, increasingly, studies are showing that this approach to aid just doesn't work. It broadly fails as aid and also does not appear to contribute to solidifying security. Part of the solution may lie in sharpening the focus of key actors involved in a stabilization response: the military concentrating on assuring public safety and building the capacity of local security/rule-of-law agencies; civilian actors, such as independent nongovernmental actors working in coordination with, and support to, the local government, doing the aid delivery and civil institution capacity building; and moving away from the closely blended PRT model.

Williams: At the time of the flooding, there was discussion in Washington about whether the United States would get "credit" in the eyes of the Pakistanis for aid efforts. It was a delicate question, particularly for officials from the U.S. Department of State and USAID, but there was definitely interest in whether a strong U.S. response to the floods—and a U.S.-branded response—could improve U.S.-Pakistani relations.[21] Has it?

Young: There's not a lot of real evidence for a "halo effect" for U.S. aid in terms of changing Pakistani attitudes. There's one study that appears to show some temporary benefit following the big U.S.

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[20] The key elements of counterinsurgency are often broken down into clear, hold, and build.

[21] For an example of such discussion, see the transcript of the 1 September 2010 program at the Brookings Institution, "Responding to the Historic Floods in Pakistan: Political and Security Considerations," in which Young participated, along with representatives of the U.S. State Department, USAID, and the former chair of the Pakistani joint chiefs of staff (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2010/0901_pakistan/20100901_pakistan_floods.pdf). See also Donald G. McNeil Jr., "Disaster Strategy: The Soft Heart and the Hard Sell," *New York Times*, 22 August 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/ weekinreview/ 22McNeil.html; Eric Schmidt, "U.S. Offers Aid to Rescue Pakistanis and Reclaim Image," *New York Times*, 15 August 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/world/asia/15pstan.html; and Howard LaFranchi, "Pakistan Flood Relief: Could it Undercut Taliban Influence?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 August 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0803/Pakistan-flood-relief-Could-it-undercut-Taliban-influence.


Moderately affected districts
Severely affected districts
Partab Bridge
PAKISTANI-ADMINISTERED KASHMIR
KHYBER-PAKHTUNKHWA
Skardu
Besham
Kabul
Tarbela Dam
INDIAN-ADMINISTERED KASHMIR
AFGHANISTAN
Islamabad
Mangla Dam
Kalabagh Barrage
Chashma Barrage
PAKISTAN
Taunsa Barrage
PUNJAB
Indus River
INDIA
Guddu Barrage
Sukkur Barrage
N
Kotri Barrage
SINDH
Flooding Status in Pakistan as of 12 August 2010

Map illustration redrawn by Vincent J. Martinez. Source: OCHA.

response in the 2005 earthquake, but this has been oversold. There may be some marginal positive impact on public opinion, but I suspect that it will be evanescent.

Williams: How much has been accomplished in rehabilitating the devastated area? How much still remains to be done?

Young: There's been progress on stuff like rehabilitating agricultural land and getting people the seeds and tools they need to restart livelihoods. Pakistanis are extremely resilient, and they are getting up and getting on with rebuilding their lives. I was in some of the most flood-hit villages in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and people have largely gone home and were busy replanting their fields, replenishing their livestock, etc., with assistance. But there hasn't been much progress in terms of rebuilding the big infrastructure.

The government has concentrated on its direct cash transfer program, called the *watan* card scheme, which uses distribution of cash cards to put money directly into the hands of flood-affected households. It's a great approach, though it has big problems in practice, including very partial and slow coverage, significant exclusion of some of the most vulnerable (including women-headed households), and corruption. Everyone I talked to on my last visit to Pakistan had paid a bribe to get their cash card equivalent to more or less 25 percent of its value. Plus *watan* cards don't rebuild your house, they don't improve your health clinic, and they don't rehabilitate your school.

Most worryingly, little has been done to repair and improve the levees and the drainage systems. I walked through many villages along the Indus and Kabul Rivers where the levees had been totally washed away, and they have not been rebuilt. And we're only a few months away from the next monsoon season.

Williams: Do you think the Taliban has benefited from or been set back by the flooding and the aid response?[22] What aid role did it attempt to play in flood response?

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[22] See Room for Debate, "Can Flood Aid Weaken the Taliban in Pakistan?" *New York Times*, 23 August 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/08/23/can-us-disaster-aid-weaken-the-taliban-in-pakistan. Lashkar-e-Taiba did try to use the flooding and response to it as a tool for recruitment and fund raising. See *Associated Press*, "Pakistani Militant Group a Global Threat, Capable of Rivaling al Qaida," *Washington Post*, 2 April 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistani-militant-group-a-global-threat-capable-of-rivaling-al-qaida/2011/04/02/AFYoJ0OC_story.html; and Adam B. Ellick and Pir Zubair Shah, "Hard-Line Islam Fills Void in Flooded Pakistan," *New York Times*, 7 August 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/07/world/asia/07pstan.html.

Young: The Taliban made a public statement in which it told people not to accept international aid,[23] it threatened international aid organizations, and it announced its own aid program, which never materialized. So it made an attempt to be a spoiler, but this didn't pan out. Charities linked to some other extremist groups did mount an aid response, but their scale was a little overstated in media coverage.[24] In any case, Pakistanis are overwhelmingly common-sense people, moderate, and not attracted to extremist ideologies, even in very conservative areas. So I doubt getting a political message along with your aid makes much of a difference to the average Pakistani.

Pakistanis are overwhelmingly common-sense people, moderate, and not attracted to extremist ideologies.

What does cause concern is the lack of government response in the recovery. People just don't see the government at the village level. Apart from PR [public relations] opportunities in aid distribution, it's just not present in people's lives in terms of services or rebuilding. That drives further alienation between citizens and the civilian government and opens up space that extremist groups—that by and large have charitable arms that provide public services and aid—can exploit. I wouldn't say this is on a truly significant scale as yet, but the potential is certainly there for serious state failure if the government cannot ramp up its services, clean up corruption, and be seen as being responsive to the average citizen.[25]

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[23] "Taliban Urges Pakistan to Reject Foreign Flood Aid," *ABC News*, 11 August 2010, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/08/11/2980194.htm.

[24] See Hasnain Kazim, "Race to Provide Aid Emerges Between West and Extremists," *Speigel Online*, 16 August 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,712060,00.html.

[25] See Carlotta Gall, "Floods in Pakistan Carry the Seeds of Upheaval," *New York Times*, 6 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/06/world/asia/06pstan.html; and Gall, "Floodwaters Give New Life to Pakistani Class Dispute," *New York Times*, 16 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/world/asia/16fishermen.html. The lack of government response was also a topic of much discussion during the two think tank programs cited above, Center for American Progress, "Turmoil in Pakistan," and Brooking Institution, "Responding to the Historic Floods in Pakistan."

Williams: What has been the impact of the flooding on the war in Afghanistan and the cross-border interaction with Pakistan?

Young: I don't feel able to comment on this. Afghanistan had its own monsoon floods, on a smaller scale, but also affecting thousands. The emergency response capacity is unfortunately much lower in Afghanistan than in Pakistan; we do have a standing emergency contingency where we work with Afghan organizations on straightforward humanitarian relief. Again, this is largely thanks to the U.S. administration and OFDA's support, and it's from their funding that we are able to maintain that capacity. OFDA just adopted our model for all of Afghanistan. There was some cross-border flood displacement into Afghanistan from Pakistan, but not a huge amount. However, one of the more concerning issues is the impact of the floods on the remaining Afghan refugee population in Pakistan. Whole refugee camps were washed away, many people lost everything, and they are now extremely vulnerable and marginalized. Many still can't return home to Afghanistan because they come from the most violent and/or poor areas.

Williams: How have the Pakistani people viewed the response of the Pakistan government to the floods?

Young: I have spoken to this question to some extent above. Generally, disaffection for the civilian authorities grows. A recent reform abolished the most local level of government, the union councils, and there's now a bit of a vacuum at the grass roots. At the local level, in provinces and districts, government is generally supportive but just doesn't have that much capacity. The federal authorities are largely absent on the ground in a practical sense, apart from the *watan* card scheme.

Williams: Looking at humanitarian questions more broadly, how do aid agencies maintain momentum for support of a particular recovery and rehabilitation effort when the eyes of the world have moved on to another crisis?

Young: It's always tough. Once the gaze moves on, the funding tends to dry up. In addition, the humanitarian community has never yet got right the transition from emergency, through early recovery, to development. It's an awkward transition, with many a stumble and often some falling between stools, which is not good because it's that period—when the emergency services wind up, people return home and start the serious rebuilding—that is critical in terms of stabilization.

We see that now in Pakistan. The UN appeal ended up quite well funded, even though it was still not enough given the huge scope of needs, but the emergency money dries up in the next few months, and many important areas are badly underfunded.[26] We try to keep the early recovery needs in focus, but with so many issues competing for attention, it is hard to get that vital media coverage. Right now, we're planning quite a big push on the anniversary of the start of the floods in July, in Pakistan as well as in the U.S., to generate some media coverage. The administration and Congress maintain a keen interest, so face time to talk about Pakistan or Afghanistan is accessible, and folks in government are usually very supportive, though the present budget pressure, and the debate on cuts, does threaten the integrity and effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance.

Once the gaze moves on, the funding tends to dry up.

People tend to assume that foreign assistance eats up a whole chunk of the government's budget—most guess it's 25 percent or more—but it's actually about 0.2 percent of it on an annual basis. So it represents value for money and is used effectively for the most part. You hear a lot about aid corruption, and it obviously does happen, but most nongovernmental organizations are extremely vigilant about accountability on spending. At IRC, we know down to the last cent how that money was used to deliver aid. Over 90 percent of our funding goes directly into field programs.

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[26] Funding for UN programs as of March 2011 was $1,306,461,176, which was still $657,012,070 short to fund the plan that was in place. The largest funding shortfalls were for food, shelter, and sanitation. UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Pakistan Office, *Pakistan Humanitarian Bulletin*, 3–16 March 2011, http://pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yB3qkjDn7K4%3d&tabid=87&mid=760.

Williams: How much do disaster relief efforts impact the effectiveness of aid organizations in nondisaster areas? Do they draw away resources? Are aid resources being stretched too thin?

Young: Disaster relief always diverts attention and resources. In Pakistan before the floods, we felt the whoosh as money was sucked away to deal with the Haitian earthquake even though humanitarian needs in Pakistan, caused by the 2008–2009 conflict displacement, remained high. To a degree, that's both understandable and legitimate. After all, humanitarian response is essentially triage to save the most lives. But it does encourage short-termism and it does foster longer-term destabilization in these fragile situations. In general, even a small increase in U.S. foreign assistance towards the UN-recommended level of 0.7 percent of GNP [gross national product] can be greatly leveraged on the ground.

Humanitarian response is essentially triage to save the most lives.

Williams: Are there lessons to be learned for both civilian and military organizations from the response to the Pakistan floods?

Young: One is greater mutual understanding of what civil-military coordination means in a context like Pakistan, where that coordination does carry real security risks and raises a lot of tough questions about aid effectiveness. Though a lot of work has been done in terms of delineating civil-military coordination—with some of the main work being done by the U.S. military in conjunction with civilian agencies, especially in places like Afghanistan—in general, understanding of imperatives, aims, and "red lines" between the military and civilian nongovernmental organizations remain variable and sometimes unobserved in the field.

In Pakistan, where a sovereign national military is involved and not an international force, it's even more complicated, although an effort is underway to agree to a coordination code with the Pakistani army. The dominance of the military and its status as the nation's strongest institution carries real implications for maintaining humanitarian principles and space. It has a constitutional role in disaster response, and the greatest logistical capacity. But, as a proponent of the counterinsurgency and with a history of capturing the state, it is self-evidently not a neutral actor. There have been instances where the Pakistani army has blocked humanitarian access or tried to control aid distribution by NGOs for political-military purposes. For us, it has highlighted once again the importance of not being shuttered behind knee-jerk invocation of principle, of keeping open dialogue, and keeping the focus entirely on the humanitarian imperative to save lives and get that aid to the people who need it most in the most efficient way. While coordination may not be possible or advisable in the strictest sense, what is termed "coexistence" remains both important and necessary.

Book Reviews

Command and Development



A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. By Mark Moyar. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. Pp. 347. $30.00 cloth; $20.00 paper.)

The importance of leadership selection and development in irregular conflicts has been stressed before. Consider the injunction: "Warfare against [guerrillas] is a matter for leadership. . . . Its success depends upon the superiority in leadership. . . . Courage, initiative, adaptability of the commander, and experience in fighting bands have to be combined in order successfully to use the techniques which, in view of the circumstances, causes the greatest damage." Expand this with: "The correct choice and training of the leader is of decisive importance. The leader of a [counterguerrilla] unit should be demanding upon himself and others, when conducting his mission. On the other hand, he must provide never-ending concern for the welfare of his men, thus maintaining the battle-worthiness of his unit."These still-valid principles come from *Warfare against Bands* (1944) and the *Hints for Hunting Units* (1945), both German World War II doctrinal publications.

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In 1955, British Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Dr. Otto Heilbrunn reviewed this World War II experience and observed that while a number of guerrilla leaders achieved almost legendary fame, "not a single anti-partisan fighter, ancient or modern, has made a reputation for himself or is known to anybody but the initiated." They concluded this was because an antiguerilla leader is made, rather than born: "his job is a highly technical one; he must combine the qualifications of a military officer and police officer, and he must be trained for his job. But no country in the world has ever trained anti-partisan fighters; they all had to learn the hard way." Counterinsurgency leaders had to be made based on having and applying sound doctrine to specific circumstances that were forever changing in conflicts for people and space. By the time needed experience and knowledge was gained by counterguerrillas, according to Dixon and Heilbrunn, it was often too late for them to use it. This seemed to be the case for the Germans, who did not always assign their best leaders to these duties, and there was no Rommel or Guderian in the ranks of its counterinsurgency fighters. As such, to use leadership as the key to successful counterinsurgency or irregular warfare is self-evident.

Or is it? According to Mark Moyar, leadership is "how to win" an irregular war; for example: "There are some simple first steps. First, the United States must pressure senior Afghan leaders to weed out bad commanders. Second, we must assign more and better officers to advise Afghan units. Third, American units should work more closely with Afghan units" ("Can the U.S. Lead Afghans?" *New York Times*, 4 September 2009). This "simple" approach leads me to address an obvious exception to this otherwise fine and useful work. As the Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the U.S. Marine Corps University (through 2010), Moyar bought into the Corps emphasis on leadership in general, and the book supports this. The simplistic or mechanistic approach to leadership in the final chapter does not link the results of either the Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey or Myers-Briggs Type Indicator to command success in any type of combat, let alone irregular warfare. This limitation will make it appeal most to Marines because of the central part leaders play in the analysis of the series of case studies presented. But it is also a return to the "great man" (or woman) interpretation of events in history. The 10 "critical attributes of good counterinsurgency leadership"—initiative, flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization—apply to both conventional and unconventional conflicts.

An added complexity is that leadership methods for one level may not work at another. Not addressed is the level of command, whether in the cockpit or with a platoon, that the counterinsurgency leader is found at, and most examples are from the highest level where military and civilian leadership interact. In fact, the argument could be made (as it was by Clausewitz) that irregular warfare calls for decentralized leadership at the lowest level. Like the attrition versus maneuver debate, it all depends upon the terrain and situation. The arguments presented reflect differences of opinion rather than fact.

Moyar argues that insurgencies are fought by leadership elites (a point that needs more development). In this, he concludes that America must also field its best leaders to win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Case studies are provided to examine this claim, with examples from the past and present. This is with nine chapters ranging from Afghanistan and Iraq reaching back to El Salvador, South Vietnam, Malaya, the Philippines (Huk Rebellion and Insurrection), and the American Civil War (war and Reconstruction). The historic case studies are well researched and written. They include a mix of distinctly American efforts, mixed American and participation with other countries, and purely foreign examples. The chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan are timely and insightful into current leadership needs and analysis. A few Marine Corps cases would have made the point as well (for example, General Smedley D. Butler in Haiti or General Lewis W. Walt in Vietnam). The value of the case-study approach as a teaching tool was recognized by Clausewitz as much as by the Harvard Business School. It certainly makes the book useful as a classroom tool. It would be hoped that today's leaders could offer case histories from their own recent experience. Included with the book are an appendix, notes, bibliography, and a foreword by Donald and John Kagan, editors of the Yale Library of Military History Series.

The Marine Corps University and Foundation sponsored a conference on the subject of counterinsurgency leadership in 2009. At this, then-Major General Robert B. Neller noted: "Thrust unexpectedly into counter-insurgency situations in 2002 and 2003, American commanders had to operate under difficult and constantly changing conditions. Some adapted quickly; others adjusted over a longer period of time with the help of experience and education." The other military panelists echoed this dual-track concern about whether leaders are made or born. Certainly the service educational institutions have a vested interest in fostering critical thinking and decision-making skills in an environment that uses a mix of reading and writing, group discussions, historical case studies, planning exercises, and shared experiences. As General Neller elaborated, "The need for leadership goes beyond today's conflicts and, indeed, lies at the heart of current debates over the future of our national security."



Men on Iron Ponies: The Death and Rebirth of the Modern U.S. Cavalry. By Matthew Darlington Morton. (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009. Pp. 286. $35.00 cloth.)

In *Men on Iron Ponies*, Matthew D. Morton "examines the United States Army's development of mechanized ground reconnaissance units between World War I and World War II" to understand how the interwar Army's cavalry branch responded to the important questions that face peacetime militaries: "What would the nature of the next war be? What kind of doctrine would lend itself to future battlefields? What kind of organization would best fulfill doctrinal objectives, once established, and what kind of equipment should that organization have? How should emerging technology be incorporated into new organizations?" (p. 4). In the process, Morton provides important insights into how military institutions cope with uncertain futures and emerging technologies.

Morton has mined an impressive and broad range of primary and secondary sources for this book, most notably the papers of many of the key interwar and World War II cavalry leaders. *Men on Iron Ponies* is also enriched by Morton's perspectives as a professional soldier and cavalry officer. The book is chronologically organized, and Morton provides a clearly written, informative history of the origins and World War II operations of the mechanized reconnaissance units that were what

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remained of the cavalry branch when the Armored Force was created in 1940 and horse cavalry was removed from the Army in 1942.

As Morton recounts, World War I demonstrated the transformative effect machines would have on future wars. The questions militaries dealt with between the World Wars were precisely those that Morton identifies. What happened within the U.S. Cavalry shows the impact a deeply entrenched culture and a leadership committed to “proven technologies” (the horse) can exert on decision making and on the willingness of its membership to break ranks with the stated orthodoxy. Morton spends the majority of his time recounting how the cavalry dealt with mechanization, and he does that well. However, the broader question of mechanization and modernization in the interwar Army is not addressed. This is an important issue, because how the Army dealt with these issues set the conditions for the interwar mechanization debate and forced officers to choose between advocating for innovation, perhaps with some career risks, or adhering to the orthodoxy and advancing their careers—an issue that is perennially relevant for militaries.

The 1920 National Defense Act disbanded the Army’s wartime Tank Corps and made the chief of infantry responsible for tank development. This was not an unreasonable decision, given that the relatively primitive tank technology had largely been viewed as an infantry support weapon during the war. There were, however, officers who saw much greater potential in mechanization, including two Tank Corps officers: Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton Jr. Both had written in journals about the potential of tanks before the branch was disbanded. Both were admonished to toe the doctrinal line, and two of the Army’s future stars chose to adhere to the reigning orthodoxy. Eisenhower left tanks for a conventional infantry career, while Patton returned to the cavalry.

Little was heard from Eisenhower in the years before World War II. Patton, however, became a vocal advocate for horse cavalry, using his authority as the only U.S. tank brigade commander in World War I to lend credence to his arguments penned for the *Cavalry Journal* or in cavalry branch papers. Thus Patton was not, as Morton describes him, “the proverbial fence sitter throughout the interwar years” (p. 71), but someone who only jumped the fence to the Armored Force when it was clear that it was in his career interest. This is not an indictment of Eisenhower or Patton. Their stories provide cautionary examples of the self-limiting behavior conservative military institutions can impose on their best when innovative thinking is needed.

I have two minor quibbles with the book. First, Morton implies that because mechanized cavalry units in World War II "had to fight for information," the future U.S. Army needs more robust human reconnaissance capabilities (p. 229). While I tend to agree with him about the future, Morton does not make the case that this capability was important in World War II. The General Board data he presents (p. 207) shows that mechanized cavalry units in the European Theater of Operations spent less than 20 percent of their time engaged in the missions of "offensive combat" and "reconnaissance." The majority of their time was spent performing "defensive combat," "special operations," or "security" missions. Second, Morton asserts that Army's adoption of the Stryker Fighting Vehicles "shows how the Army can get it right" (p. xi). Ironically, combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that these vehicles share many of the same survivability and off-road limitations that Morton takes issue with in his excellent analysis of the development of World War II mechanized cavalry vehicles.

These are small points that do not detract from the many strengths of *Men on Iron Ponies*. Most importantly, Morton shows that Major General John K. Herr (the last U.S. chief of cavalry) and other like-minded officers who championed the retention of horse cavalry units in the U.S. Army until 1942 should not be simply dismissed as wrongheaded Luddites. Instead, Morton usefully shows that these officers behaved in ways that one should expect from well-meaning leaders coping with rapid technological change, unclear threats, and tight budgets.



War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command. By David Jablonsky. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. Pp. xiv, 386. $35.00 cloth; $23.00 paper.)

David Jablonsky provides a fine intellectual biography of Dwight D. Eisenhower, centered on Eisenhower's thought, practice, and advocacy of unified command throughout his military and political career. *War by Land, Sea, and Air* presents an important argument: Eisenhower's attempts as president to restructure the military and national security command hierarchy were based on his experience as a junior officer, his celebrated career in World War II and in NATO, and his frustrated attempt as Army Chief of Staff to affect unification of the armed services. Jablonsky concludes that the 1958 reorganization of the defense establishment served as a sturdy framework for command relations in the Cold War and provided the foundation from which later congressional legislation could proceed to fulfill Eisenhower's aspirations of fully functional joint and combined command. With an eye to the present, Jablonsky opens with a telling anecdote that reveals the immense authority and international standing of U.S. regional commanders in chief, referring to Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf who, following the coup of 1999, communicated his intentions to General Anthony C. Zinni (commander of U.S. Central Command), rather than to any diplomatic representative or political leader of the United States.

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Jablonsky shows that Eisenhower believed in the necessity of unified command at the theater level and in unified effort of the nation or alliance.

His thought process had taken shape long before World War II, when General Eisenhower exercised command authority over joint and combined forces in the European theater. From his early days at West Point, Eisenhower embraced teamwork and unity of effort. While his postgraduate schooling stressed unity of command only at the tactical level and taught the ambiguous guidelines of the 1920s for interservice collaboration, Eisenhower's own studies of the Western Front in World War I deepened his commitment to unity of command at the highest levels, particularly in coalition warfare. The experience of World War II honed Eisenhower's understanding of unified command and led him to push hard for unification of the armed services. Frustrated in his efforts by the National Security Act of 1947, Eisenhower tried again to afford greater unity of command of the armed forces during his presidency, but the 1958 legislation that strengthened the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of individual service chiefs still fell short of Eisenhower's objective and left regional commanders caught between powerful service interests and political directives. Jablonsky concludes that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that increased unity of command and led to the exalted position of regional commanders in chief stands as Eisenhower's true legacy.

Jablonsky is an accomplished writer and a leading scholar of policy and strategy. His experience as former Army officer and professor at the Army War College allows him to consider the culture of the armed services, the nature of command, and the strategic and political implications of inter-service rivalry and unification. As a result, *War by Land, Sea, and Air* illuminates the life of Eisenhower, transcends the conventional chronology of the world wars, interwar period, and Cold War as distinct eras, and instead shows fundamental continuities and offers a fresh interpretation of the relationship of high command, institutional politics, and national policy and strategy. The book is founded in the author's sustained engagement of the pertinent sources. Still, when addressing the New Look (national security policy under the Eisenhower administration), Jablonsky's discussion might have benefited from Saki Dockrill's work. The same can be said for engaging with Mark Stoler's studies on Allied military and strategic cooperation in World War II. Nevertheless, *War by Land, Sea, and Air* is clear-sighted and engrossing, and it offers a profound argument that needs to be considered by scholars, policy makers, and military officers interested in questions of high command, coalition warfare, and civil-military relations.



America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force. By Beth L. Bailey. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. Pp. xi, 319. $29.95 cloth.)

For readers familiar with the institution of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), *America's Army* initially seems familiar territory. But that impression quickly disappears, as it becomes clear that Beth L. Bailey provides detail and context not available in other studies. While nominally an administrative history, Bailey's work is, at heart, an examination of how an all-volunteer military impinges upon the American assumption that military service is an obligation of citizenship. In so doing, she points out that the military is more than an armed force—it is also a central part of American society. Indeed, the author ponders how the AVF affects America's ability to make war while setting the AVF in the context of marketing and consumerism.

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Early on, Bailey makes it clear that, despite misgivings among the military, the AVF was unavoidable. Popular dissatisfaction with the draft made it impossible to maintain conscription, a process understood by its opponents as inherently unfair, favoring the privileged over the poor. Anti-draft sentiment also emerged from the conviction that a conscript army made it easier for presidents to commit to war. President Richard M. Nixon, eager to curry favor with the public, insisted upon an end to the draft. Arguing that nuclear weapons made large armies obsolete, Nixon contended that the United States required a smaller, professional military manned by volunteers. Better benefits and higher pay made an all-volunteer force possible. In short, the free market promised a better military than the one created through coercion.

Chief of Staff of the Army General William C. Westmoreland and the Army generally shared grave doubts about whether the Army could meet manpower needs by relying on volunteers. Concerns about whether a volunteer military would damage Americans' understanding of the obligations of citizenship—particularly the obligation to military service—also troubled the Army. Despite these worries, Westmoreland considered the move to an AVF an opportunity to heal a badly wounded institution. Under his close supervision, the Army purposefully moved forward with a marketing campaign aimed at repairing the service's image and enticing talented young people, regardless of race or gender, to enlist. Under the guidance of N.W. Ayer advertising, the Army launched a recruiting campaign designed to appeal to young people's increased individualism under the slogan "Today's Army Wants to Join You." It also bought time on primetime television and placed ads in popular magazines portraying the Army as an institution that provided educational and professional opportunity while respecting individual freedoms. When relying on the draft, the military made little effort to ensure that its recruiting advertisements were attractive or reached their target audience. As Bailey sees it, relying on volunteers meant that the Army had to present itself—in some ways, reinvent itself—as a consumer product.

Adjusting to the marketplace exacerbated existing problems. Although there is substantial literature on the integration of African Americans and women into the military, Bailey's take on this process provides new insight by placing integration in the context of the consumer market. Despite racial integration in the Army and a new popular intolerance of racism, questions about the role of, and opportunities for, African Americans in the new force remained fraught. For many, the place of women in the military was particularly contentious. In the early 1970s, the Army fully expected ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and began preparing for that eventuality. It did this, in part, by planning to increase the number of female recruits. The ERA and a bid by President Jimmy Carter to include women in selective service requirements failed, however, amid emotional arguments about "God's plan for humanity and women's inherent nature" (p. 134). When Ronald Reagan defeated Carter in the 1980 presidential election, the Army almost immediately suspended its plans to recruit more women. What most people would consider false advertising was the Army's greatest problem. New recruits charged that the Army was not living up to its promises and that little had changed despite the new advertisement campaign. The resulting popular distrust badly interfered with the Army's efforts to recruit dedicated, high-quality personnel.

In perhaps the most insightful part of the study, the author makes clear how pivotal the 1980s were to the Army. Reduced budgets and recruitment problems ignited talk of returning to the draft as an antidote to what General Edward C. Meyer dubbed the "hollow Army." Rather than looking backward, the Army adopted management solutions. General Maxwell R. Thurman, director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, "made recruiting his business" (p. 177). Closely guided by Thurman, the Army recruiting system mastered the art of modern corporate management and reassessed how it approached creating and training an all recruit army. It was Thurman who understood that the new Army slogan, "Be All You Can Be," sent exactly the right message. By the mid-1980s, the Army had largely found its way out of the doldrums of the previous decade. Nevertheless, as Bailey points out, through the next 20 years, the new slogan continued to "shift the focus . . . from obligation to benefit" (p. 195).

After the Berlin Wall fell, the U.S. Army faced yet another challenge. During the Cold War, the Army justified big budgets and large manpower authorizations by focusing on its role as the primary obstacle to the voracious Russian bear. When the Cold War ended, the Army contended with ways to reduce personnel while revising its raison d'être. Suggestions for meeting personnel reductions included eliminating jobs for women and ending recruiting, but the Army quickly rejected such measures in favor of less drastic processes. It also shifted focus to nontraditional missions such as peacekeeping and began to represent itself to the American public and the Congress as what Bailey describes as a "provider of social good," not only in terms of the missions it performed, but also as a place of equal opportunity for all Americans (p. 201). It did so while emphasizing service over self-interest. Army service was not only a demonstration of good citizenship; it was a path to improved citizenship. By 2001, three decades of cultural shifts and political changes meant that the Army was too small with too many missions and was not sufficiently flexible. The worry that the Army was too soft surfaced, prompting the service to set about rekindling its warrior culture, in part, by defining and emphasizing the "warrior ethos."

When the United States went to war in Iraq in 2003, brief public debate about whether America should revert to the draft revealed that the Army had come to prefer an all-recruit force. Unfortunately, the service by that time faced the challenge of recruiting quality personnel under the shadow of almost certain combat service. Despite recent changes in marketing techniques that included the online recruiting site, Goarmy.com, with its reality webcast about life as an Army recruit and video games, recruitment fell. To meet recruiting goals, the Army reduced volunteers' qualifications, so that by 2007 only 70 percent of the force had earned high school diplomas.

Notwithstanding nearly 40 years of serious challenges to its identity and organization, however, Bailey concludes that in terms of readiness, morale, deployability, and equal opportunity, the current U.S. Army is largely a success. Yet, as the author reminds us, it is our loss "when individual liberty is valued over all and the rights and benefits of citizenship become less closely linked to its duties and obligations" (p. 260).

America's Army is that rare thing—genuine scholarship. It is impressively documented, unusually well written, and intensely thoughtful. Accessible to all readers, Bailey's work is a must-read.


NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER
David Petraeus
John Abizaid
George Casey Jr.
Peter Chiarelli
FOUR GENERALS AND THEIR EPIC STRUGGLE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
the FOURTH STAR
DAVID CLOUD & GREG JAFFE
"The generals really come to life, as does the Army itself." —New York Times Book Review

The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army. By David Cloud and Greg Jaffe. (New York: Crown, 2009. Pp. 330. $28.00 cloth; $16.00 paper.)

Over the past 30 years, a number of books have been published seeking to explain why the U.S. Army, so dominant in conventional combat, has apparently been unable to effectively defeat insurgencies. These works, which include Andrew Krepinvich's *The Army and Vietnam* (1988), Lewis Sorley's *A Better War* (2007), and John Nagl's *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (2005), have laid the foundations for an explanatory narrative that argues that the U.S. Army's preoccupation with preparing for a large-scale, armor-intensive war of maneuver with the Soviet Union contributed to its failure to train for counterinsurgency warfare. This narrative has been further buttressed by a number of books examining the Iraq War, with Thomas Ricks's two books, *Fiasco* (2007) and *The Gamble* (2009), notable among them.

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David Cloud and Greg Jaffe's *The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army* is among the most recent contributions to this literature. In this work, the authors seek to explore the institutional and doctrinal transformation of the Army from a force trained to wage a large-scale armored war with an organized military into a force whose primary focus is irregular warfare and counterinsurgency in nations like Iraq and Afghanistan. To investigate this change, they examine the biographies of four generals who ultimately achieved four-star rank during the Iraq War: George W. Casey Jr., David H. Petraeus, John P. Abizaid, and Peter W. Chiarelli. While this approach provides fruitful details and information on a particularly critical period in the history of Army, it also presents a number of drawbacks that the authors only partially confront.

The four subjects all belong to a generation of officers commissioned either toward the end of the Vietnam War or shortly after it concluded. All four held senior commands that allowed them to shape the course of the war in Iraq. Abizaid served as head of U.S. Forces Central Command (CENTCOM) from 2003 to 2006. Casey commanded Multi National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) from 2004 until 2006, and Chiarelli served as his deputy in 2006. Petraeus relieved Casey in 2007 and remained head of MNF-I until 2008, when he subsequently assumed command of CENTCOM, where he was serving at the time of this book's publication.

The authors argue that the experiences of these four soldiers and their personalities fundamentally shaped the Army. Demoralized by the Army's failure in Vietnam (the authors' first chapter on the post-Vietnam period is dramatically titled "Age of Anarchy"), junior officers such as Abizaid, Petraeus, Casey, and Chiarelli found themselves in a service struggling to restore its confidence in itself as a warfighting institution. Their training and experiences were marked by the tension between preparing for short, large-scale, intense conventional wars and planning for long-term counterinsurgencies against irregular forces unable and unwilling to confront the U.S. Army on the open battlefield. Cloud and Jaffe argue that the Army evaded the legacy of Vietnam throughout the 1980s by focusing its efforts on fighting a war decidedly unlike the one they had just faced.

A few of Cloud and Jaffe's subjects came to this realization long before the Iraq War. Abizaid, who spent much of the late 1970s and 1980s learning Arabic and living and studying in Jordan, drew the conclusion that future wars would look more like the Israeli occupation of Lebanon than the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a conflict characterized by large-scale armored engagements. When writing his doctoral dissertation at Princeton University, Petraeus criticized the Pentagon's overemphasis on short, firepower-intensive, conventional wars. Aware of the Army leadership's prevailing wish to forget about Vietnam and fighting guerrillas and also hesitant to attack military orthodoxy, Petraeus prudently decided not to publish the study. Nevertheless, Petraeus and Abizaid quickly became aware that large-scale, armor-intensive wars like Operation Desert Storm were an aberration and that America's future wars would be decidedly different.

The experiences of all four influenced their respective approaches to the challenges of the Iraq War. Abizaid, suspicious of any kind of nation-building venture in an Arab state, recommended a light hand, the rapid creation of Iraqi security forces, and a speedy withdrawal. This approach was embraced by Casey, who focused on reducing the handprint of U.S. forces on the war. Meanwhile, Chiarelli recommended full-spectrum operations that coupled military operations with construction projects and civil affairs actions. However, during his time as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division and subsequently commander of Multi National Corps-Iraq, Chiarelli often found that his was a minority voice and viewpoint.

Ultimately, Abizaid and Casey failed to produce an effective Iraqi security force capable of bringing an end to the conflict. Petraeus, consequently, stands as the most transformative figure in Cloud and Jaffe's study, and the authors interpret his appointment as a watershed moment in the history of the Army, when the old force dedicated to short, decisive wars became an Army dedicated to counterinsurgency and nation building. Petraeus dramatically altered the nature of the Iraq War by implementing counterinsurgency principles developed during his service as commander of U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth and through decades of research and study. His focus on engaging the population, forging alliances with local tribal leaders, and building a robust U.S. presence to provide security for the civilian population proved effective and dramatically reduced violence in the country.

Perhaps the book's most important contribution is the wealth of details provided by the four biographical sketches, details that will be of use to future historians and analysts of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book is less effective at describing "the epic struggle" for the Army noted in its subtitle. Exploring the lives and experiences of these four particular generals, while interesting, does not necessarily provide the best means for exploring how the Army confronted the challenges of the Iraq War and counterinsurgency warfare. Based almost entirely on interviews, the work lacks supporting evidence from archival research. Furthermore, one wonders whether these are the most representative four generals the authors could have selected. Raymond T. Odierno, for example, who played a critical role in the Iraq War from its beginning in 2003 and was one of the architects of the surge, had as substantial an impact on the conflict as any of the four generals analyzed in this work. The book's lack of a foreword, introduction, and conclusion means that many of these methodological issues are left unaddressed.

Overall, the book is an informative exploration into how a number of prominent officers in the U.S. Army coped with the legacy of Vietnam and adapted to fight irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The biographical information on all four generals will be of value to scholars of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its reliance on interviews and lack of an introduction and conclusion will likely frustrate readers seeking a more substantial and critical exploration of this critical period of transformation. Nevertheless, the study stands as an informative resource to analysts and historians of the U.S. military, the Iraq War, and counterinsurgency warfare.



Obama's Wars. By Bob Woodward. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. Pp. 441. $30.00 cloth.)

I recall a particularly haughty college medieval history professor describing a colleague's latest academic publication as a "tendentious potboiler." The criticism was stinging, doubly so after I discovered the meanings of both words. I filed the expression away, vowing to unpack it someday to describe a book I found to be worthy of such invective. At last, I have found that book in Bob Woodward's latest tome, *Obama's Wars*.

At the time of its release, Washington was all atwitter over Woodward's book. The legendary journalist could always be counted on to get the story that no one else could, starting with his Watergate articles for the *Washington Post* with Carl Bernstein and progressing through a series of volumes on national security and politics that enjoyed the benefit of virtually unequalled Washington access. With *Obama's Wars*, however, Mr. Woodward has passed the point of no return.

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The principal manner in which Woodward's book falls short of the mark is a criticism that applies to investigative journalism generally, but which Woodward raises to an art form: facts that can be neither proven nor disproven. Frequently, Woodward cites facts gleaned in conversations where only he and a source were in the room, with no way to verify content and context independently. Readers are left in the position of having to trust

Woodward, with insufficient information on which to dispute any particular contention substantively.

In places, the book reads like a transcript, as though Woodward simply published a direct dictation of his interview notes. He frequently inserts quotations in isolation and out of context, without linking them to larger narrative or demonstrating their relevance. Washington's confidante, a professional journalist by trade, should know better than to trade literary quality control for editorial deadline compliance. From Woodward, the reading public is entitled to expect both.

Woodward even gets the title wrong: there is but one "war," with several ongoing campaigns in multiple theaters. There are no plural "wars," unless, in addition to the Afghanistan-Pakistan continuum of operations, Woodward is referring to the wars inside the Beltway. If that is his meaning, he is overselling the analogy—President Barack H. Obama is not at "war" with his own military advisors, commanders, cabinet members, and presidential staff. The president presides over an occasionally combative, arguably dysfunctional bureaucratic group of subordinates and advisers jockeying for position and influence, with each working hard to impose his or her will over the disparate interests through expression of commander's intent and clear decisions—hardly the stuff of "war," but rather more the stuff of usual bureaucracy. Woodward's description attempts to highlight the process as unusually messy and controversial; otherwise, there is no need to write the book. To this reviewer, the dynamic he describes does not look much different than most any other organizational decision-making process, all of which involve disparate interests, clashes of will, maneuvering, stonewalling, and negotiating, all of which yield (or should yield) when the person or entity with decision-making authority makes his or her determination. If, prior to taking his decision the president really did have to send the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs back to the drawing board to get more than one option for the strategy decision, then the untidy process may require some reform. Even so, it is likely not at the crisis stage that Woodward implies.

Woodward oversimplifies and caricatures the immensely complex actors involved in making the most important set of strategic decisions in the Obama presidency. The book boils down to a set of characterizations that are probably unfair and grossly exaggerated at best. Taken at face value, President Obama is virtually the only balanced, thoughtful actor in the entire decision-making drama. Woodward's portrayal of Admiral Michael

G. Mullen (USN) shows him as someone who is stubborn and lacking in creativity, bordering on malevolent, and even dishonest. Admiral Mullen's portrait is juxtaposed against that of General James E. Cartwright (USMC), whose conduct is painted as the antithesis of the chairman's; Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates is reserved to the point of reticence and indecisiveness; National Security Advisor James L. Jones Jr. is an honest broker but overmatched by the political culture and conniving lieutenants and peer actors in the White House; Lieutenant General Douglas E. Lute (USA) similarly is trustworthy, competent, and sincere, but outgunned. General David H. Petraeus (USA) is, according to Woodward, sinister and hiding some secret agenda, perhaps to validate his own counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine so that he can go down in history as the all-time COIN theorist. General Stanley A. McChrystal (USA) is besotted by General Petraus's COIN-ade. Meanwhile, the service chiefs, arguably at least as powerful and influential as the combatant commanders and the theater commander in terms of strategy formation and inside-the-Beltway military advice, are completely compromised by Woodward; his volume barely acknowledges that they exist. To the uninitiated, it would appear that the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps are figureheads who attend parades and design new uniforms, rather than serving as military advisors to the president, as their statutory mandate requires.

Despite its flaws, *Obama's Wars* does contain some remarkable insights into the strategic decision-making process, demonstrating that it is not nearly as neat or predictable as doctrine suggests—full of power plays, actors overstepping roles and boundaries, usurpation of authority, political posturing, and careerism. *Obama's Wars* is worth reading, if for no other reason than that no author has achieved the level of access that Woodward has. It is not the kind of epic or timeless volume that should appear in any serious security professional's personal library, but it is worth the read, if available at the local library.



Clausewitz and Contemporary War. By Antulio J. Echevarria II. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. 210. $99.00 cloth.)

An American military scholar once wrote an essay titled "Busting the Icon," which claimed that many U.S. military practitioners embrace a view of war that is "out of touch with current circumstances." These military leaders, the author argued, have embraced an outdated liturgy that emphasizes, nay *requires*, a bloody and senseless clash of arms at short distance. Supposedly, evidence of this bloodlust can be seen in current operations like Iraq to be "increasingly bankrupt."

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This mistaken understanding of war and our purported infatuation with ground-focused, territorially-oriented, and human-centric combat is laid at the feet of that tired old stiff Prussian Carl von Clausewitz. His impenetrable prose and inherent contradictions have apparently confused military leaders for nearly two centuries and produced a cult of Clausewitzian theologians. This cult is accused of perpetuating a myopic focus on coming to grips with our adversaries in large-scale close combat.

The Prussian sage is probably spinning in his grave at the thought that he single-handedly infected Western military thinking with an "unbridled lust for slaughter" and "a desire to throw as many of America's sons and daughters within range of enemy guns as possible."

Is Clausewitz both utterly irrelevant and bankrupt? Readers looking for resolution of this debate are strongly encouraged to closely examine

Antulio J. Echevarria's latest book. In *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*, Echevarria concisely explains the purpose and methodology underlying Clausewitz's *On War*. The author, director of research at the Army's Strategic Studies Institute, fully admits that understanding it can be a "difficult and at times genuinely frustrating task." To minimize this frustration, Echevarria painstakingly reconstructs the Prussian philosopher's method so that readers can grasp his general theory of war, his arguments regarding the relationship between policy and war, and his principles of strategy. The author contends that there certainly are parts of *On War* that are no longer valid today, but that studying it is still useful and will "provide today's military practitioners and civilian analysts a foundational understanding of the primary elements of armed conflict."

Clausewitz and Contemporary War is divided into three parts. The initial section addresses Clausewitz's purpose and his method about universal laws. The next section addresses the nature and universe of war as *On War's* author defined it. This section contains Echevarria's finest chapter, a discussion of how Clausewitz's thinking about the role of policy and politics matured. Here the author dissects Clausewitz's most noted construction of war as a continuation of politics.

Echevarria notes that policy is not always in control or the driver of strategy, and that Clausewitz himself put limits on what rational policy can attain. While Clausewitz stressed that "war was merely the instrument" of policy, he also knew that policy can be influenced by chance, friction, and the dynamics of passion stimulated by conflict. "Wars involve living forces rather than static elements," Echevarria concludes, "thus, it can change quickly and significantly in ways that the logic of policy may not expect." (Hew Strachan's lively but less structured *Clausewitz's On War: A Biography* [2007] makes the same point and is also highly recommended.) The last part of the book is focused on strategy, and includes a notable chapter on centers of gravity. Here Echevarria ventures into a useful discussion of this fundamental Clausewitzian concept and how it applies to the ideological strengths of modern combatants like al-Qaeda.

The end product is deeply researched and thoroughly thought out. Echevarria has provided an important redefinition of Clausewitz and his major concepts, but he is not a blind adherent. He does not treat *On War* as if it were canon law, just an incomplete but important breakthrough in our knowledge about war. *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* is ideal for war college curricula and for students of strategic studies in both civilian and military institutions.

If you are one of those ground officers struggling with the "bankrupt," confusing, and frequently contradictory content of the crusty Prussian general, I highly recommend this book. Be forewarned, however, that this is a serious book requiring serious thinking. If you suffer from an "obsequious devotion to the writings of Clausewitz" and lust for bloody battles, you may want to pass. But if you are confused about what General von Clausewitz actually said and are truly interested in learning something, do not pass this one by. For those who aspire to senior positions in our defense establishment, as a policy maker or a practitioner, read *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* to truly understand the context in which *On War* was written and its unmistakable relevance today.

Historical Context



The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. By Samuel Moyn. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. 337. $27.95 cloth.)

Although he made them a cornerstone of his foreign policy, Jimmy Carter did not claim that there was much that was novel about human rights. They were ancient: old enough to have "invented" America, and not the reverse. Who could disagree with that? While Americans could debate Carter's piety about human rights in foreign policy, few contested his claim that human rights were themselves a historical inheritance, descended, as it were, from the Magna Carta and the Glorious Revolution to Jefferson's Declaration, Madison's Constitution, and Lincoln's Proclamation.

Samuel Moyn's achievement in *The Last Utopia* is to challenge the belief, still widely shared and too easily assumed, that human rights have a deep historical provenance. Moyn proposes instead that they are a recent innovation, dating only to the 1970s. To prove his hypothesis, Moyn launches a frontal assault on the status quo that forces readers to think anew about human rights—their meaning, their history, and their prospects. An intellectual historian, Moyn enjoins us to be precise in our terms and to situate the rise of human rights ideas in the real historical context out of which they emerged. While his argument will not change all minds, the radicalism of his perspective and the brilliance of his argument crack open the history of human rights as a dynamic, contested, and vital arena of

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scholarly inquiry.

What are human rights? The question of definitions too often elicits vague responses. Moyn, in contrast, is pithy and precise. He does not catalogue specific rights but defines human rights in terms of the way they make their claims. For most of modern history, Moyn contends, the claimants of rights have taken the nation-state to be a guarantor of rights and an agent of their fulfillment. What makes contemporary human rights so novel and distinct, Moyn proposes, is the claim, which became widespread in the 1970s, that human rights precede and supersede the modern nation-state. So how did this come to pass?

The rise of human rights in the 1970s depended on a vigorous, transnational social movement that brought the claims of universal rights to the fore. Moved by optimistic visions of a law-girded world, the movement for human rights proceeded from what Moyn calls a "utopian" vision. The Amnesty International volunteers who wrote letters to despots on behalf of prisoners of conscience were concerned with individuals, but they also sought to change the world. They imagined a universal law, binding the power of governments, subjecting them to its writ, and exposing misdeeds to humankind. This, Moyn writes, was a strident ambition and a novel one—so much so that to speak of human rights prior to the 1970s is to indulge in anachronism.

Why was it that the 1970s brought a new vocabulary of human rights? The question of origins, Moyn argues, is really a question of "displacement" (p. 116); it was the failure of other utopian schemes for the betterment of humankind that opened up the space for human rights. The great epic of early postwar history, Moyn argues, was not the rise of human rights—a marginal theme—but the ascent of postcolonial nationalism, another utopia promising historical deliverance. The postwar ascent of the sovereign state, of course, inhibited rights claims that were transnational and antisovereign in nature. Only in the 1970s, as the legitimacy of postcolonial projects crumbled in an era of coups and military strongmen, did the space for human rights expand. In the Soviet sphere, meanwhile, Marxist-Leninism's crisis of legitimacy during the 1970s cracked open the door to human rights, which Western activists helped to push further ajar.

For the disillusioned, human rights offered an alternative utopia, an opportunity for redemption and ethical purification. This, Moyn suggests, was the real the appeal of the "anti-politics" that human rights proffered. Yet the notion of anti-politics is too often a fiction, Moyn concludes, and not necessarily a very useful one. As human rights have matured and as the appetites of their proponents have expanded, they have become burdened by the baggage—of politics, ideology, and interest—that they claimed to repudiate in the first place.

The enthusiasts of human rights may chafe at Moyn's dour conclusion, but they will have little choice but to grapple with it. *The Last Utopia* is an important book, and it will likely shape the historical debate on human rights for years to come. That is to be welcomed. Too much recent work on the history of human rights has the character of warm milk: worthy, reassuring, and stultifying. After this, Moyn offers a strong shot of caffeine. But that is not to say that he is right on every point.

Careful readers will find vulnerabilities in any argument so taut as Moyn's. His claim for discontinuity in the 1970s—from rights bestowed by the state to rights retained against the nation-state—strikes this reader as too crisp. And his designation of human rights as "utopian" raises questions. By the standards of 20th-century politics, human rights activists have been a mild-mannered bunch. Usually content to seek modest change—the extraction of fewer fingernails or restrictions on the sale of electric cattle prods to caudillos who would use them on people—human-rights activists have sought tangible change within the confines of a broken world. Fantasies of universal law have sustained some human rights visionaries for sure, but does this make the entire movement a "utopian" project? If so, how different is it from other forward-looking political projects? Are most politics not animated, at some level, by visions of the future perfect?

To raise difficult questions, however, is not to dismiss Moyn's argument, but to engage it. As brilliant and bewitching as the book is, *The Last Utopia* seems likelier to propel historical debate than to conclude it. That, one infers, is Moyn's intention and his laudable contribution to an emerging historical field. In short, this is a compelling and provocative book. I cannot recommend highly enough.



Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz. By Richard H. Immerman. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pp. ix, 271. $24.95 cloth.)

More than three decades ago, Robin W. Winks entitled an essay, "The American Struggle with 'Imperialism': How Words Frighten" (in Rob Kroes, ed., *The American Identity: Fusion and Fragmentation* [1980]). Given the directness, the clarity, and the analytical rigor with which Richard H. Immerman has assessed American imperialism, he obviously was not intimidated by the words, the concept, or U.S. imperial practices.

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Immerman asserts that the United States "is and always has been an empire" (p. 4). Although the term "empire," as employed by the nation's founders was "value-free" and used synonymously with the "state," the new nation's leaders practiced imperialism by aggressively, often forcibly, acquiring large expanses of previously independent territory and the peoples who inhabited them. From this early national beginning to the present, American empire has been "inextricably tied to establishing and promoting 'liberty'" (p. 5). Americans have sought to distinguish their practices from those of other imperial nations and thereby establish American exceptionalism by contending that U.S. expansion has carried with it the blessings of liberty and other American values and institutions, that American motives have been benign and the outcomes progressive.

Immerman disputes both the exceptional nature of the U.S. empire and its benign promotion of liberty. He cites Thomas Jefferson's changed terminology from a U.S "Empire of Liberty" in 1780 to an "Empire for Liberty" in 1809 as signaling more aggressive American expansion at the expense of the Spanish, Native Americans, and Mexicans. Ironically, as Americans exercised their most forceful and ruthless pursuit of empire in the 19th century, they became increasingly uncomfortable with the terms empire and imperialism. They were loath to have U.S. practices on the North American continent equated with those of the Europeans in East Asia or Africa, or subsequently with authoritarian aggressors from Germany, Japan, or the Soviet Union. Following the brief but obviously imperial indulgence in the acquisition of noncontiguous territories in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, the U.S. practice of informal empire facilitated claims of exceptionalism, even as the United States constructed the "most powerful empire in world history" after World War I (p. 12). American military force played a central role, but U.S. influence has also taken more informal, more subtle political, economic, and cultural forms that have allowed Americans to deny the existence of their empire. But, Immerman, responds, the "form" of "effective control" over other nations and peoples is "less important" than the "power" and ability to "shape the lives of the native populations" and to mold their "politics" (pp. 11–12). Ironically, the practice of informal imperialism, together with the ongoing American ambivalence over the tension between U.S. actions and professed principles, has also led to U.S. reluctance to flex its "military and economic muscles fully" and to "an unprecedented amount of trouble imposing its will on its dependents" (pp. 13–14).

Only since the end of the Cold War have a growing number of Americans acknowledged the existence of an American empire, albeit a righteous one in opposition to evil terrorists. These proponents of American empire have also argued for the forceful expansion of democracy and, of course, liberty. Immerman finds that of all American presidents, George W. Bush "acted the most imperially in the classical sense" (p. 14). His "global war on terror" (GWOT), including the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the denial of legal rights to both foreign nationals and American citizens, and the torture and extraordinary rendition of prisoners, has challenged the "American narrative" of exceptionalism and exposed "An American Empire *for* Liberty" as an "oxymoron" (pp. 233, 235).

Immerman deftly develops and amplifies these arguments by examining the careers of six public figures: Benjamin Franklin, John Quincy

Adams, William Henry Seward, Henry Cabot Lodge, John Foster Dulles, and Paul D. Wolfowitz. This narrative and interpretive strategy works nicely. Immerman has written lucid and engaging biographical portraits, has skillfully contextualized and explained the subjects' thoughts and actions, and has demonstrated how these men represented more general American assumptions and attitudes regarding American empire.

Franklin lobbied for territorial expansion as early as 1751, anticipated subsequent arguments that a more extensive polity would promote internal harmony, and successfully sought expansive boundaries in the settlement with Britain in 1783. Significantly, he also anticipated the important racial component of American empire by viewing Native Americans as an inferior obstacle to constructing a "lovely white" nation (p. 30). Adams, commonly recognized as the foremost U.S. secretary of state, went far toward realizing the American empire by negotiating the Transcontinental Treaty with Spain in 1819. He also recognized that the sectional dispute over African American slavery, the most egregious contradiction of stated U.S. values, rendered the ongoing construction of empire a threat to the liberty it was supposed to protect. A protégé of Adams, Seward acquired Alaska, but most importantly envisioned and pursued commercial empire and sketched a blueprint for U.S. imperial actions in the 1890s. Lodge, the "most prolific propagandist" for turn-of-the-century imperialism, unapologetically sought an "Empire *of*, in contrast to *for*, Liberty" (pp. 141, 156). While advocating insular annexations to advance American power and security, he epitomized the "intellectual gymnastics" needed to justify American actions by claiming they brought civilization to inferiors incapable of governing themselves (p. 152).

Dulles, who did not employ the "vocabulary of empire," helped construct an "Empire of Security" to confront the Soviet "Empire against Liberty" (pp. 172, 175). In applying containment, Dulles and the United States acted imperially by making the rules for and exercising authority over both allies and Third World dependents such as Guatemala, Iran, and South Vietnam.

Wolfowitz, who held State and Defense Department positions in the Ford, Carter, Reagan, and both Bush administrations, epitomized the neoconservative perspective that gloried in American exceptionalism and called for the United States to extend democracy by force and to protect its liberties by destroying the enemies of its values and institutions. With Wolfowitz's guidance, Immerman asserts, "the concept of Empire for Liberty" came to "its logical conclusion" under President George W. Bush, and in so doing demonstrated the "flaws in that logic" (p. 19).

Immerman concludes this provocative volume with the guarded hope that the recent exposure of Americans to the "dark side" of empire might prompt them to press for a foreign policy of "less empire and more liberty" (p. 237). Since his book convincingly demonstrates that Americans have pursued empire from the 1750s, and that the GWOT is hardly the first evidence of the dark side, this may be an overly optimistic hope.



America's Captives: Treatment of POWs from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror. By Paul J. Springer. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010. Pp. viii, 278. $34.95 cloth.)

Paul J. Springer brings an interesting mix of academic training and service-academy work experience to his comprehensive study of American custodianship of prisoners of war (POWs). A former student of Texas A&M professor Arnold Krammer, long considered the leading American authority on World War II POWs, Springer has taught at West Point and the Air Command and Staff College. This vantage point affords him numerous insights into the POW condition. *America's Captives* examines the housing and care of American prisoners of war from the American Revolution to the present day. Springer holds that U.S. POW policy and practice have been improvisational. Due to a single-minded, if understandable, devotion to victory on the battlefield, little or no advance thought has ever been given to the problem of holding significant numbers of enemy soldiers for extended periods of time. This defect has been especially glaring when it comes to the actual practice of detaining prisoners of war. The end result is that the types of POW camps used to contain prisoners have varied from war to war, supervisory personnel have often been of poor quality, and the treatment of the prisoners themselves has sometimes been exemplary and sometimes atrocious.

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A review of several American wars makes it clear that the treatment of POWs has been "spur of the moment" and that this has led to results that are highly inconsistent. Since the Union and Confederacy expected the Civil War to be short and easy, the large number of captives taken by both sides soon overwhelmed the limited number of officers, guards, and other resources allocated for them. The absence of any effective planning consigned captives in blue and gray to desperate circumstances where they received insufficient space, food, and medical assistance. Malnutrition and disease ravaged camps such as the ones at Elmira, New York, and Andersonville, Georgia. Tens of thousands of Civil War prisoners perished. Ironically, the "Brother's War"—fought between Americans—saw the worst mistreatment of prisoners of war in all of U.S. history.

German, Italian, and Japanese POWs held by U.S. authorities during World War II, on the other hand, received good treatment. The planning effort, while still inadequate, proved superior to that of the Civil War, the United States adhered to the Geneva Convention of 1929, and the nation was willing enough to use a portion of its great wealth for the upkeep of prisoners. Sadly, the World War II example did not inform the circumstances surrounding the Iraq War. False assumptions about the impending conflict doomed advance planning. The U.S. Army devoted too few military police, and badly trained ones at that, to guard captured Iraqi soldiers and civilians at Abu Ghraib prison. Violations of the Geneva Convention followed. Physical and sexual abuse perpetrated against the prisoners crossed the line from "harsh interrogation and treatment" to outright torture. Abu Ghraib prisoners suffered greatly: sodomy, rape, and at least one case of murder transpired.

Springer's book is well-researched, and his themes are convincing. The author has a firm grasp on the relevant historiography, while his bibliography contains most if not all the major works. The impromptu nature of American POW practice and the disparate results spawned by it cannot be denied. The author correctly contends that treatment of POWs by American authorities has usually been better than that provided by enemy nations to U.S. POWs. A valuable point pertains to the World War II American reeducation program, wherein Army officers tried to instill democratic values in German prisoners of war. Springer explains that in later wars, such as Korea and Vietnam, enemies exploited this precedent by justifying re-indoctrination and propaganda efforts against American soldiers on the grounds that the U.S. government tried them first.

While the majority of this work is admirable, two aspects of it are problematic. Springer notes that the failure to adequately account for large numbers of prisoners taken by the American Expeditionary Force in 1918 led the captives to be "inadequately sheltered and fed" (p. 121). Shortly thereafter, he characterizes camp conditions as excellent, declaring that the Germans received "ample rations" (p. 138). Which was it? More disturbing, Springer attributes the terrible misdeeds at Abu Ghraib to a handful of morally corrupt soldiers and civilian contractors. He does continue up the chain of command to Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, arguing that culpability ended there. As far as President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld go, they "never authorized physical or sexual abuse in any capacity" (p. 199). The last assertion is dubious, if not wrong; many experts now insist that President Bush ordered "harsh interrogation," a euphemism for torture, or something so close to it that it comes down to semantics. Secretary Rumsfeld has admitted under oath that he is accountable for what happened at Abu Ghraib, although he defines what took place as "abuse," not torture. Springer does not really whitewash the Bush administration, but he appears loath to ascribe despicable actions to Bush and Rumsfeld without incontrovertible proof.

Despite a few inconsistencies and espousal of the official line on Bush administration responsibility for Abu Ghraib, Springer's book is both important and timely. As the first overarching study of the American POW experience to appear in over half a century, *America's Captives* cannot be ignored by POW specialists and should be consulted by all American civilian, military, and judicial authorities whose duties touch on terrorist and nonterrorist detainees. Whether the reader agrees with Springer at each turn or not, his ideas deserve scrutiny and careful consideration.



The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power. By Sean McMeekin. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. xv, 460. $29.95 cloth.)

JEREMY BEST is a doctoral candidate in history at the University of Maryland, College Park. He is a historian of German imperialism and is currently researching the role of missionaries in Germany's overseas empire.

Most modern readers are likely to be more familiar with the story of Lawrence of Arabia and Agatha Christie's *Murder on the Orient Express* than they are with the woeful history of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Sean McMeekin's *The Berlin-Baghdad Express* seeks to address this oversight. In McMeekin's words, "What is missing from the story is the colossal and almost totally forgotten role of imperial Germany in the drama" (p. 341). His book outlines the role of Germany in the late history of the Ottoman Empire and how the First World War came to be the death of the "sick man of Europe."

The book's title and early chapters seem to portend a book on the history of Germany's Near Eastern geopolitical centerpiece, the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway; however, the railway soon recedes into the background. *The Berlin-Baghdad Express* covers the Turko-Germanic diplomatic and military relationship from the 1890s until the end of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s. McMeekin's work is a welcome addition to scholarship on the Ottoman Empire and the foreign policy of the *Kaiserreich*. From the German side, McMeekin compellingly argues that the Ottoman East was the center of Wilhelm II's late-19th-century bid for global power. McMeekin, unlike many other scholars, does not reduce the peoples of the Middle East to bystanders of their own history. Rather, he chronicles the ways in which local and regional goals and actions aided and impeded German efforts.

McMeekin makes impressive use of archives in Russia, Germany, Austria, Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom to tell the history of Germany's efforts in the Middle East from a multitude of perspectives. Armed with these records, McMeekin reveals Germany's (and the rest of Europe's) misunderstanding of the region and of Islam. Central to Germany's ambitions in the region was the desire to use Islam and its adherents to challenge the Romanov and British empires for world domination. When the Germans coaxed the Young Turks to bring their country into World War I, the Germans thought they had their longed-for global jihad.

Rather than a simple history of German actions, McMeekin elevates the various other actors of the region to full participants in the story. He reveals that, in fact, the Turko-Germanic friendship and alliance was the result of Ottoman desires and wrangling as well. The construction of a Berlin-to-Baghdad rail line served the interests of the Ottoman Empire just as much, if not more. Furthermore, McMeekin shows that the Germans, much like many contemporary thinkers, viewed Muslims as one group to be mobilized for German war aims in a global holy war. In fact, the vast diversity of the Islamic community stymied Germany's hopes. Riven by national divisions as much as Europe, Muslims made their own political choices during the war, and most chose not to join the jihad. Even among those Muslims interested in fighting the Entente, conflict between the modernizing, liberal Young Turks and more devout Muslims fractured any coalition for jihad. German planners sent their agents into North Africa, Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan, but to no avail. This section is the most interesting of the book, though this reviewer believes fewer examples would have been sufficient, particularly because they could then have been handled with greater depth.

Where the Germans' understanding of the Muslim world was incomplete, McMeekin at times offers an overly simplistic explanation of the Germans in his narrative. He, on several occasions, stereotypes operatives as "ruthless" Germans (pp. 203, 213). More importantly, McMeekin seems only to see Turko-, Perso-, and Arabophiles among the Germans. He does not offer in his work any account of other opinions among Germans. Were there not Germans opposed to any entanglement in the Near East?

These shortcomings aside, McMeekin's book is an impressive work of scholarship that tells an important piece of the history of World War I, the

Ottoman Empire, and the Middle East. He shows very clearly how German diplomats and military officers misunderstood the realities of Muslim politics and society even as they sought to utilize the same for their own political purposes. His insights offer an important perspective for modern politicians and soldiers engaged with the modern Middle East.



Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919–1941. By Anne L. Foster. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010. Pp. xii, 241. $79.95 cloth; $22.95 paper.)

Since the work of Akira Iriye began appearing in the late 1960s, historians have become accustomed to treating the United States as a Pacific power, even before 1941. Diplomatic historians, working in the field now known as international history, have traced the U.S. entanglements in East Asia caused by the rise of Japanese power, the collapse of Chinese politics after 1911, as well as the growth of commerce and trade in the Western Pacific. More recently, the literature about the American colonization of the Philippines after 1898 has encompassed research and writing by area studies specialists, military historians, and U.S. foreign policy experts, no longer working in isolation from each other. Anne L. Foster's book builds on this literature and reaches beyond the Philippines, China, and Japan to examine how the United States interacted with the European colonies in Southeast Asia. Foster's thesis is that after World War I, even though U.S. diplomats, businessmen, and missionaries brought their own particular concerns and interests to their interaction with other colonies of Southeast Asia, they participated as full members of the community of colonizers. And although the United States attempted to alter colonial arrangements to suit their economic and political needs, they were content and able to work in the system of colonialism initially created by the Europeans.

ANDREW GOSS is an assistant professor of history at the University of New Orleans, where he teaches Asian and Islamic history. He is author of *The Floracrats: State-Sponsored Science and the Failure of the Enlightenment in Indonesia* (2011).

Foster's study treats the interwar period as an era of late imperialism, the two decades before the Pacific War when the politics of colonialism was still broadly accepted among the imperial powers, but was less surefooted, as the ideology of the civilizing mission seemed increasingly hollow and self-serving. She argues persuasively that it was at this moment that the United States came to play an important role in the colonial politics of Southeast Asia. Americans in the Philippines proclaimed that they had pioneered a new model of colonial rule, in which Filipinos were being groomed to run a modern country, following the American example of capitalism and politics. The contradictory stance of the United States—it was both for and against colonialism—meshed well with the political reality elsewhere in Southeast Asia after 1919. In detailed case studies, Foster examines the intercolony cooperation to monitor and subvert communist agitation, the conflicts over rubber production, and the politics surrounding Hollywood films being shown in colonial Southeast Asia. In this way, she demonstrates that the United States played a much more prominent role in shaping colonialism than previously understood. Moreover, by examining the impact of the Depression, which devastated the European-controlled export economies of Southeast Asia, Foster underscores the rising American prominence in the region.

Foster's diplomatic history methodology, which reads closely the American diplomatic traffic, as well as the Dutch, English, and French archives, is refreshing in that it treats old problems in new ways—for example, her fascinating account of the anticommunist collaboration between the colonial powers long before the Cold War—while also examining new areas such as American efforts to navigate the film-censor boards in Southeast Asian colonies. She moves beyond the diplomats' circles when she looks at the American efforts to maintain a consistent supply of low-priced rubber by looking at the Goodyear enterprises, both plantations and factories, in the Netherlands East Indies. Here, as well as in her analysis of a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey's effort to win oil concessions in the Dutch colony, she is convincing, showing that while the Americans were critical of European colonial capitalism, they nonetheless found ways to work and profit in the existing system. Foster is an exemplary international historian, carefully examining and contextualizing the reactions of the colonizer and colonized in the European Southeast Asian colonies to the projections of American diplomatic, cultural, and economic power.

In discussing the origins of the U.S. retreat from the Philippines in the 1930s, Foster details how U.S. goals in colonial Southeast Asia were intertwined with the two most familiar projections of U.S. power in the Pacific, through the military buildup in the Pacific and with colonial administration in the Philippines. She deliberately separates the Southeast Asian region from the rest of Asia and argues that the U.S. had a Southeast Asia policy even before World War II. This policy was premised on the softer economic and cultural influences. Befitting a monograph, Foster delineates her problem carefully, but some readers might find her interest too narrow, as her analysis only reaches out tentatively to other areas and geographical periods. For example, there is almost no discussion of the U.S. military strategy in Asia as it related to either the British or Japanese. Yet she is also adamant that her thesis is not just another attempt to explain the roots of the Cold War. Nonetheless, her conclusions that the U.S. was a full participant in colonial Southeast Asia, and that this involvement continued after 1945, are important and timely.



Tungsten in Peace and War, 1918-1946. By Ronald H. Limbaugh. (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2010. Pp. xiv, 284. $44.95 cloth.)

Tungsten has the highest melting point of any metal. Although it was not recognized as a distinct metallic element until the industrial age, it has found use as a filament for incandescent light bulbs and as an alloying element in steel to make objects, especially cutting tools or military armaments, which are hard and can operate at very high temperatures. For these reasons, governments since 1900 have considered tungsten a strategic metal, necessary as a constituent of ammunition and armor and, more importantly, in making machine tools for manufacturing a wide array of military ordnance and other supplies.

FREDRIC L. QUIVIK is associate professor of history at Michigan Technological University. He has worked as an expert historian of technology in environmental litigation for more than 15 years, including serving as an expert for the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Eastern New York in the Li Tungsten Superfund case on Long Island.

By focusing on the corporate papers of the Nevada-Massachusetts Company, one of the leading domestic tungsten-mining companies in the United States during the middle two quarters of the 20th century, and then doing a masterful job of researching the historical context in which Nevada-Massachusetts operated, Ronald H. Limbaugh has written a superb history of this obscure metal's role in American political, economic, military, and industrial affairs.

Charles H. Segerstrom, a banker and mine investor based in Sonora, California, founded Nevada-Massachusetts in 1924 to operate the tungsten mine of the Pacific Tungsten Company near Mill City, Nevada. He presided over the company as it negotiated changing markets for tungsten in the postwar era of the 1920s, the Great Depression of the 1930s (when for a while Nevada-Massachusetts was America's only domestic tungsten producer), and an American economy mobilized for World War II in the 1940s. Segerstrom died in 1946, and his family continued to control the company's interests until they sold the assets in 1970. Limbaugh, who had been archivist and professor of history at the University of the Pacific in Stockton, California, met Segerstrom's daughter-in-law in Sonora and was able to arrange for the family to donate Segerstrom's papers to the University of the Pacific's Holt-Atherton Library. The papers included the central corporate files of Nevada-Massachusetts.

Limbaugh's book is a model of placing corporate records in context. The first chapter describes the importance of tungsten to modern industry. The second details the importance of tungsten to the several belligerents in World War I. This global context is important for understanding the history of tungsten in the United States. The war witnessed discovery of the Mill City mine that would become Nevada-Massachusetts's central property, and demand for tungsten during the war stimulated the launching of tungsten mining elsewhere in Nevada. But demand was complicated during and after the war by the discoveries of rich and easily mined tungsten deposits in China. The nature of China's deposits, coupled with low labor rates there, made it possible for China to sell tungsten on the global market for a fraction of the cost to produce in Nevada and elsewhere in the United States.

Those realities about the sources and prices of tungsten on the global market created the dynamics of the story Limbaugh unfolds. He analyzes the history of U.S. policy during war and peacetime in the first half of the 20th century, as the government worked to assure an adequate supply of this strategic metal. Policy makers had to weigh the practicalities and the ideologies of protectionism and free trade. They grappled with the competing strategies of using foreign tungsten in order to conserve domestic resources in the event of war, on one hand, and on the other hand of subsidizing domestic resources in order to help domestic industry thrive in preparation for war. Limbaugh's remaining six chapters explore how these questions were debated and answered during the market adjustments of the 1920s, the Great Depression, the lead-up to World War II, and the war itself. Chapters 3–8 show how Segerstrom participated in those debates and how he managed his company to assure its health and profitability during changing conditions. In the process, Limbaugh mines the Nevada-Massachusetts records to reveal interesting character traits of Segerstrom as a sharp and successful corporate official. For example, Segerstrom was adamantly opposed to government intervention in the economy in the form of wage or price protections, but he lobbied energetically on behalf of protectionist trade restrictions. Limbaugh also shows that the ethical standards to which Segerstrom adhered as a corporate official were always based on whether his actions would benefit his company practically in terms of profitability.

Although tungsten may be an obscure metal, Limbaugh's book is an excellent study in the history of interplay between the U.S. government and corporate industry regarding strategic resources.

HAL BRANDS
Latin America's Cold War

Latin America's Cold War. By Hal Brands. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. x, 385. $29.95 cloth.)

As Timothy Garton Ash once argued, a good history book should always try to mix rigorous research based on facts with a stream of original ideas. Hal Brands's new work, which covers the history of the Cold War in Latin America from the end of World War II until the early 1990s, seems to have fully achieved the right blend of these ingredients. To be sure, Brands's book contains little unknown to specialists who study this turbulent period. Nonetheless, from a historiographical perspective, the main ideas underlying *Latin America's Cold War* are innovative. Nor is this just a work of synthesis: Brands's ideas are supported by extensive and methodical research carried on in 13 different archives located in Latin America, the U.S., and in Europe.

VANNI PETTINÀ is a Spanish National Research Council fellow and LSE-IDEAS Latin American International Affairs program associate. His research focuses on the history of the Cold War in Latin America, with special attention to the 1950s. His publications include "The Shadows of Cold War over Latin America: The U.S. Reaction to Fidel Castro's Nationalism, 1956-1959," *Cold War History* (2010).

Brands, who teaches at the Sanford School of Public Policy of Duke University, convincingly challenges the two main existing historiographical narratives on Latin America's Cold War. On the one hand, the book disputes the Manichaeism and the triumphalist approach that has usually marked the conservative sector of the historiography on this field. According to the author, conservative commentators have portrayed the period as a clash between the good, often represented by the alliance between the Latin American right and Washington, and the evil, namely the Soviet Union and, after 1961, Fidel Castro's socialist Cuba. Conservative scholarship has therefore downplayed the impact that U.S. policies had in fostering authoritarian and appallingly repressive regimes in the hemisphere. But, Brands argues, the "revisionist" approach to the period is also problematic. Authors such as Greg Grandin, Steve Stern, or Daniela Spenser, focusing too narrowly on "right repression, U.S. complicity, and popular victimization" (p. 71), have oversimplified a reality where the causes and the responsibilities of instability, social upheaval, and external interventionism are far more complex and diversified. Consequently, Brands, one of the few U.S.-based scholars who seems to deal with Latin American history without that sense of guilt that marks many of his colleagues, tries to retrace the complexity of this scenario.

The main argument of the book is that what made the Cold War era in Latin America so tumultuous was its "multilayered" nature. The global struggle for ideological and geopolitical hegemony between Washington and Moscow constantly interacted with the Latin American pathological dispute over "domestic arrangements and internal power structures." According to Brands, the constant clash between Latin American left and the right over the social and political boundaries of the state should be considered the original source of instability. This conflict, already in crescendo after World War II, became increasingly polarized during the 1960s, mainly as a consequence of Cuba's interventionist policies adopted in the aftermath of its revolution. Castro and, even if more intermittently, the Soviet Union, blew the winds of continental revolution, encouraging the formation of Marxist guerrilla movements through Central and South America. They did so because of revolutionary ideology and also as a defensive strategy aimed at distracting U.S. attention from Cuba. No less relevant for the radicalization of Latin America political arena was the emergence of the global Third World, which from the end of the 1950s started generating the perception of a collective struggle between the North and the South for the development of the latter. On a local level, this collective image reinforced social tensions and eventually armed mobilization against domestic and international order. The expansion of guerrilla movements and social unrest equally challenged conservative elements of Latin American societies and Washington, which interpreted this phenomenon as an effort to change the strategic equilibriums in one of their traditional areas of hegemony.

Brands does not deny that this convergence often led Washington to throw its weight behind brutal, authoritarian, and socially conservative regimes, especially in South America during the 1970s and in Central

America throughout the 1980s. But he correctly underlines that the problem of communist expansion was not an excuse Washington used to mask U.S. traditional imperialist projection in the region. By contrast, he convincingly demonstrates that U.S., Cuban, and Soviet "competing interventionism" mutually interacted, intertwining with the local political level, creating a structural base for instability and violence. The result was the militarization of the political conflict and the weakening of the democratic option that lasted four decades.

This book will probably generate a vigorous debate. Nonetheless, the rich, innovative, and comparatively more balanced perspective it offers on Latin America's Cold War era makes it compulsory reading for anyone interested in understanding this facinating period.



NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Partnership. By Lawrence S. Kaplan. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2010. Pp.xii, 281. $34.95 cloth; $24.95 paper.)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) are among the most important and enduring multilateral organizations to have emerged after World War II. Although NATO pays homage to the UN in its charter, the reality is that the two have had a difficult and often contentious relationship. *NATO and the UN* puts both organizations into historical perspective using a number of crises as case studies to illustrate the areas of overlap and often competition between them. The author begins with a clear statement of his hypothesis that "there is no more contentious subject in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) than its relationship with the United Nations (UN)" (p. 1). While this might appear to be hyperbole, the author supports this assertion through the cases, from the creation of NATO, to the Suez Crisis of 1956, and continuing to the present and the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. And, while the history of the relationship between the two organizations is interesting and important, what also emerges in this study is the role of the United States and the impact that domestic politics played as the various NATO nations were deciding to act—or react—in each case.

JOYCE P. KAUFMAN is professor of political science at Whittier College. She is author of *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict and the Atlantic Alliance* (2002) and coeditor, with Andrew Dorman, of *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice* (2011).

From the beginning of the book, Lawrence S. Kaplan, a NATO scholar, stresses the relationship of mutual need between NATO and the UN, and how their respective histories intersected around major international flash points. The historical approach makes his arguments easy to follow and also illustrates the relative power of each organization at different times. Presenting each crisis, the author makes no presumption about the "correct" behavior of each organization or of its individual members. Rather, he documents the case and the course of action that the organization followed, including those times when, in retrospect, the action exacerbated the situation rather than helping to ease the tension surrounding the crisis.

A couple of other points are made quite clearly that will be helpful to a student of either organization, or to anyone who is simply interested in the evolution of security policy since the start of the Cold War. One is the impact of individuals, whether the secretary general of the UN, the various leaders of NATO (both political and military), or critical leaders within the individual nations. For example, the dominance of a secretary general, such as Dag Hammarskjöld, made a definite difference in the credibility of the UN during the Congo crisis in 1960. That stands in marked contrast to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whose style and approach undermined the UN during the crises in the Balkans in the 1990s. That failure of the UN, in turn, allowed NATO to emerge as the critical organization at a time when it was reevaluating its role in the post–Cold War world.

The Cold War itself becomes an actor in this study for the ways in which the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union influenced the decisions made within the UN, but also NATO. Against the backdrop of the Cold War and changes that were necessitated when the Cold War ended, to this reader, NATO emerges as the more vibrant organization. Unlike the UN, which remained static, NATO seems to have been better able to adapt in the face of changing geopolitical realities.

Underlying many of the cases were the divisions that emerged between the United States and its NATO allies. These have become especially pronounced in the decisions made after 9/11, and the author makes clear that the reasons for those divisions which affect the Alliance to date have their origins in history. The United States lost its place as the unspoken leader of the alliance in the wake of Vietnam, a war that "revived an old European fear, namely, that America's historic orientation toward the Pacific arena would drain the Atlantic alliance of its vitality as well as of U.S. troops" (p. 83). Although it was largely unspoken, this fear emerged periodically to roil the unity of the alliance, becoming overt at times, such as the 1977 speech by Helmut Schmidt to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in which he articulated what he saw as "drift" in U.S. policy.

In order to really appreciate the cases and the points that the author makes, the reader needs a basic knowledge and understanding of the subject matter. For example, when the author references the "dual-track decision" (p. 107), he does so without additional explanation, assuming that the reader will know what this means. Given the complexity of the topic, only those readers who have that basic background will probably be drawn to the book, and they will find it an interesting exploration of these two important organizations.



Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions. By Joy Gordon. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. ix, 359. $39.95 cloth.)

Invisible War is a thorough and scathing documentation of the humanitarian effects of the American-led United Nations sanctions against Iraq from 1990 to 2003. Those sanctions were comprehensive in scope, global in reach, and, combined with the military destruction from the 1991 Gulf War, devastating for the Iraqi people. While concerns about the humanitarian impact led to changes in the sanctions over time, most notably the Oil-for-Food Program, Joy Gordon slams U.S. policy for interpreting the exceptions as narrowly as possible and aiming to systematically destroy the Iraqi economy, thereby trampling the spirit, if not the letter, of international norms on genocide and crimes against humanity.

KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development (Washington, DC) and visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, is a coauthor of *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (3rd ed., 2007).

The factual basis for Gordon's arguments is detailed in more than 100 pages of endnotes and sources, drawing on United Nations (UN) and other official documents, independent studies, and more than a dozen interviews with U.S. and foreign officials. Yet, while the overall message that the sanctions were a catastrophe for Iraq is clear, the welter of facts and figures is often overwhelming and hard to follow. In addition, the book leaps back and forth in time, with the chapters focused on different functional elements of the case. The result is frequent repetition and inconsistencies in emphasis and argumentation that can leave the reader more confused than enlightened on key points, such as the responsibility that Saddam Hussein should bear for delaying the oil-for-food scheme for five years.

While Gordon makes a strong argument that the U.S. policy was wrongheaded on moral, ethical, and foreign-policy grounds (though the latter is more implicit than explicit), the weakness of the book is that it fails to grapple seriously with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's government and to analyze what alternative policy approaches existed that would have been feasible, effective, and less costly to the Iraqi people. Elements of what a different strategy might have looked like emerge when Gordon discusses UN efforts to reform the sanctions regime and lessen the humanitarian impact. But she focuses on the efforts by U.S. policy makers to block or limit the reforms and offers no analysis of whether these alternatives would have been effective in foreign policy terms, or more acceptable in humanitarian terms.

Gordon does not seem to believe that American policy makers were evil or stupid, but neither does she delve much into their motivations for sticking to such a costly policy. In Iraq, the international community was facing a regime that had acquired and used chemical weapons, including against innocent civilians, and was assiduously seeking a secret nuclear weapons capability. From that perspective, the U.S. policy of squeezing Iraq as hard as possible in hopes of removing Saddam Hussein from power was not irrational. As Gordon points out, however, that goal was not shared by other UN Security Council or General Assembly members, and American policy makers could only hope to achieve it by manipulating the consensus-based rules and obstructing efforts to loosen the sanctions. At various times, the United States bowed to pressures and agreed to loosen the restrictions on dual-use goods, but Gordon thoroughly documents the various ways that U.S. policy makers undercut those reforms with endless requests for information and bureaucratic holds on contracts.

In the final chapter, Gordon accuses the United States of policies that "simply do gratuitous harm that had not the least relation to the threat Iraq might have posed to its neighbors or to anyone else" (p. 233). But concern that those particular goods might be diverted for nefarious uses is not the only explanation for U.S. behavior. Rather, if U.S. policy makers believed that a revitalized Saddam Hussein would again acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, then they were faced with a far more difficult dilemma than just which goods to block and which to approve. Later in the chapter, Gordon recognizes but does not seem to fully appreciate the depth of the dilemma that U.S. policy makers faced: if they eased the sanctions, the chances of destabilizing Hussein would recede, and they feared that containing him indefinitely would be difficult if not impossible.

While Gordon's focus is on the humanitarian ethical consequences of the sanctions policy, the book makes clear that it did not serve U.S. security interests, either. The combination of the United States running roughshod over other UN members and the growing concern about the humanitarian impact led to steady erosion of international support for enforcing the sanctions. By the time Secretary of State Colin L. Powell shifted to supporting a "smart sanctions" strategy, with a narrower focus on military goods and more freedom for Iraq to purchase humanitarian and civil sector goods, it was too late. It is difficult to know whether the shift might have sustained international support for UN sanctions for long, but it was quickly rendered moot by President George W. Bush's decision to use military force to achieve what he believed economic sanctions could not.

Finally, while the book is a strong indictment of U.S. policy in this case, its relevance for the future is not clear. After other early post–Cold War UN sanctions against Yugoslavia and Haiti, the UN turned decisively against comprehensive economic sanctions as a tool of collective security. Since then, the emphasis, clearly informed by the Iraq experience, has been on using more "targeted" economic sanctions and avoiding broad negative effects on the populace in target countries. The United States is now paying the cost of its earlier manipulation of the rules and is finding other UN Security Council members less willing to cooperate with its initiatives, for example in trying to influence Iran. Some rebalancing of U.S. dominance was clearly needed, but if the UN now returns to the impotence that marked its efforts during the Cold War, the world will not be better off.

Current Areas of Interest and Engagement



Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. By Thomas Barfield. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pp. xi, 389. $29.95 cloth)

Afghanistan has been the focus of many scholarly studies over the last 30 years. Whereas prior to the successful pro-Soviet coup of April 1978, only a very limited number of Western scholars had taken a keen interest in the country's history, politics, culture, social structures, foreign relations, and geostrategic importance, following the communist takeover and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 21 months later, numerous works analyzing these variables began to flood the market. These works, whether in the form of monographs or articles, have been varied in their coverage and quality. While some have made a solid effort to reach the high standard set by the early scholars of Afghanistan, such as Louis Dupree, Leon Polluda, and Vartan Gregorian, many others have fallen short of that standard in various degrees. The book under review falls substantially within the first category.

AMIN SAIKAL is professor of political science and director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University and author of *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (2006) and *The Rise and Fall of the Shah: Iran from Autocracy to Religious Rule* (2009).

Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History makes a serious attempt to survey and analyze the changing political, cultural, and social landscapes of the country from the ancient time to the present. It provides meaningful and objective insights into governance, state legitimacy, social and economic development, and foreign interventions, and Afghan responses to them, with an admirable degree of thoughtfulness and fluency.

Barfield's approach is grounded in cultural and social anthropology, but he also demonstrates a keen flare for historiography. He sets his historical narrative against the backdrop of some of the theoretical formulations of Arab historian Muhammad Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), as registered in his famous work *Al-Muqaddimah*, or *An Introduction to History*. Khaldun's views of "desert civilization" and "sedentary civilization" seem to impress Barfield most. He applies these views to illuminate Afghanistan's historical journey, and to test the validity of the views against this journey. In a sense, Khaldun's formulations provide the theoretical theme running through the book.

Barfield begins his study with a survey of people and places and goes on to provide a historical sketch of premodern Afghanistan, and a fairly detailed analysis of the country's changes in fortunes since its emergence as an identifiable political and territorial unit from the mid-18th century. In this, he pays special attention to the consolidation of the Afghan state and processes of political legitimation, especially from the late 19th century.

Overall, Barfield makes a very useful and readable contribution to our understanding of Afghanistan's political, cultural, and social evolution in both historical and contemporary terms. He makes a special effort to unpack the turmoil that has come to beset Afghanistan over the last 30 years in relation or comparison to what has underpinned the country's past.

Having said this, the book is primarily for general readers who have little or no knowledge of the country. There is not much in it that could enrich specialists. While its narrative is sound, it provides few novel or refreshing insights. It also suffers from a number of deficiencies and omissions.

Its historical examination of Afghanistan within the crucible of Khaldun's views certainly provides something new, but the book's narrative could easily do without it. While Khaldun's ideas were pioneering, one can easily construct an approach to explain Afghanistan's historical evolution and changing regional circumstances with reference to a number of other theoretical formulations related to development studies, the theory of modernization, and international relations. The book appears at times to seek to reconstruct Afghan historical events to fit in Khaldun's views rather than allowing those events to speak for themselves.

What is astonishing about a work of such magnitude is that it is largely based on secondary sources, authored mostly by Western scholars. The little that it contains in the way of primary sources relates to the author's field observations and a number of interviews. Even in this, the author bridges his fieldwork between the early 1970s and his visit to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001 by mainly quoting primary sources from secondary ones. For example, for a Soviet Politburo report about the situation in Afghanistan after the murder of the first Communist president of Afghanistan by his prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, in September 1979, he quotes Ludwig Adamec's *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan* (3rd ed., 2003) as a source rather than citing the original report (p. 234). The same applies to quite a number of other assertions and judgments, which remain uncorroborated by original sources. In addition, the book cites very few of the large number of works by Afghan scholars, most in Dari and Pashtu, but some also written in, or translated into, English. There is no citing of historical works by such Afghan historians as Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, Saiyyed Qassim Rishtia, Abdul Hai Habibi, and Nasri Haqq-Shinas.

Beyond this point, the book is considerably repetitive. For example, the author keeps reminding us, although in different words, of the legacies of Dost Mohammad Khan or Abdurrahman Khan—both rulers of Afghanistan in the 19th century. While from the author's point of view this may be useful, it nonetheless makes the volume congested with unnecessary repetition.

In all, the book makes good introductory reading, with a sound understanding of Afghanistan's past and present. It does not call for the restoration of the past to resolve the current problems, but urges lessons to be learned from Afghan history as an aid to put the country on a stable path of change and development. The main value of the book lies in the fact that it brings together a number of variables to elucidate its analysis. Otherwise, it is quite eccentric in its approach and coverage, but as Barfield says, this is his story of Afghanistan (p. 16), paralleling Frank Sinatra's song: "I did it my way."



The Muslim Revolt: A Journey through Political Islam. By Roger Hardy. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Pp. 239. $26.50 cloth.)

In the introduction to this book, Roger Hardy argues that the crisis in relations between the Muslim world and the West is the most urgent issue of our time, and also the least understood. The author lists three phenomena that underpin this conflict and that tend to accompany and aggravate each other: long-standing ethnic or nationalist conflicts that have acquired a more religious character; the newer global struggle—ideological as well as military—now known as the "long war" between the United States and its allies on one hand and al-Qaeda and similar radical Islamist groups on the other; and lastly, modernity and globalization seen by Muslim populations as an out-of-control Western steamroller threatening to destroy their cherished way of life. Hardy also mentions five "expert-derived" causes for the Islamic militancy that are a major aspect of these "people's wars," where the local and global mingle: a historical yearning to recapture former glory; political resistance to Western imperialism and local autocracy; an economic response to poverty and underdevelopment; the ideological brainwashing effect of a fierce and reactionary worldview; and the notion that culturally, Islam is inherently aggressive, intolerant, and anti-Western (the author disagrees with this last point).

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The book's most important point, however, is that our failure to understand Islam and its extremist variants means that we pay a high price for this ignorance. Hardy clarifies this argument by comparing the West's uninformed perception of the 11 September 2001 attacks as unprovoked and without context with the belief of the perpetrators that the attacks were revenge for and an attempt to reverse the long humiliation and domination of Muslims at Western hands, as well as a counterattack against the West's "Crusader-Zionist Alliance."

The journey that Hardy takes readers on in his book benefits from his 30-plus years of personal travel and encounters as a journalist (more than 20 of them with the BBC) covering Middle Eastern and Islamic issues. The first stop on that journey is a well-summarized review of Islam itself, with the goal of better understanding the Muslim revolt—both against an imposed modernity associated with European colonialism and a failed modernity associated with the postcolonial regimes. The author also examines the development of Islamism and the key figures, especially Egyptian, who shaped and enabled the spread of this movement to its significant influence on the radical jihadists of today. This informative treatment of Islamism forms one major part of Hardy's well-researched narrative, and it intersects at multiple points with the other focus of the book, which is an exploration of the role of political Islam in Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Southeast Asia, and Europe. The diversity reflected in these countries and regions, all of them important to U.S. interests, illustrates well that Islam is multidimensional and not always anti-Western.

Hardy educates the reader on some other important issues from different parts of the Islamic world, including how Shi'ism differs from the Sunnism practiced by most of the world's Muslims, and, especially critical to understanding the militants' strategy and methods, their radical ideology, and its key role in the "war of ideas" being waged against both the West and the Muslim governments themselves. Ironically, the globalization and modernity that the extremists condemn have provided them with more effective tools and wider access to spread their venom, especially the Internet and related advances in communications technologies. These means enable al-Qaeda and other radical groups to disseminate their messages of Muslim humiliation; the legitimizing role of violence; and the power of imagery, such as television coverage of the attacks on the World Trade Center towers. This potent mix provides young Muslims with identity, ideology, and inspiration to take up the radical Islamist cause; it also illustrates how much catching up the West must do to compete effectively in the war of ideas.

In his conclusion, Hardy warns that absent a clearer understanding of Islam, Islamism, and jihadism; a better appreciation of the roots of Muslim grievances; and the development of more effective means to foster less hostility and more equality between the West and the Islamic world, the Muslim revolt will continue for many years to come. He also astutely cautions that the West may forfeit its peace-brokering advantage and lose the "hearts and minds" of Muslims if it continues to operate as it has.



The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West. By Lorenzo Vidino. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Pp. 326. $29.50 cloth.)

Lorenzo Vidino sets out to define and analyze a dilemma Western governments are facing: the need for credible Muslim community partners to facilitate Muslim integration in Western societies and stem the tide of homegrown terrorism. The significance of the problem lies in the fact that Muslims in the West comprise the fastest growing religious communities, characterized by relatively large young populations and fractured organizational structures. Vidino's analysis provides a unique window on a debate within Western law enforcement and security analysts on whether Muslim Brotherhood groups in Europe and the United States can be the intermediaries to connect Muslim communities to their respective governments. Reviewing the cases of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States, Vidino weighs the arguments of those who believe that the Brotherhood is part of the problem and those who think they are part of the solution.

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Optimists believe a number of factors raise the stocks of the Muslim Brotherhood as a potential partner: financial backing; linkages to top religious and political leaders in countries allied with the United States (the Persian Gulf States and Turkey, for example); a history of communal activism in the West; a willingness to cooperate with political forces with which they have little in common (proof of flexibility and sophisticated political strategy); and a record of condemnation of terrorism.

In contrast, pessimists believe there are major obstacles impeding any potential dialogue with the Brotherhood, including the failure of this transnational movement to define its place in world affairs; the limited number of its members; the discrepancy between the undemocratic views espoused by the movement's major ideologues and the democratic practices of its activists; the illiberal values espoused by Brotherhood-endorsed religion scholars, especially on women; and the suspected links of the group to designated terrorist organizations.

Much of the study offers assessment of the two positions. On terrorism, Vidino presents the argument of critics suggesting that Brotherhood press releases condemning terrorism are self-serving and cannot be trusted as genuine. But he also outlines the counter view that the Brotherhood could have chosen not to condemn acts of terror or to condone them. Thus, leaders of the movement clearly aim to distinguish themselves from the extremism of al-Qaeda. Moreover, they have been helpful in the communal aspects of Western governments dealing with radicalization. In the United Kingdom, they agreed to take over a mosque run by extremists, and in France, they participated in the government-initiated council of Islamic leaders.

Vidino suggests a realistic approach, stemming from the fact that nonviolent Islamists abide by the law. If they cannot be suppressed, then marginalizing them only assures their radicalization. Vidino suggests cautious engagement with the Brotherhood as part of a policy that aims at speaking to "a wider range of voices, proactively seeking to connect with traditionally underrepresented groups" (p. 223). He is encouraged by the French policy, which he believes has made progress in taming the Brotherhood. Even the controversial bans on hijab and niqab did not cause the group to abandon its cooperation with the government.

The book is cognizant of the dynamism of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, but not so much in the United States, where the discussion of the core book question is based on selected, static snapshots of the movement up to the early 1990s. The book gives no consideration to the history of Brotherhood members who in the mid-1990s decided to sever ties to the mother organization. Also, much of the discussion of the American case is based on intelligence data related to Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood members and their suspected links to Hamas prior to its designation as a terrorist organization in 1995. Moreover, Vidino muddies the question of who is part of the group by offering the label "New Muslim Brotherhood" to refer to all individuals and groups with current or past links the movement.

Paradoxically, this caveat reinforces Vidino's refreshing dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood in the West. Perhaps further research is required to identify voices of change within the community of nonviolent Islamic advocates. Particularly important elements within this crowd are reformers who advocate the reconciliation of Islamic values with the concept of citizenship in modern states and the incorporation of all human experiences in the development of analytical models to examine the challenges facing contemporary Muslims.



My Life with the Taliban. By Abdul Salam Zaeef. Translated and edited by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Pp. 331. $29.95 cloth; $19.95 paper.)

My Life with the Taliban is the first autobiography written by a founding member of the Taliban. After fighting the Soviets and being present at the initial meeting of the Taliban, Abdul Salam Zaeef served as a bureaucrat in the first Taliban government ministries. When the movement was given diplomatic recognition by Pakistan, Zaeef was chosen to be their first Ambassador to Islamabad. He was later detained by the Pakistanis and spent four years imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay.

His book, originally published in Pashto, was intended for an Afghan audience. Two Kandahar-based Western researchers translated it into English. The use of extensive endnotes enriches the occasionally sparse text with detailed background for the Western reader.

MATTHEW COLLINS is a Middle East analyst at the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Quantico, VA. He spent more than 10 years as a U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer.

Self-mythologizing is a time-honored tradition among successful insurgent leaders. Victory is seen not only as a triumph of superior force or strategy, but as a validation of the moral superiority of their cause. Selective memory, self-aggrandizement, and factual liberties are to be expected. What is important is not that such things happen, but how. A memoir of this kind gives the reader a glimpse of the author's worldview as he chooses to present it, and one quickly sees how different that worldview is.

The story of the Taliban that emerges is that of a small, congenial group of idealistic religious students returning from refugee camps in Pakistan to come of age fighting the occupying Soviets. Zaeef fondly recounts teaching the men he fought with and setting up sharia courts to establish a rudimentary justice system amid the chaos of the invasion. He admits that this period, with the few hundred men he fought with, was the happiest time of his life.

The "Taliban of September 11th" was a response to the civil war and lawlessness that followed the departure of the Soviets, known as *topakiyaan*, or "the time of the men with guns." This group, a loosely organized network of minor clerics and teachers who fought together against the Soviets, also led a movement against the Afghan warlords. They repeated their pattern of establishing a justice system and starting schools based on their somewhat dubious backgrounds as sharia scholars.

One is struck by Zaeef's legalistic, Manichaean worldview. He is incensed that Pakistan would repeal his diplomatic immunity but does not seem to grasp how the United States could be so upset about its embassies being bombed in Africa. He echoes the long-held academic view that Mullah Omar was surprised that his failure to turn over Osama bin Laden after 11 September would lead to a U.S. invasion. At Guantanamo, in a culturally revealing moment, Zaeef seems as appalled by having his beard shaved as by the abuse he suffers at the hands of his captors.

Some parts of the book require a strong stomach. Zaeef remains completely unrepentant in his views about the Taliban's moral purity. While his colleagues cheered on the 11 September attacks, he wept, not for the murder of thousands of innocents, but because he recognized that this tragedy would mean more suffering for the Afghan people. Of course, fighting an insurgency requires strong stomachs and short memories. Often, messy peace deals are struck with former adversaries. These peace overtures have already begun with moderate Taliban leaders, and Zaeef may be trying to set himself as a mediator to that end. He remains a diplomat to the last.

Zaeef is anything but an unbiased source and takes liberties with several facts throughout the book. He presents the Taliban as a moral, law-abiding movement that helped rid Afghanistan of its Soviet invaders, brought order amid chaos in civil war, and fought an equally righteous campaign against the America invaders. That this movement might violate the rights of its own citizens, repress its women, and abuse its children is never countenanced. Also absent from the narrative is the Taliban's decision to make Afghanistan the world's largest opium producer.

The contemporary reader will also appreciate Zaeef's telling anecdotes about the challenges of Afghan governance from his time working the Taliban's government ministries:

> The Taliban controlled about 90 percent of the country, but there were still massive internal disputes over control. The different provincial government branches acted independently from each other; central ministries and the provincial governors feuded over power; all these problems remained unresolved when the Islamic Emirate was ousted in 2001.

The book ends with an updated conclusion, reflecting on the Barack H. Obama administration's appointment of General Stanley A. McChrystal to head the International Security Assistance Force and the decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan. This addendum is a boon for strategic communications and intelligence analysts, as it is a well-presented summary of the Taliban narrative written by the consummate true believer.


Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts
The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict
Edited by PETER ANDREAS and KELLY M. GREENHILL

Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict. Edited by Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. Pp. ix, 287. $65.00 cloth; $24.95 paper.)

Numbers increasingly drive policy. Government agencies justify missions and budgets with a host of statistics that demonstrate the urgency and importance of their issue area. Nongovernmental organizations rely on shocking numbers to stir public support to their cause, raise funds, and gain influence in the policy arena. International humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping missions only occur after actors reach a consensus on the number of people killed or suffering and agree that the number is large enough to warrant action. The U.S. government continuously uses statistics to assess the compliance of foreign countries on issues ranging from illicit drugs and human trafficking to financing terrorism and arms smuggling. Such decisions have wide-ranging consequences for foreign aid, bilateral trade, and diplomatic engagement.

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This irrefutable fact—that numbers play an influential role in policy making—is the focus of Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill's new edited volume, *Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts*. The editors have collected nearly a dozen contributions from respected academics working on issues related to crime and conflict. Each reflects on the role that statistics play in their issue area. While each case is unique, the authors reinforce several important themes throughout the volume: statistics in these areas are often widely inaccurate, manipulated by political actors, and go unchallenged.

Throughout the volume, the contributors reinforce the point that statistics should not drive policy in these issue areas because it is nearly impossible to obtain reliable data. Victims of human trafficking are not known to governments until they obtain freedom and tell their stories. Because of the moral stigma associated with sex work, many who gain freedom do not come forward. In the end, as Kay Warren argues in her contribution, reports on human trafficking are based more on national reputation than real evidence. Similarly, illicit trades, because of their illicitness, are nearly impossible to measure effectively. As Andreas points out in his piece, the true extent of the global market in such areas as counterfeit items, wildlife, and cocaine is simply not known, making any data questionable. Because of this, high profile seizures are touted as successes, while they may simply be the natural result of an increase in overall trade. Conflict statistics are equally prone to inaccuracy due to the logistical issues associated with collecting reliable data in war-torn areas. Thus, it is not surprising that the statistics used in these cases often vary dramatically based on the source and fluctuate widely over time. In sum, the contributions stress that much of what we want to know is simply unknowable, and that basing policies on faulty data is not only irresponsible, but may lead to bad policy.

The challenges in collecting data on these issues also make confirming or refuting statistics used in the policy arena extremely difficult. The result is that actors manipulate numbers or selectively choose statistics for political objectives. For example, in their article, John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond point out the politics behind analysis of the conflict in Darfur. The 2004 U.S. State Department–led, and meticulously conducted, Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) caused Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and President George W. Bush to declare that "genocide" was occurring in Darfur, and estimates based on the data were as high as 300,000 to 400,000 dead. Yet shortly thereafter, the State Department, by that time led by Condoleezza Rice, ceased relying on ADS data, refused to reaffirm that genocide was occurring, and presented data from a new report claiming as few as 60,000 deaths in the conflict. Another such example is illustrated by Greenhill in her piece, where she points out that the U.S. and UN examined identical satellite footage, yet their estimates of Rwandan refugees in Zaire in the mid-1990s were nearly 750,000 apart. While the volume is most often focused on (and critical of) the use of numbers in U.S. policy making, examples from cases as far ranging as Israel and Bosnia demonstrate that this is a universal problem. Where data is imprecise, powerful states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations will seek to champion those numbers that best support their goals.

Despite the inaccuracy of statistics on crime and conflict, and their political manipulation, the volume highlights the vigor with which we still cling to numbers. The media often cites statistics without questioning their source or validity. Governments determine important policies based on vague estimates applied to arbitrary ranking systems. To their credit, the contributors also criticize academics, including themselves, for treating statistics as reliable facts simply because they are found in a government or organization's report.

After reading the book, one gets the sense that perhaps the adage should be modified to say that a number is worth a thousand words. And in the end, it is difficult to see this changing. The volume is wanting on this respect. It spends a great deal of space tearing down the use of numbers (indeed, by the middle, the chapters already felt repetitive), but it never presents a solution. The book's main contribution is to serve as a caution to those in the policy making arena to be vigilant in interpreting statistics on crime and conflict. But in the end, given the power of numbers to shape opinion, statistics—whether accurate or not—will continue to drive policy.